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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PATRICIA J. SMUIN, * 
• 
Plaintiff, Appellee * 
and Cross-Appellant, * Case No. 900483-CA 
• 
vs. * 
FLOYD R. SMUIN, * 
• 
Defendant, Appellant, * Argument Priority 
and Cross-Appellee. * Classification No. 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated §78-2A-3(2)(h). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is taken from a final judgment entered by 
the Honorable Judge Dennis L. Draney, Eighth Judicial 
District Court, relative to a divorce proceeding entered 
August 22, 1990. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review in this 
appeal: 
1. Did the court correctly compute Plaintiff's alimony 
when it took into consideration that both parties worked and 
contributed to their life style, that Defendant has a 
substantial net income while Plaintiff is unable to work 
and her net income from disability payment is minimal in 
comparison. 
2. Did the court properly award permanent alimony to 
Plaintiff since there were no facts adduced at trial 
indicating any likelihood that Plaintiff, given her age and 
disabilities, has any potential to increase her income in 
the future. 
3. Did the trial court properly award health insurance 
to the Plaintiff in view of her severe and permanent 
disability and in view of the availability of insurance 
through Defendant's employment. 
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
awarding the full amount of Defendant's retirement plan 
funds to Defendant in exchange for payment of one half of 
the marital debt of the parties without verifying the value 
of Defendant's retirement funds and without entering a 
2 
qualified domestic relations order, when facts indicated 
that Defendant's retirement funds and property might triple 
the amount of the marital debt and accrued in large part 
during the marriage of the parties. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
29 U.S.C.A. §1056(d) (West Supp. 1991) 19 
26 U.S.C.A. §414(p) (West Supp. 1991) 16 
26 U.S.C.A. &4980B (West Supp. 1991) 16 
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(3) (1953 as amended). 1 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Proceedings Below 
On November 24, 1989, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-
Appellant Patricia Smuin (hereinafter "Plaintiff") filed a 
Complaint for Divorce claiming irreconcilable differences 
between the parties. Plaintiff requested among other things 
alimony; release from liability for the marital debts of the 
parties; medical and dental health insurance as available 
through the employment of Defendant-Appellant and Cross-
Appellee Floyd R. Smuin (hereinafter Defendant); and a 
qualified domestic relations order to facilitate an award to 
Plaintiff of one half of Defendant's retirement and profit-
sharing plans. (R. 1) 
Course of the Proceedings 
Following a bench trial on May 30, 1991, Honorable 
Dennis L. Draney of the Eighth Judicial District Court 
granted Plaintiff a divorce. On June 11, 1990, Defendant 
filed an Objection to the Court's Decision which was not 
designated as a Motion under Rules 50(a) and (b), 52(b) or 
59. On August 10, 1990, Plaintiff filed a Response to 
Defendant's Objection to Court's Decision. On August 27, 
1990, Defendant filed a Request for Ruling on his Objection 
to Court's Decision. 
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On August 22, 1990, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Decree of Divorce were signed and entered by the 
trial court. On August 23, 1990, the Court entered a Ruling 
on Defendant's Objection to Court's Decision. 
On September 5, 1990, Plaintiff filed a Verified 
Petition for Order to Show Cause for enforcement of the 
court's decr€*e because Defendant had not paid any alimony or 
insurance premiums, had threatened Plaintiff, and had not 
allowed Plaintiff to collect her personal belongings as 
previously agreed. On September 25, 1990, a hearing was 
held on the Order to Show Cause theretofore issued and the 
court entered its ruling for immediate enforcement of the 
decree. On September 28, 1990, a Notice of Appeal was filed 
by Defendant. On September 19, 1990, Plaintiff filed a 
Notice of Cross-Appeal. 
Disposition in the Court Below 
Pursuant to the decree of August 22, 1990, the court 
granted Plaintiff alimony in the amount of $400.00 per month 
to be paid by Defendant. The court chose not to limit this 
alimony to a definite period. (R. 48). The court further 
decreed that Defendant should pay approximately $130.00 per 
month (Tr. 99 L. 3-11) for the extended benefits of 
Defendant's health insurance coverage through his employment 
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covering his wife under the COBRA provisions. The marital 
debts of approximately $36,000.00 were to be paid by 
Defendant in exchange for which the Defendant was to obtain 
any and all interest he might have in the profit-sharing and 
retirement plans held through his employer. (R. 48). 
Plaintiff was awarded the 1975 Buick free and clear, 
while Defendant was awarded the 1973 trailer free and clear. 
The court also ordered that Defendant keep the 1987 Cadillac 
together with the indebtedness of $12,000.00 thereon. The 
contemporary award of personal property was confirmed. (R. 
48). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the time that the parties were married on August 6, 
1975, (Tr. 16 L. 19), Plaintiff had one fifteen year old son 
living with her from a previous marriage, and the recently 
widowed Defendant had his three children living with him. 
(Tr. 17 L. 15-25), Tr. 18 L. 1-12). Plaintiff took 
temporary leave from her full-time employment to help with 
the children and the home. (Tr. 19 L. 2-16, Tr. 40 L. 11-
25) . 
In 1981, increasing problems between the parties and 
with the children compelled the Plaintiff to move out of the 
home. (Tr 26 L. 20-25, Tr. 39 L. 16-19). Plaintiff lived 
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apart in a trailer that she purchased through her employment 
and continued to support herself and her son. (Tr. 27 L. 1-
13). The parties achieved at least partial reconciliation 
and continued their marital relationship, still holding 
themselves out to the community as husband and wife: they 
consistently dined, vacationed and weekended together; they 
named each other as beneficiaries in health and life 
insurance policies; they owned checking accounts and 
vehicles jointly; and they had physical marital 
relationships. (Tr. 28 - Tr. 35 L. 1), (Tr. 89 L. 9 - Tr. 
90 L. 15). 
In 1983, the parties entered into a children's clothing 
store business together. (Tr. 34 - Tr. 35 L. 1). The 
Plaintiff agreed albeit reluctantly that she would take on 
the management of the store. Defendant agreed to use part 
of the equity on the home that he owned prior to the 
marriage of the parties to finance the venture. (Tr. 35 L. 
21 - Tr. 36 L. 7). When the business failed within a year. 
Defendant blamed Plaintiff, even though business was 
depressed all over Uintah County because of the general 
recession and the collapse of oil-shale enterprises. (Tr. 
83 L. 16 - Tr. 34 L. 1). 
Subsequent to the failure of their business, the 
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parties continued in their separate employments and separate 
homes until May 15, 1988, when Plaintiff moved back with the 
Defendant. On June 27, 1988, she suffered from a brain 
aneurysm and was hospitalized. (Tr. 80 L. 5-9, Tr. 44 L. 5 
- L. 26). Plaintiff has been completely disabled since 
then. (Tr. 51 L. 23 - Tr. 52 L. 3)-
On February 16, 1989, Plaintiff had surgery on her 
remaining aneurysms and was cautioned to avoid all even 
slight trauma to the head. Defendant also was cautioned. 
(Tr. 45 L. 8 - Tr. 46 L. 8). On July 3, 1989, Plaintiff 
suffered additional damage, including double vision, 
confused thinking, lack of bladder control, and body 
numbness, consequent to a bump on her head. Plaintiff 
alleges that Defendant intentionally caused the bump. 
(Tr. 69 L. 7 - L. 18, Tr. 45 L. 11 - Tr. 48 L. 18). 
After this further deterioration in Plaintiff's 
condition and at Defendant's insistence, Plaintiff filed for 
divorce in November of 1989. Defendant took Plaintiff to 
file pro se in order to save money. (Tr. 61 L. 15 - Tr. 62 
L. 19). 
Plaintiff presently receives $427.00 monthly in Social 
Security Disability income. (Tr. 51 L. 23 - Tr. 52 L. 3). 
Defendant's Financial Statement of April, 1990, indicates a 
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gross income of $3,725.00 monthly. Testimony adduced at 
trial showed that upon retirement Defendant will receive at 
least $1,079.33 per month from Chevron and $268.33 from 
Stauffer's. (Tr. 87 L. 10 - 17). Additionally, a fully 
vested annuity fund from Defendant's present employer exists 
which was not discussed at trial, with a deferred value of 
$334.00 as calculated in April of 1983. (Defendant's 
Exhibit 8). Furthermore, all funds available to Defendant 
upon retirement through Social Security which would accrue 
in addition to the above sums were not mentioned by counsel 
or by the court. 
Preliminary calculations as presented at trial revealed 
the value of Defendant's retirement fund as approximately 
between $80,000.00 and $100,000.00. Debt of the marriage, 
including the approximate $12,000.00 owed on the 1987 El 
Dorado Cadillac, totalled approximately $47,000.00. 
(Tr. 82 L. 1 - L. 16, Defendant's Exhibits 1 - 2 ) . 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Awarding Plaintiff $400.00 in monthly alimony payments 
unlimited by any definite period was properly within the 
trial court's discretion and was an equitable determination 
given the facts and circumstances of the present case. 
Similarly, the award of health insurance to Plaintiff should 
be confirmed. A trial court has considerable discretion in 
adjusting financial and property interests of parties, and 
the Court of Appeals will not disturb the lower court's 
decision unless it is clearly an abuse of discretion. 
The lower court's decision allowing Defendant the right 
to all the proceeds from his retirement and profit-sharing 
funds in exchange for Defendant's responsibility for the 
full mortgage debt should be remanded so that a qualified 
domestic relations order be entered and a proper 
determination be made of the amount of money represented by 
one half of Defendant's retirement benefits earned during 
the course of the marriage. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN COMPUTING PLAINTIFF'S 
PERMANENT ALIMONY AWARD. 
A. The Lower Court correctly computed alimony when it 
took into account among other things the parties' relative 
incomes and the disability of the Plaintiff. 
It is settled in Utah that a divorce court has 
considerable discretion in adjusting financial and property 
interests of the parties, and that the Court of Appeals will 
not disturb a Court's decision unless it is clearly unjust 
or a clear abuse of discretion. Smith v. Smith, 751 P.2d 
1149, 1151 (Utah App. 1988); Gill v. Gill, 718 P.2d 779, 780 
(Utah 1986); Pope v. Pope, 589 P.2d 752, 753 (Utah 1978). 
In awarding alimony, the trial court must consider 
three factors: (1) the financial condition and need of the 
receiving spouse; (2), the ability of the receiving spouse 
to produce sufficient income for him or herself; (3) the 
ability of the responding spouse to provide support. 
Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 90 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989); Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). 
The lower court calculated Plaintiff's alimony award 
equitably taking into consideration the relative incomes of 
the parties and the future earning potential of the 
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Defendant as well as the lack of earning potential of the 
Plaintiff. (R. 4). Plaintiff's gross and net monthly income 
is $427.00 from Social Security disability income. (Tr. 51 
L. 23). From this Plaintiff must pay rent and other monthly 
expenses including medical prescriptions totaling $892.75. 
(Tr. 58 L. 23). 
Defendant's gross monthly income is $3,725.00 with a 
net income of $2,620.38 (Defendant's Financial Statement). 
Defendant's calculations for monthly expenses of $1,860.43 
include the full debt assigned to him by the court, part of 
which is a payment in lieu of rent for the equity of his 
home in the amount of $476.55, and part of which is the debt 
on the 1987 Cadillac bought by and awarded to him. (Tr. 91 
L. 3-21, Defendant's Exhibit 1, Tr. 81 L. 1-19). 
Due to Plaintiff's total and permanent disability as 
adjudged by the Social Security Administration, (R. 49 L. 1-
5), it is not likely that she will be able to increase her 
present income in the future. If Plaintiff were to increase 
her income substantially, the lower court's decision would 
not prevent an appropriate modification at that time. 
Throckmorton, 767 P.2d at 123. 
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B. The court properly considered the standard of 
living/ the quality and the length of the marriage to arrive 
at an equitable result. 
The ultimate test of an alimony award is whether the 
party receiving alimony will be able to support him or 
herself as nearly as possible at the standard of living 
enjoyed during the marriage. Schindler, 77 6 P.2d at 90. 
Testimony adduced at trial confirms that the alimony 
award allows Plaintiff merely to subsist at minimum levels 
and not to enjoy the pre-divorce standard of living. In 
contrast, Defendant will continue to enjoy his pre-divorce 
life, and probably will continue to improve it. (R. 63 L. 
24 - R. 65 L. 20). Thus the alimony award represents a 
minimum amount due the Plaintiff and is by no means 
inequitable to the Defendant. 
Contribution to the health and quality of the marriage 
as well as circumstances of the parties upon divorce 
constitute legitimate considerations of the trial court in 
its arrival at an equitable alimony award. Burt v. Burt, 
799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
In his brief, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's 
alleged lack of contribution to the marriage renders the 
alimony award inequitable. Defendant even mentions that he 
made a few payments on Plaintiff's car that she brought into 
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the marriage, an allegation first offered in his brief, 
totally unsupported by the record, and intended to bolster 
his premise that since Plaintiff contributed nothing to the 
marriage it would be inequitable to award her alimony. 
(Brief of Appellant at 5, but see Tr. 20 L. 9-11, Tr. 23-
25) . 
However, the facts adduced at trial reveal Plaintiff's 
considerable contributions to the marriage. Plaintiff 
contributed economically: through employment, through labor 
and skill in management of the business venture entered into 
by the parties, through inheritance invested in the expenses 
of the marriage, and through extensive personal property 
brought into the marriage. (Tr. 20 - Tr. 26, Tr. 96 L. 13-
23). 
Plaintiff also contributed emotionally and socially to 
the relationship, first by taking responsibility for 
Defendant's home and children, including their medical and 
educational needs. (Tr. 26, Tr. 39 L. 3 - Tr. 40 L. 25). 
Later, Plaintiff continued to contribute to the marriage by 
living and supporting herself and her son separately, thus 
relieving some of the tensions in the household: the parties 
still spent most of their time together, dining, weekending, 
vacationing, and sustaining marital relationships together. 
14 
(Tr. 28-35 L. 1, Tr. 89 L. 9 - Tr. 90 L. 15). 
Defendant also claims that the years when the parties 
were not living together should not be "counted" as part of 
their marriage. (Brief of Appellant at 12-13). His further 
assertion that he "took Plaintiff back" after her aneurysms 
attacks (Brief of Appellant at 11-12) is patently false and 
unsupported by the record, as she returned to live with him 
approximately one month before her first attack, and was 
forced into divorce soon thereafter. (Tr. 80 L. 5-9, Tr. 44 
L. 5 - L. 26, Tr. 61 L. 15 - Tr. 62 L. 19). 
In any event, the trial court has wide discretion to 
evaluate the marital estate as of the date of the 
termination of the marriage, even if the parties have been 
separated. Alexander v. Alexander, 737 P.2d 221, 224 (Utah 
1987). Additionally, the trial court has discretion even to 
take into consideration the premarital assets of a party 
under appropriate circumstances to achieve an equitable 
alimony and property settlement award. Noble v. Noble, 761 
P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988). 
In the present case, the trial court's computation of 
alimony and its permanent assignment are equitably tailored 
to both parties' circumstances. Therefore the trial court's 
alimony award should be affirmed. 
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II. THE COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED HEALTH INSURANCE BENEFITS 
TO PLAINTIFF ASIDE AND APART FROM ALIMONY. 
It has been argued above that the alimony award 
represents a minimum equitable award for Plaintiff, given 
her total inability to meet basic expenses without said 
award and given the ability of the Defendant to provide said 
award. 
The alimony award meets this minimum standard only 
because of the additional award of health insurance which 
enables Plaintiff to sustain her medical treatments without 
sinking to the abject poverty required for total Medicaid 
coverage. (Tr. 65L. 21-Tr. 65L. 5). COBRA provisions 
in federal law facilitate continuing coverage for Plaintiff 
under Defendant's group policy, with Defendant remaining 
responsible for only 50% of the premium. See 26 U.S.C.A. 
4980B (West Supp. 1991). 
The premium required to be paid by the Defendant was 
approximately $130.00 per month at the time of trial. (Tr. 
99 L. 3-8). Any additional premium amount would be 
accompanied by Defendant's corresponding cost of living 
raise. 
The trial court decided correctly that health benefits 
of all awards are essential to avoid Plaintiff's complete 
poverty and dependence on the state. Therefore Plaintiff's 
16 
health benefit award should be affirmed. 
III. THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DEFENDANT ALL THE 
RETIREMENT AND EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS AS COMPENSATION FOR 
DEFENDANT RETAINING RESPONSIBILITY TO PAY THE MORTGAGE DEBT 
OF THE PARTIES. 
A. The court failed to perform the required accounting 
of sums available to Defendant through retirement and 
employment benefits earned during the course of the marriage 
of the parties. 
In Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988), the 
Utah Supreme Court required the trial court to consider the 
value of the husband's retirement and employment accounts 
and to reapportion property distribution to offset the 
resulting values. The Gardner court stated that valuation 
of such accounts "should be sufficiently detailed and 
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by 
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached." Id. at 1078. See also Woodward v. Woodward, 656 
P.2d 431, 432 (Utah 1982); and see, Enqlert v. Enqlert, 576 
P.2d 1274, 1276 (1978) . 
In the instant case, the court below failed to 
determine the value of Defendant's retirement earned during 
the course of the marriage as required by Gardner. It was 
only "estimated" at trial that Defendant's retirement funds 
were valued at between $80,000.00 and $100,000.00. No 
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findings were made as to the present value of the vested and 
unvested stock options of Defendant. Similarly, no findings 
as to the vested and unvested annuity or as to the Social 
Security income to be available to Defendant were made. 
Normally, Plaintiff should have been awarded a value 
represented by retirement benefits times one half of the 
fraction represented by the years of the marriage over the 
years that Defendant earned the benefits. See Woodward, 656 
P.2d at 433-34. 
The lower court determined it an equitable division of 
responsibilities and rights to hold Defendant fully and not 
one half liable for the mortgage debt but to allow Defendant 
any and all proceeds from his retirement accounts earned 
during the marriage. 
Thus Plaintiff gives up all interest in accounts 
probably in excess of $100,000.00 in exchange for relief 
from one half of a $36,000.00 mortgage debt. (Defendant's 
Exhibit 15, 3-4). The lower court failed consider the result 
and to determine the monetary values in a "sufficiently 
detailed" manner as required by Gardner. Therefore the 
present case should be remanded for the appropriate 
calculations, and for the requisite reapportionment of 
property interests in Defendant's retirement accounts. 
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B. The* trial court did not enter a qualified domestic 
order as requested by the Plaintiff and as proper under the 
facts of this case. 
29 U.S.C. §1056 et seq. outlines the procedure by which 
a domestic relations order may qualify a former spouse as 
alternate payee to certain of the accrued benefits before or 
upon the payee's retirement. See also,, 26 U.S.C. §414(p). 
In her Complaint, Plaintiff requested that the court below 
enter a qualified domestic relations order for appropriate 
benefits in order to assure herself of a secure and 
dependable source of income in light of her severe and 
permanent mental and physical disabilities. 
Defendant has demonstrated his unwillingness to provide 
for Plaintiff in her disabled condition. The marriage 
survived as long as Plaintiff fully provided for herself 
financially while continuing to sustain the marriage 
emotionally and socially. In the latter years of the 
marriage, Plaintiff even bought her own trailer and lived 
separately so as to relieve tensions with stepchildren and 
so as to avoid violent confrontations with the Defendant. 
(Tr. 25). 
When the stepchildren problems began to diminish upon 
their gradual emancipation, Plaintiff again attempted to 
live with Defendant; but soon after her cataclysmic brain 
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damage, Defendant took her to file for divorce pro se to 
avoid expense. Defendant could not deal with being on the 
giving end of the relationship even during her period of 
disability. See supra at 7. 
Since the divorce, Plaintiff has had to return to court 
on an Order to Show Cause because Defendant did not pay 
court ordered alimony and health insurance premiums. See 
supra at 5. 
Thus a qualified domestic relations order would aid 
Plaintiff by making her a direct payee of benefits to which 
she is entitled. She would not have to depend upon 
Defendant totally in order to receive necessary funds. 
Therefore the case should be remanded for a proper 
determination of those benefits whether vested or not vested 
which are appropriately distributed through a qualified 
domestic relations order. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons outlined above, the trial court's 
awards of alimony and health insurance should be affirmed. 
The case should be remanded for the limited purpose of 
valuation and distribution of property, with provision for 
entering a qualified domestic relations order if appropriate 
under the facts adduced on remand. 
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DATED t h i s I k day of J V L t / ^ ^ 1991 \Q> __<-£ 
Respectfullry~Nsubmitted, 
UTAH^EGAL "SERVICES, Inc . 
By Jferri .Hill 
Attorney/for Appellant-Cross-Appellee 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I, Jerri Hill, attorney tor Appellee-Cross-Appellant, 
hereby certify that on the \ y day of J^ ./-*—^  1991, I 
mailed four true and correct copies of the above Brief of 
Appellant-Cross-Appellee, first class postage prepaid, to: 
ROBERT M. McCRAE, Attorney at Law 
McCRAE & DeLAND 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
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ALEXANDER v. ALEXAWDER 
Qte«s737 T2d 221 (Utah 1987) 
any work stoppage caused by a strike de- ited by law. ATnerican 
Utah 221 
prives the workers of benefits. When the 
employer violates the labor laws, the state 
will subsidize the subsequent strike, even 
though the strike stops all work. 
The employees argue that they qualify 
for this exception because the strike was 
caused by Greyhound's violation of federal 
labor laws. The employees cite a variety 
of company activities which they believe 
are unfair labor practices under section 8(a) 
of the National Labor Relations Act,^in-
cluding threats of loss of employment or 
benefits, picket line surveillance, and cir-
cumvention of the collective bargaining 
agreement. 
[7] Greyhound disputes this claim in 
three ways. It first argues that the unfair 
labor provisions relied on by claimants are 
not laws "pertaining to hours, wages, or 
other conditions of work," as those terms 
are used in section 35-4-5(dXl) of the Code, 
and that those are the only violations that 
can trigger the operation of that section. 
Second, Greyhound contends that even if% 
claimants' alleged violations do fall within 
section 35-4-5(dXl), the National Labor Re-
lations Board has exclusive and preemptive 
jurisdiction to decide whether an employer 
has committed an unfair labor practice un-
der federal law. Lastly, Greyhound argues 
that it did not, in fact, commit the alleged 
unfair labor practices. We find that the 
alleged violations do not relate to "hours, 
wages, or other conditions of work"; there-
fore, we need not reach Greyhound's sec-
ond and third contentions. 
[8] Most of Greyhound's alleged labor 
law violations pertain to the bargaining 
process. Only the alleged imposition of 
Greyhound's October 31st offer with a re-
troactivity provision could be said to directr 
ly affect wages, hours, or conditions of 
work. The employer's implementation of 
its proposals after negotiations have 
reached an impasse, however, is not prohib-
i t Section 8(a) of the National Labor Relations 
Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 15S(a) (1982), pro-
vides in pertinent part: 
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for 
an employer— 
Federation of 
Television & Radio Artists v. N.L.R.B., 
395 F.2d 622, 624 (D.C.Cir.1968). We 
therefore conclude that section 35~4-5(dXl) 
has not been triggered here. 
In this case, Greyhound suffered a work 
stoppage that existed because of a strike. 
The strike was not a result of Greyhound's 
nonconformance with the law, but was a 
voluntary action taken by the employees in 
the course of negotiating a new contract. 
The decision of the Board is therefore af-
firmed. 
HALL, CJ., STEWART, Associate 
CJ., and HOWE and DURHAM, JJ., 
concur. 
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Stephen Noma ALEXANDER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v, 
Diane Jean ALEXANDER, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 20841. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 28, 1987. 
Decree of divorce was entered in the 
District Court, Second Judicial District, 
Douylas L. Cornaby, J., and husband ap-
pealedThe Supreme Court, Durham, J., 
held that (1) awarding custody of young-
est child to wife, thereby separating young-
est child from three older siblings, who 
lived with husband, was not abuse of trial 
court's discretion; (2) refusal to reduce val-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed in Section 157 of this ^tle; 
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the 
representatives of his employees, subject to 
the provisions of Section 159(a) of this title. 
* , 01 nusDand s profit-sharing plan to ac-
count for income tax liability that could be 
imposed in future was not abuse of trial 
court's discretion; and (3) including in eval-
uation of marital estate contributions hus-
band made to profit-sharing plan after wife 
left marital home but before marriage was 
terminated was not abuse of trial court's 
discretion. 
Affirmed. 
Howe, J., filed concurring opinion. 
1. Divorce «=»301 
Task of determining best interest of 
child in custody dispute was for trial judge, 
who had opportunity to personally observe 
and evaluate witnesses. 
2. Infants «=>19.3(7) 
Custody determination of trial judge 
will not be overruled where trial judge 
exercised his discretion in accord with stan-
dards set by Supreme Court 
3. Divorce <*=>301 
Evidence that wife had been primary 
care-giver for youngest child and planned 
to live with child's grandmother in situation 
in which grandmother would share child-
care duties and evidence suggesting that 
husband ran a dirty, disorganized house-
hold and had no firm plans for care of child 
while he worked were sufficient to support 
award of custody of youngest child to wife. 
4. Divorce <*=>298(4) 
Fact that wife had abandoned husband 
did not preclude trial court from awarding 
custody of youngest child to wife in divorce 
action. U.C.A.1953, 30-2-10. 
15. Divorce «=>296 
Awarding custody of youngest child to 
wife, thereby separating youngest child 
from three older siblings, who lived with 
husband, was not abuse of trial court's 
discretion in divorce action; there was ten 
and one-half-year gap between parties' last 
two children, wife was primary care-giver 
for youngest child and there was evidence 
that husband was unable to provide home 
environment suitable for youngest child. 
<J. Parent and Child *=*2(3) 
Maternal preference is impermissible 
in custody proceeding. 
7. Divorce «=>298(1) 
Isolated statement by trial judge, to 
effect that wife lost custody of three older 
children when she left marital home, was 
insufficient to show that award of custody 
of youngest child to wife was based on 
improper maternal preference. 
8. Divorce «=»252.4 
Property division which required hus-
band to pay marital debts was not abuse of 
trial court's discretion in divorcfc-actian. 
9. Divorce <3=>253(3) 
Trial court's refusal to reduce present 
value of husband's profit-sharing plan "to 
account for income tax liability that could 
bejmposed in the future was not abuse of 
trial court's discretion in determiningprop-
erty division in divorce action. 
10. Divorce <s=>252.3(4) 
Including contribution husband made 
to^Trofit-sharing plan after wife left mari-
tal home but before marriage was termi-
nated was not abuse of trial court's discre-
tion in valuing marital estate in divorce 
action. 
William H. Lindsley, for plaintiff and ap-
pellant 
James B. Hanks, for defendant and re-
spondent 
DURHAM, Justice: 
Plaintiff Stephen Norris Alexander ap-
peals from a decree of divorce awarding 
defendant Diane Jean Alexander custody 
of their youngest child. 
Plaintiff and defendant were married in 
Arizona in 1968. At the time of the mar-
riage, defendant was sixteen years old and 
pregnant. The parties had two more chil-
dren within the first three and a half years 
of their marriage, making defendant the 
mother of three preschoolers at the age of 
nineteen. After a ten and a half-year hia-
tus, the parties' fourth and final child was 
born. 
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[5] Plaintiffs claim that it was improp-
er to separate the children is likewise with-
out merit "While it is true that a child 
custody award which keeps all the children 
of the marriage united is generally pre-
ferred to one which divides them between 
the parents, that preference is not binding 
on the face of considerations dictating a 
contrary course of action." Jorgensen v. 
Jorgensen, 599 P.2d 510, 512 (Utah 1979); 
see also Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 120 
(Utah 1986). In this case, we think the ten 
and a half-year gap between the parties' 
last two children, defendant's role as pri-
mary care-giver, and plaintiffs inability to 
provide a home environment suitable for a 
young child are considerations that were 
properly used to award defendant custody 
of the youngest child. We find no abuse of 
discretion. 
[6,7] Plaintiff also asserts that the trial 
court was motivated by an improper prefer-
ence for the mother because of the age of 
the youngest child. We agree with plain-
tiff that a maternal preference is impermis-
sible. Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 
1986). Plaintiff, however, has offered us 
no proof that such a preference operated 
here. As support for his claim, he cites 
only an isolated statement by the trial 
judge to the effect that defendant lost cus-
tody of the three older children when she 
left the marital home. Plaintiff asks us to 
reach too far to move from this remark to 
the conclusion that the trial court exercised 
an improper maternal preference. 
Property Division 
The trial court awarded defendant, who 
has only a tenth-grade education, no alimo-
ny, but gave her half of the marital estate 
and ordered plaintiff to pay the couple's 
outstanding debts in lieu of alimony. Nei-
ther party was awarded child support 
Plaintiff claims that it was error for the 
trial court to order him to pay the marital] 
debts and argues that the trial court erred 
in failing to reduce the value of a stock-
price-tied profit-sharing plan to account for 
tax liability and in including post-separa-
tion contributions to the plan in assessing 
its value. We find no error. 
[8] As long as a property division is 
made within the standards set by this 
Court, we will not disturb the trial judge's 
decision. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d at 1074; 
Burnham v. Burnham, 716 P.2d 781, 782 
(Utah 1986). We find the property division 
made by the trial court to be well within its 
discretion. 
This Court endows the court's adjust-
ment of the financial interests of the 
parties with a presumption of validity 
and does not review their values absent a 
clear abuse of discretion — We do not 
lightly disturb property divisions made 
by the trial court and uphold its decision 
except where to do so would work a 
manifest injustice or inequity. 
Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d at 119 (citations 
omitted); see Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 
1201 (Utah 1983). 
[9,10] We also decline to disturb the 
trial court's valuation of the profit-sharing 
plan. The trial court did not reduce the 
present value of the plan to account for 
income tax liability that could be imposed 
in the future. Plaintiff has not argued and 
it does not appear that the valuation of the 
profit-sharing plan was itself a taxable 
event; therefore, we do not think the trial 
court's refusal to speculate about hypothet-
ical future consequences was an abuse of 
discretion. See Gilbert v. Gilbert,.G2& P.2d 
1088, 1089 (Montl981) (affirming a proper-
ty division in which the trial judge did not 
adjust the market value of a retirement 
account in anticipation of future tax liabili-
/t^j~Plaintiff argues that contributions he 
'made to the profit-sharing plan after de-
fendant left the marital home but before 
the marriage was terminated i 
Tiiave been included in the maKt%l estate^ 
We disagree. Under appropriate cifeszn^ 
sjances. the trial court is wiffiihHfe^dis^nr" 
tion in evaluating the marital estate as of 
thgjlate the marriage is terminated. Jes-
person v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 
(Utah 1980). 
Affirmed. Costs to respondent 
HALL, CJ., STEWART, Associate 
CJ., and ZIMMERMAN, J., concur. 
1076 Utah 748 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
a somewhat similar instruction was harm-
less error. Furthermore, the property sto-
len was not fungible property which de-
fendant might have legitimately possessed. 
Rather, the checks were identified as prop-
erty belonging to others were shown to 
have been forged and would not legitimate-
ly have been in his possession under any 
circumstances. 
Affirmed. 
HALL, CJ., concurs. 
DURHAM, Justice (concurring 
separately): 
I concur in the majority opinion, but 
write separately to emphasize the obli-
gation of defense counsel to notify judges 
who have ruled on pretrial suppression is-
sues that defendants' objections to chal-
lenged evidence are reserved and not with-
drawn, thus alerting those judges to the 
possibility that trial evidence may affect 
the validity of earlier rulings. I agree that 
in this case there was an extensive hearing 
on defendant's motion to suppress, and it is 
quite clear from the record that defense 
counsel did not intend to waive any related 
evidentiary objections at trial. In fact, sev-
eral ambiguous references during trial to a 
"prior motion" may have referred to de-
fendant's pretrial motion to suppress. It is 
important, however, that trial judges be 
given the opportunity to review pretrial 
suppression rulings when and if there is 
any likelihood that they were erroneous. 
When the pretrial judge is also the trial 
judge, unlike the circumstance in State v. 
Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah 1983), this is 
easily accomplished by indicating on the 
record, either at the end of the pretrial 
hearing or at the trial outside the presence 
of the jury, that there is a continuing objec-
tion to the evidence challenged in the mo-
tion to suppress. 
HOWE, and ZIMMERMAN, JJ.f 
concur in the concurring opinion of 
DURHAM, J. 
Betty M. GARDNER, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
William James GARDNER, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 19246. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 4, 1988. 
Divorce decree was entered by the Sec-
ond District Court, Weber County, Ronald 
0. Hyde, J., and wife appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Stewart, Associate CJ., held 
that (1) trial court was required to value 
husband's retirement account; (2) wife was 
entitled to findings in support of denial of 
her request for portion of husband's medi-
cal assets; (3) regardless of whether evalu-
ation and distribution of a professional de-
gree or professional practice is ever appro-
priate, it was inappropriate in the present 
case where marriage was of long duration 
and present earnings and business assets 
provided a more accurate measure of the 
true worth of wife's investment in hus-
band's degree; and (4) alimony award was 
insufficient and inequitable. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Howe, J., filed opinion concurring and 
dissenting. 
1. Divorce *=»286(5) 
Though the Supreme Court may modi-
fy decisions of trial court, trial^ourt^JP* 
portionment of marital property will^gl^ 
disturbed unless it is clearly unjust^gLl 
clear abuse of discretion. 
2. Divorce «=»252.3(4) 
Marital property includes pension fund 
or insurance, but dividing retirement or 
pension funds is not necessarily consisten 
with principles of equitable distribution* 
all cases, and providing for payments w 
GARDNER v. GARDNER Utah 1077 
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payout begins should be employed only m would qualify for social security payments 
rare instances. only as an "ex-wife married over 20 years." 
3. Divorce <3=>252.3(4) 
* Trial court, in apportioning marital 
property upon divorce, was required to at 
least consider the value of the husband's 
retirement account, and alternatives avail-
able for taking that value into account 
would include requiring husband to pay 
half of net present value to wife in annual 
jnstallmentsJ or reapportioning property 
distribution to offset that value. 
£ ! - • 
4.-Divorce <3=*253(4) 
p& Wife was entitled to finding in support 
ofctienial of her request for a portion of the 
assets of husband's medical assets, and it 
was error to refuse to place present value 
fijereon on the ground that the assets were 
futuristic." 
5? Divorce <s=>252.3(l) 
Goodwill is properly subject to eq-
uitable distribution upon divorce. 
6. Divorce e=»252.3(l) 
Regardless of whether professional de-
gree and professional practice may in ap-
propriate cases constitute marital property 
subject to evaluation and distribution upon 
i^vorce, wife's request for property inter-
est in husband's medical degree was inap-
propriate where the marriage was of long 
juration and present earnings and business 
assets provided a more accurate measure 
[ofjhe true worth of the wife's investment 
m h^er husband's degree. 
7." Divorce «=>237 
^Alimony award should, after marriage 
^Tlong duration and to the extent possible7 
Equalize the parties' respective standards 
Lo l^mng and maintain them at a level as 
[dose ^ Tbossible to the standard of living 
fajoyed during the marriage. 
Wvorce *»240(2) 
_ "Alimony award of $1,200 per month 
feffl husband's retirement and $600 per 
l&guth thereafter was an abuse of discre-
Jgg^where husband was a physician with 
SJgjagB of $6,000 per month, wife had not 
^employed for 30 years, husband had 
ltantial retirement assets, and wife 
9. Divorce <3=*225 
There was no error in divorce case in 
failing to award attorney fees to wife, 
where portion of property award was for 
purpose of assisting wife to pay attorney 
and no showing was made in trial as to the 
nature and amount of fees. 
Pete N. Vlahos, Ogden, for plaintiff and 
appellant 
C. Gerald Parker, Ogden, for defendant 
and respondent. 
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff Betty Gardner appeals from a 
decree awarding alimony and attorney fees 
in a divorce action she brought against her 
former husband, William Gardner. We re-
verse and remand for further considera-
tion. 
Mr. and Mrs. Gardner were married at 
Steels Tavern, Virginia, on April 17, 1950. 
No children were born to them, but the 
couple adopted two children who are now 
both adults. Early in the marriage, Mrs. 
Gardner worked full-time as a secretary 
while Mr. Gardner completed his medical 
training. Mr. Gardner also worked various 
jobs, and his parents provided support in 
the form of medical school tuition. Mrs. 
Gardner has not worked since 1958, when 
Mr. Gardner completed his medical train-
ing. Mr. Gardner is now employed as a 
general surgeon, earning $6,000 per month. 
While married, Mr. and Mrs. Gardner 
acquired substantial real and personal 
property. Their major asset was a farm, 
including a home and equipment located 
near Eden, Utah, worth between $246,000 
and $280,000. Other assets included Mr. 
Gardner's medical assets and retirement 
funds with an uncertain valuation of be-
tween $73,000 and $177.000; a contract for 
the sale of stock in the Ogden Clinic Investr 
ment Company; a certificate of deposit; 
household furniture, furnishings and fix-
tures; boats and automobiles; sporting 
equipment; and two horses and associated 
equipment At the time of divorce, the 
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couple's only outstanding debts were a 
first mortgage on the family home and a 
loan for the purchase of one automobile. 
The trial court ordered that the farm, 
home, and equipment be sold and the pro-
ceeds be divided equally. Until the farm 
was sold; Mrs. Gardner was entitled to its 
use, although she had to pay the mortgage, 
taxes, and insurance. The court also or-
dered that the motor vehicles and boats be 
sold and the proceeds divided equally, with 
the exception of one personal automobile 
for each party. The household furnishings 
and other items of personal property were 
divided roughly equally, according to per-
sonal need. Mr. Gardner was awarded his 
medical and business assets, including re-
tirement funds, except MRS. Gardner was 
awarded one-third of the proceeds from the 
sale of the Old Ogden Clinic building to pay 
her attorney fees. They were to share 
equally a money market certificate. The 
court granted Mrs. Gardner $1,200 per 
month aiimony, to be reduced to $600 per 
month following Mr. Gardner's retirement. 
Mrs. Gardner was also to have a claim for, 
$50,000 against Mr. Gardner's estate in the 
event that he predeceased her. 
Mrs. Gardner asks this Court to reverse 
the judgment of the lower court She cites 
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 
(Utah 1982), for the proposition that she 
has a spousal right to an equitable distribu-
tion of Mr. Gardner's retirement funds. 
She also asserts a property interest in his 
medical degree and business and claims 
that the alimony award was insufficient. 
Finally, she asks this Court for an award of 
attorney fees. 
In a divorce proceeding, the trial 
court should make a distribution of proper-
ty and income so that the parties may 
readjust their lives to their new circum-
stances as well as possible. Turner v. 
Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982); Mac-
Donald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 
P.2d 1066 (1951). Although this Court may 
modify decisions of the trial court, its ap-
portionment of marital property will not be 
disturbed unless it is clearly unjust or a 
clear abuse of discretion. Turner, 649 
P.2d at 8. 
The trial court awarded Mr. Gardner his 
retirement account and medical assets 
without placing a present value on any of 
those assets. The trial court called both 
those types of assets "futuristic" and indi-
cated that their value would be utilized at 
retirement. The court did not attempt to 
resolve the differing valuations of the as-
sets and provided little explanation for the 
award to Mr. Gardner. 
Recently, in Acton v. Dehran, 737 P 2d 
996, 999 (Utah 1987), we noted: 
Failure of the trial court to make find-
ings on all material issueslTreversihfa 
error unless the facts in the record arq 
"clear, uncontroverted, and capable Qf 
supporting only a finding in favor of the 
judgment'' Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 
P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983). . . . The find-
ings of fact must show that the court's 
judgment or decree "follows logically 
from, and is supported by, the evidence." 
Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 
1986). The findings "should be suffi-
ciently detailed and include enough sub-
sidiary facts to disclose the steps by 
which the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue was reached." Rucker [v. 
Dalton], 598 P.2d [1336] at 1338 [Utah 
1979]. See also Mountain States Legal 
Foundation v. Public Service Commis-
sion, 636 P.2d 1047, 1051 (Utah 1981). 
The trial court's statement in its findings 
that the retirement account and Mr. Gard-
ner's medical assets are "futuristic" was 
apparently intended to mean that they 
could not be given a present value or 
should not for other reasons be taken into 
account. That, however, does not follow 
from the evidence presented at trial, nor is 
it supported by our cases. Regardless of 
how remote the full value of an assetj^jL 
still has pi^ser£value. The testimony ad-
duced at trial devoted to differing valua-
tions by the parties merited more precise 
findings. 
( f ^ In Woodward v. Woodward, 656 
P.2d at 432, wejrecognized that retirement 
benefits, whether vested or not, arejjorg. 
of deferred compensation wtachj^fggl? 
sjiouldjtTeast consider SvTie^yidmgi^ 
jtal assets. A right to deferred compete 
GARDNER 
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tion acquired during marriage, or that por-
tion of one's right to deferred compensa-
tion acquired during marriage, should not 
be entirely ignored in dividing assets, irre-
spective of when the vested funds are pay-
aEIe! Thus, marital property "encompass-
es all of the assets of every nature pos-
sessed by the parties, whenever obtained 
and from whatever source derived; and 
this includes any such pension fund or in-
surance." Englert v. Englert, 576 P.2d 
1274 (Utah 1978). 
However, an award of a part of a 
spouse's retirement funds may create sig-
nificant problems. In some instances, mar-
ital assets are sparse, income is low, and an 
award of an equitable share of retirement 
assets might work a substantial hardship. 
Courts have, however, awarded the value 
of the assets on a periodic payment plan 
and, in some instances, have provided for 
payments when payout begins. This alter-
native should be employed only in rare 
instances. In Woodward, the Court stated: 
Long-term and deferred sharing of finan-
cial interests are obviously too suscepti-
ble to continued strife and hostility, cir-
cumstances which our courts traditional-
ly strive to avoid to the greatest extent 
possible 
. . . [Wlhere other assets for equitable 
distribution are inadequate or lacking al-
together, or where no present value can 
be established and the parties are unable 
to reach agreement, resort must be had 
to a form of deferred distribution based 
upon fixed percentages. 
656 P.2d at 433 (quoting Kikkert v. Kik-
kert, 177 NJ.Super. 471, 478, 427 A.2d 76, 
79-80 (1981)). 
Obviously, dividing retirement or pension 
funds is not necessarily consistent with 
principles of equitable distribution in all 
caseB. The purpose of divorce is to end 
marriage and allow the parties to make as 
much of a clean break from each other as 
is reasonably possible. An award of de-
ferred compensation which ties a couple 
together long after divorce can frustrate 
.that objective. 
[tty) Nevertheless, the division of retire-
ment funds between two persons can be 
v. GARDNER Utah 1079 
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accomplished when necessary. For exam-
ple, in Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238 
(Utah App.1987), a physician was required 
to pay one-half the net present value of his 
retirement plan, $56,850, to his former wife 
in five annual installments. The court 
awarded present value of the share to be 
paid within five years to avoid "leaving the 
parties in a 'financial entanglement that 
would continue for approximately twenty 
or thirty years and would probably result 
in further court hearings and cause future 
animosity between the parties.'" Id. at 
241-42. Rayburn provides a possible al-
ternative for dealing with the value of the 
retirement account in this case. Because 
of the sizeable assets in this case, another 
alternative would be reapportionment of 
the property distribution to offset the value 
of the retirement account. 
In any event, it will be necessary on 
remand to determine the value of the re-
tirement account. The account has a 
present value of between $73,000 ftTlf* 
$177,000, and the Court should at least 
consider the value of the account in making 
the property distribution. 
Another alternative for the apportion-
ment of property lies in the trial court's 
discretion to award the entire value of a 
solely owned professional corporation to 
the husband. Dogu v. Dogu, 652 P.2d 1308 
(Utah 1982). In Dogu, the earning power 
of the corporation resulted entirely from 
Dr. Dogu's continuing ability to work; 
however, there were questions as to his 
ability to do so. The trial court awarded 
the wife savings certificates, bank ac-
counts, and stock to offset the present liq-
uid assets of the corporation (accounts re-
ceivable and bank accounts). The trial 
court did not attempt to value the future 
earnings potential of the corporation, pre-
sumably because of questions regarding 
the ability of Dr. Dogu to continue to gen-
erate income for the corporation. 
[4,5] The Ogden Clinic, of which Mr. 
Gardner is a member, is a well-entrenched 
institution, whose twenty-three members 
have banded together in a business orga-
nization. It is not likely to be highly sus-
ceptible to earnings interruptions because 
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of the ill health of one of its members. 
The Ogden Clinic is not entirely valueless. 
Mr. Gardner's share, using his own figures, 
is worth at least $3,826 (partnership $3,726, 
corporation $100). Mrs. Gardner's account-
ants value the business much higher. Nei-
ther gave consideration to the good will 
inherent in the professional clinic.1 Mrs. 
Gardner was entitled to findings in support 
of the denial of her request for a portion of 
those assets. Instead, the trial court dis-
posed of the medical assets in the same 
sentence in which it disposed of the retire-
ment account. 
The medical assets at issue here were not 
included in the retirement account, but the 
trial court seems to have assumed that 
they were one and the same. In any event, 
no findings of fact were made as to the 
value of the medical assets. The award to 
Mr. Gardner of his retirement funds and 
medical assets may be proper and eq-
uitable. However, we cannot adequately 
review the trial court's determinations on 
the basis of the sparse findings before us. 
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a 
valuation of the medical assets and retire-
ment accounts and reconsideration of the 
distribution of the marital property on the 
basis of those findings. 
In addition, Mrs. Gardner assets an eq-
uitable and legal property interest in the 
medical degree of her former spouse. 
Whether professional degrees and profes-
sional practice constitute marital property 
subject to valuation and distribution upon 
the dissolution of a marriage has been the 
subject of much debate in recent years, 
especially in the wake of decisions where 
such a valuation has been made. See, e.g., 
Inman v. Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 
1982); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N J. 488, 
1. A marriage may be analogized to a partner-
ship. Upon dissolution of the marital "partner-
ship," an equitable distribution should be based 
on consideration of all assets, not just those that 
survive the trip to the bottom of the balance 
sheet. Where appropriate, value may be given 
to that "something in business, which gives rea-
sonable expectancy of preference in the race of 
competition," commonly known as good will. 
Jackson v. Caldwell 18 Utah 2d 81, 85, 415 P.2d 
667, 670 (1966). 
The ability of a business to generate income 
from its continued patronage is commonly re-
453 A.2d 527 (1982); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 
66 N.Y.2d 576, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 489 N.E. 
2d 712 (1985). It has similarly been the 
subject of discussion in our Court of Ap-
peals. See Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 
238 (Utah App.1987); Petersen v. Petersen, 
737 P.2d 237 (Utah App.1987). 
One authority has argued that education-
al achievements are susceptible to valua-
tion,2 but there is judicial authority for the 
proposition that the value of an education 
does not fall within the common under-
standing of the concept of property: 
An educational degree, such as an 
M.B.A., is simply not encompassed even 
by the broad views of the concept of 
"property." It does not have an ex-
change value or any objective transfer-
able value on an open market. It is 
personal to the holder. It terminates on 
death of the holder and is not inheritable. 
It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, 
conveyed, or pledged. An advanced de-
gree is a cumulative product of many 
years of previous education, combined 
with diligence and hard work. It may 
not be acquired by the mere expenditure 
of money. It is simply an intellectual 
achievement that may potentially assist 
in the future acquisition of property. In 
our view, it has none of the attributes of 
property in the usual sense of that term. 
In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 
432, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978). See also Maho-
ney, 91 NJ. 488 at 496, 453 A.2d 527 at 
531. 
The cases which have refused to hold 
that professional degrees and practice con-
stitute marital property subject to valua-
tion and distribution have nonetheless as-
sessed and divided the value of the degree 
ferred to as good will. Good will is properly 
subject to equitable distribution upon divorce. 
See, e.g.f Dugan v. Dugan, 92 NJ. 423, 457 A.2d 
1 (1983); Matter of Marriage of Flecge, 91 Wash. 
2d 324, 588 P.2d 1136 (1979). But see The 
Treatment of Good Will in Divorce Proceedings, 
18 Fam.L.0. 213 (1984). 
2. See Fitzpatrick & Doucette. Can the Economic 
Value of an Education Really Be Measured?. 21 
J.Fam.L. 51 (1983). 
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or practice on the basis of other legal and 
equitable remedies. These cases follow a 
common fact pattern. Typically, the hus-
band is supported throughout a long gradu-
ate or professional program by the working 
wife, and the couple is divorced soon after 
graduation. In such cases, there are few 
marital assets to distribute, and the courts 
have considered other ways of compensat-
ing the spouse. In a limited number of 
cases, the courts focus on the educational 
degree or professional practice. See gener-
ally In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 
N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Mahoney, 91 NJ. 
488, 453 A.2d 527; Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847; 
O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 
489 N.E.2d 712; and Hubbard v. Hubbard, 
603 P.2d 747 (Okla.1979), for various theo-
ries of valuation. 
[6] We agree that an educational or 
professional degree is difficult to value and 
that such a valuation does not easily fit the 
common understanding of the character of 
property. However, at least in the present 
instance, we need not reach the question of 
whether such a valuation may ever take 
place. Sufficient assets distinguish this 
case from others in which equity and fair-
ness required another solution. Where, as 
here, the marriage is of long duration, 
present earnings and business assets pro-
vide a more accurate measure of the true 
worth of the wife's investment in her hus-
band's degree. The home, farm, automo-
biles, and other assets of approximately 
$500,000 allow for a divisible award be-
tween the Gardners. In a sense, Mrs. 
Gardner has realized benefits from the 
medical degree in the form of a greater 
property settlement and higher alimony. 
We find Mrs. Gardner's request for a prop-
erty interest in Mr. Gardner's medical de-
gree inappropriate under these facts and 
affirm the findings of the trial court in this 
regard. 
[7,8] Mrs. Gardner also claims the trial 
court's award of alimony was insufficient 
and inequitable. We agree. An alimony 
award should, after a marriage such as this 
and to the extent possible, equalize the 
parties' respective standards of living and 
maintain them at a level as close as possi-
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ble to that standard of living enjoyed dur-
ing the marriage. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 
1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); Higley v. Higley, 
676 P.2d 379, 381 (Utah 1983). In Jones, 
we enumerated three factors important in 
fixing an alimony award: (1) the financial 
conditions and needs of the wife; (2) the 
ability of the wife to produce sufficient 
income for herself; and (3) the ability of 
the husband to provide support. Jones, 
700 P.2d at 1075. See also English v. 
English, 565 P.2d 409, 412 (Utah 1977). 
Mrs. Gardner has not been gainfully em-
ployed since 1958. Though testimony indi-
cated that she was skilled as an executive 
secretary, it will be difficult for her to 
regain these skills and become reemployed 
after a thirty-year absence. Mr. Gardner, 
by contrast, retains his career as a physi-
cian with earnings of $6,000 per month. 
The trial court awarded Mrs. Gardner 
$1,200 per month as alimony, to be reduced 
to $600 per month following Mr. Gardner's 
retirement. The court provided no expla-
nation of the basis for the preretirement 
award and stated that the reduction in ali-
mony following Mr. Gardner's retirement 
reflected a drop in his earning potential, 
Mrs. Gardner's eligibility for social securi-
ty, and the fact that the house would be 
sold, providing Mrs. Gardner with liquid 
assets. We think that this award was an 
abuse of discretion. 
Mrs. Gardner executed an affidavit prior 
to trial listing her monthly expenses at 
$1,700 per month. The trial court appar-
ently relied on testimony at the hearing 
and on a prior affidavit which set her 
monthly needs at $1,200. Mrs. Gardner is 
not employed and has little prospect of 
being reemployed. Viewing her future 
earning potential and current monthly ex-
penses, however arrived at, against that of 
Mr. Gardner's, we think it is clear that the 
award is insufficient to equalize the par-
ties' standards of living. 
Similarly, the trial court's award of $600 
monthly alimony following Mr. Gardner's 
retirement is also unreasonably low. Mr. 
Gardner has substantial retirement assets. 
Should Mr. Gardner reach retirement age, 
these assets will have increased substan-
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tially. Mrs. Gardner, however, has no pen-
sion and will qualify for social security 
payments only as an "ex-wife married over 
20 years." She will not qualify for regular 
social security benefits- until she has 
worked another thirty-nine quarters. Be-
cause the likelihood of her providing for 
her own retirement is small, we find that 
the trial court's award is insufficient to 
equalize the parties' standards of living 
following Mr. Gardner's retirement. 
We reverse and remand for further pro-
ceedings in light of the above and in light 
of the factors enumerated in Jones, 700 
P.2d at 1075. On remand, the trial court 
must evaluate the wife's ability to support 
herself based on findings and conclusions 
under the standards stated in Acton v. 
Delirany 737 P.2d 996. It is not clear from 
the record before us that Mrs. Gardner will 
be able to meet her monthly needs either 
before or after Mr. Gardner's retirement, 
and this is the focus of our concern. Our 
review of the record therefore indicates 
that the alimony award may have to be 
increased. However, explicit findings 
based on the factors in Jones are needed to 
support that conclusion. 
[9] Finally, Mrs. Gardner asks this 
Court to make an award of attorney fees. 
The trial court made no specific award of 
attorney fees. However, in its findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, the trial court 
made clear that an award of a one-third 
interest in the Old Ogden Clinic building 
account and the division of the money mar-
ket certificate was for the purpose of as-
sisting the wife to pay her attorney. Mr. 
Gardner correctly notes that a request for 
attorney fees must be accompanied by evi-
dence at trial as to the nature and amount 
of such fees. See Warren v. Warren, 655 
P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1982). No such show-
ing was made at trial, and the findings do 
not support Mrs. Gardner's request Inso-
far as we have approved the property set-
tlement of the lower court, the award of 
attorney fees made part of that settlement 
is affirmed. 
HALL, CJ., and DURHAM and 
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
HOWE, Justice (concurring and 
dissenting). 
I concur in the majority opinion except in 
that part dealing with alimony. As to that 
part, I dissent for the following reasons. 
First, in reversing and remanding for a 
valuation of the medical and retirement 
assets and a redistribution of marital prop-
erty on the basis of those findings, Mrs. 
Gardner's financial position will undoubted-
ly improve and her income increase. This 
increase will have a direct bearing on the 
amount of alimony which she should be 
awarded. It is premature for us to now 
hold that the $1,200 per month or the $600 
per month awarded by the trial court is 
inadequate. It may well be that after the 
redistribution of property is made, the 
amounts awarded will be entirely fair and 
could even be excessive. This is especially 
true as to $600 alimony after Mr. Gardner's 
retirement. Any amount of his retirement 
awarded to her on remand decreases her 
need for alimony and his ability to pay it. 
The trial judge recognized this reality when 
he wrote in his memorandum decision: 
Upon his retirement, the alimony shall 
reduce to $600 per month. The reasons 
for this reduction are: by the time of 
retirement, the home should be sold and 
the plaintiff should have liquid assets; 
defendant's income will materially de-
crease; plaintiff will also receive some 
social security benefits. It is my intent 
in awarding to the defendant his medical 
assets and retirement assets that alimo-
ny shall be paid therefrom and that the 
plaintiff shall have a claim thereon as 
against the defendant's estate if he 
should predecease her. This claim shall 
be in the amount of $50,000. 
Second, the $l,700-per-month alimony re-
quested by Mrs. Gardner was based on her 
affidavit which listed her monthly needs at 
that amount, but based on her assumption 
that the court would allow her to continue 
to live on the twenty-one-acre country es-
tate of the parties on which is a six-bed-
room home with garages for four cars, a 
bam, and other outbuildings. Consequent-
ly, in arriving at her $l,700-per-month re-
quest, she included the monthly mortgage 
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payment, the property taxes, insurance pre-
miums on that property, monthly utilities 
on that property, and amounts for the care 
of the farm animals and for farm, garden, 
and house maintenance and repairs. How-
ever, the trial court did not award her the 
country estate or allow her to permanently 
stay there, but ordered that the parties sell 
the property as soon as possible. The ma-
jority opinion does not assail this determi-
nation. The sale of the property ordered 
tiy the court necessarily eliminated many of 
tUe monthly expenses which formed a basis 
for the $1,700 alimony request. The trial 
court, therefore, acted properly in exclud-
ing those items of expense in determining a 
reasonable amount of monthly alimony and 
presumably included instead the cost of 
Mrs. Gardner's living in smaller and less 
expensive quarters. On cross-examination, 
Mrs. Gardner admitted that her cost of 
living would be less if she did not live on 
the estate. Thus, the $1,200 awarded by 
the trial court was clearly within the range 
of the evidence before the court. The ma-
jority does not claim that $1,200 was 
"clearly erroneous" as rule 52, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, requires us to conclude 
before we may upset findings of fact by 
the trial court 
We have always accorded trial courts 
considerable latitude in fixing alimony. 
Yet here, the majority sweeps aside the 
trial court's judgment because it is only one-
fifth of Mr. Gardner's monthly income and 
is insufficient to "equalize the parties' stan-
dard of living." Insofar as this writer 
knows, reasonable and fair alimony has 
never been expressed as a percentage of 
the husband's monthly income. This is a 
new concept, completely foreign to the test 
recognized in Jones t>. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 
(Utah 1985), for determining an alimony 
award. Since the monthly income of di-
vorced husbands is not all the same, the 
monthly needs and financial conditions of 
divorced wives vary widely, and debts and 
other factors have to be considered, per-
centages should not be employed or relied 
on. 
rc Finally, I strongly dissent from the re-
peated references in the majority opinion 
that alimony is to "equalize" the financial 
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position of the parties after their divorce. 
Again, this concept is contrary to the three 
factors to be considered which we enumer-
ated in Janes v. Jones, supra: (1) the finan-
cial condition and needs of the wife, (2) the 
ability of the wife to produce a sufficient 
income for herself, and (3) the ability of the 
husband to provide support. We have said 
that the wife is entitled to enjoy as near as 
possible the same standard of living she 
enjoyed during the marriage and she 
should be prevented from becoming a pub-
lic charge. English v. English, 565 P.2d 
409, 411 (Utah 1977). But this is not the 
same as "equalizing" their incomes. The 
instant case is a good example. Mr. Gard-
ner is a highly skilled surgeon earning 
$6,000 per month. Mrs. Gardner was not 
employed at the time of the divorce. She 
thought she could maintain the standard of 
living to which she had become accustomed 
if she received $1,700 per month alimony. 
If their financial positions after divorce are 
to be equal, she presumably should have 
$3,000 per month alimony. I do not think 
the majority intends that result. 
The object of divorce is to set the parties 
free of each other after an equitable divi-
sion of property is made and, if needed, an 
award of alimony is made which will enable 
both parties to maintain as near as possible 
the standard of living they enjoyed during 
the marriage. The parties then go their 
separate ways and attempt to rebuild their 
lives. But because of the disparity in their 
earning ability, the wife here, who has 
training as a secretary but has not been 
employed for thirty-three years, will never 
earn as much as her husband-surgeon. 
Our cases do not suggest that the divorce 
decree should attempt to cure this disparity 
by "equalizing" their future incomes. 
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notated.* 
[4] Nowhere in the Utah Constitution 
or Utah Code Annotated does the legisla-
ture give the Tax Commission the unbri-
dled discretion to make findings of fact 
beyond the scope of what is presented in 
the hearings or inferences to be drawn 
therefrom. Although it is a "universally 
recognized rule" that this court must "take 
some cognizance of the expertise of the 
agency in its particular field and according-
ly to give some deference to its determina-
tion," ,0 the agency's decision must rest 
upon some sound evidentiary basis, not a 
creation of fiat11 
[5] It is unclear from the record how 
the Tax Commission arrived at the figures 
it used in calculating the fair market value 
of petitioner's property. First National has 
upheld its burden to marshal all of the 
evidence in support of the Tax Commis-
sion's findings and has shown that on the 
record before us those findings are incon-
sistent with the evidence presented. 
We remand for the purpose of requiring 
the Tax Commission to more fully artic-
ulate the basis for its findings and determi-
nation of fair market value in light of the 
evidence presented in the hearing. 
within such limitations as the Legislature may 
prescribe, it shall review proposed bond is-
sues, revise the tax levies of local governmen-
tal units, and equalize the assessment and 
valuation of property within the counties. 
The duties imposed upon the State Board of 
Equalization by the Constitution and Laws of 
this State shall be performed by the State Tax 
Commission. 
In each county of this State there shall be a 
County Board of Equalization consisting of 
the Board of County Commissioners of said 
county. The County Boards of Equalization 
shall adjust and equalize the valuation and 
assessment of the real and personal property 
within their respective counties, subject to 
such regulation and control by the State Tax 
Commission as may be prescribed by law. 
The State Tax Commission and the County 
Boards of Equalization shall each have such 
other powers as may be prescribed by the 
Legislature. 
9. Section 59-1-210 states in pertinent part: . 
The powers and duties of the commission are 
as follows: 
(7) to exercise supervision over assessors 
and county boards of equalization, and over 
HOWE, Associate C.J., and STEW 
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., 
concur. 
(o | «Y minei* SYSUH 
3 f '^»^A-^V 2> 
David BURT, Plaintiff and Appellee^ 
v. 
Betty Mae BURT, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 890190-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Oct. 12, 1990. 
Former spouses' property wasjiffi 
and alimony awarded to wife bvlSvog 
decree entered in the Second.jfD2 
Court, Weber County, Stanton M^lSj 
Wife appealed. The Court of*] 
Orme, J., held that- (\) nronertv whic 
other county officers in the,perf< 
their duties relating to the assessnjj 
erty and collection of taxes.-so£t 
ments of property are just and~\ 
ing to fair market value, and 
burden is distributed without* 
crimination; 
(23) to correct any error in an; 
made by it at any time befbrqg1 
and report the correction to i u~ 
tor, who shall enter the co: 
upon the assessment roll; 
(25) to perform any further duj 
by law, and exercise all powers. 
the performance of its duties:^ 
(27) to comply with the proc&Q 
quirements of Chapter 46b.'Tif 
adjudicative proceedings. 
10. Utah Power & Light Co. v. Sfflj 
590 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1979} 
11. Hurley v. Board of Review ojm 
767 P.2d 524, 526-27 (Utah 1988)3 
Light, 590 P.2d at 335. 
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inherited, as well as its appreciated value, 
w a s wife's separate property; (2) trial 
court failed to enter specific findings on 
needs and condition of wife necessary to 
justify award of alimony; (3) value of par-
ties' retirement benefits were marital as-
sets, subject to equitable distribution upon 
divorce; and (4) wife was not entitled to 
award of attorney fees incurred on appeal. 
Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings. 
1. Divorce <s=>252.3(3) 
In property division incident to divorce, 
inherited or donated property, including its 
appreciated value, is generally separate 
from marital estate and hence is left with 
receiving spouse. 
2. Divorce e=>252.3(3) 
Inherited or donated property may be 
part of marital estate, subject to division 
incident to divorce, if nonreceiving spouse 
augments, maintains, or protects property 
through his or her efforts, parties have 
inextricably commingled the property with 
marital property so that it has lost its sepa-
rate character, or the recipient spouse has 
contributed all or part of the property to 
the marital estate. _ 
1 Divorce <e=>252.3(3) 
k^ Wife's inheritance maintained its sepa-
gkLcharacter even though inherited funds 
lad .been substantially changed in form, 
«[here inheritance was readily traceable to 
segregated accounts, portfolios and real es-
tate. 
^Divorce e=>241, 252.3(3) 
^. In property division incident to divorce, 
interest in inherited property to nonheir 
JPouse may be awarded in lieu of alimony 
** in other extraordinary situations where 
^uity so demands. 
*• Divorce <s>253(4) 
•. *
n
 Property division incident to divorce, 
*J*w court erred in not making sufficient 
Swings to justify decision awarding wife's 
^
r e
 in marital home to husband as an 
V*8^ to husband's putative interest in 
^ **
e
 Purchased by wife with separate in-
setted funds 
v. BURT Utah H 6 7 
166 (UtahApp. 1990) 
6. Divorce <3=>237 
Gross disparity in income resulting 
from property division incident to divorce 
may be remedied by awarding alimony. 
7. Divorce <s=>237, 249.7 
While trial court should equitably ap-
portion property and calculate alimony pay-
ments, alimony may not be automatically 
awarded whenever there is a disparity be-
tween parties' incomes; where nearly all 
income at issue is simply return on proper-
ty interests, the trial court should first 
distribute property interest and only then 
consider need for alimony. 
8. Divorce <s=*231 
Alimony is appropriate to enable re-
ceiving spouse to maintain, as nearly as 
possible, standard of living enjoyed during 
marriage and to prevent spouse from be-
coming a public charge. 
9. Divorce <s=>239 
Trial court abused its discretion by 
awarding alimony without making specific 
finding* nf_faA*-*w finsrtnnl nnnHr, and con-
ditions of receiving ^pojase^abjhty of re-
ceiving spouse to produce sufficient in-
- <^me,-a^d-i^ spondtng"^p^use*s"" ability to 
provide support. 
10. Divorce <s=>252.3(4) 
Retirement benefits which accrue dur-
ing marriage are marital assets subject to 
equitable distribution upon divorce. 
11. Divorce <®=>224 
Party who was awarded fees by trial 
court in divorce decree and prevails on ap-
peal generally will be awarded fees, and 
attorneys fees will generally not be award-
ed on appeal where trial court did not 
award fees below, except when party 
presents well-supported claim of changed 
circumstances. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-3. 
12. Costs <s=>260(5) 
Attorney fees may be awarded in ap-
peal from divorce decree where appeal is 
frivolous, regardless of trial court's ruling 
on fees. 
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13. Divorce <s=>225 
Attorney fees would not be awarded to 
wife on appeal where trial court did not 
award fees to wife and where wife made no 
showing of changed circumstances necessi-
tating an award. 
14. Divorce <s==>254(2) 
In property settlement incident to di-
vorce, trial court may award spouse share 
of income stream from vested retirement 
benefits as benefits are paid as a property 
award, not alimony, and thus award is not 
terminable upon remarriage. U.C.A.1953, 
30-3-5. 
15. Divorce <2>252.2 
In division of property incident to di-
vorce, the overriding consideration is that 
ultimate division be equitable: that proper-
ty be fairly divided between parties, given 
their contributions during marriage and 
their circumstances at time of divorce. 
Pete N. Vlahos, F. Kim Walpole, Ogden, 
for defendant and appellant. 
John T. Caine, Ogden, for plaintiff and 
appellee. 
OPINION 
Before BENCH, GARFF, and ORME, 
JJ. 
ORME, Judge: 
Defendant Betty Mae Burt appeals from 
the trial court's entry of a divorce decree, 
assigning error to the division of the par-
ties' marital property and the award to her 
of $300 per month as alimony. Defendant 
also seeks attorney fees and costs on ap-
peal. We reverse and remand for further 
proceedings. 
FACTS 
Plaintiff David Burt and defendant were 
married in 1947. Two children were born 
of the marriage, both of whom reached 
majority before the commencement of this 
action. At the time this action was filed, 
plaintiff had been retired from government 
employment since 1976 and was receivffl 
regular retirement payments of $l,350m^ 
month. Plaintiff also received an addition 
al $616 per month primarily from rentali 
income and from a small watch repair i t r ^ 
ness which produced nominal income!;*! 
fendant received monthly income of $ | l l l 
from Social Security, $185 from an Indiv^j 
ual Retirement Account, and $515 in}int|9| 
est and dividends from her investments 
The net disparity in monthly incomesISS 
plaintiff and defendant amounts to $850tf" 
favor of plaintiff. "*8 
While the disparity in income is mTfavo| 
of plaintiff, an even more dramatic differs 
ence in property exists in favor of defllS 
dant. Between 1969 and 1972, defends?! 
received a total of $71,600 by inheritance! 
Over the years she made various mveit/l 
ments and substantially increased hej^holdg! 
ings, which amounted to at least $174"60|F 
by the time of trial, and even more accord^ 
ing to plaintiff's evidence. She purchase 
a home valued at $65,000, using investmenl 
income, in which she was living at the^ugj 
of divorce. Early in the marriage,^ 
ties jointly purchased a maritaKhpmi 
loan for which had been fully^satis: 
1973. Plaintiff was a w a r d e d ^ 
free of any claim by defendant-
The plaintiff was also awardei 
fifty percent interest in an mne^{£i 
which generated the rental incom|fra 
to above. Plaintiff was allowed 
his full retirement income and; 
tionally awarded savings account 
$28,509. Plaintiff was, however 
to pay defendant $300 monthlj|u| 
On appeal, defendant* :pnma 
lenges the trial court's failure^ 
sate her for her joint interest in*th|! 
home, suggesting the courtier 
garding the parties' home—a 
awarded solely to plaintiff—as^# 
offset against defendant's home, wtoj 
been purchased solely with hgr^ fig] 
funds. The defendant also chaHgnr 
court's failure to award her .*J§p® 
plaintiffs government retireme^ 
acquired during the marriage, ^ 
vivor annuity benefits incident^ 
1. The plaintiff jointI> inherited the rental prop- erty with his brother. 
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She claims the alimony awarded her in an 
effort to narrow the parties' income differ-
ential was not an adequate substitute for 
the retirement benefits to which she was 
entitled as a matter of property distribu-
tion. 
MARITAL HOME 
The trial court allowed plaintiff to retain 
the marital home without any claim against 
it by defendant. Defendant suggests the 
court erred in simplistically giving each 
party a home of equivalent value without 
regard to ownership—her house was really 
her house while "his" house was "theirs." 
However, the court's intended analysis was 
apparently that plaintiff was entitled to an 
equitable offset against the amounts which 
the defendant had been able to amass 
through investment of her inherited funds 
which, if not for the plaintiffs all but ex-
clusive payment of the mortgage and 
household expenses, even during the sub-
stantial period when both worked, would 
have been partially diverted, of necessity, 
towards those joint expenses. In making 
such an award the court, in effect, awarded 
a substantial portion of defendant's inherit-
ed funds to plaintiff. 
[1,2] Inherited or donated property, as 
well as its appreciated value, is generally 
regarded as separate from the marital es-
tate and hence is left with the receiving 
spouse in a property division incident to 
divorce. Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 
P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988). However, such 
property may appropriately be considered 
part of the marital estate, subject to divi-
sion, when the other spouse has by his or 
her efforts augmented, maintained, or pro-
tected the inherited or donated property, 
id.; Dubois v. Dubois, 29 Utah 2d 75, 504 
P.2d 1380, 1381 (1973); where the parties 
have inextricably commingled the property 
with marital property so that it has lost its 
separate character, Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 
308; or where the recipient spouse has 
*• In the event the trial court does not find the 
situation warrants awarding the plaintiff some 
credit against defendant's inherited property, 
and plaintiff is required to part with a portion 
°f "his" retirement and buy out defendant's in-
v. BURT Utah H 6 9 
166 (Utah App. 1990) 
contributed all or part of the property to 
the marital estate. Id. 
[3] Even though defendant's inheri-
tance is readily traceable and has not been 
commingled, plaintiff argues that defen-
dant's inherited funds have substantially 
changed in form—they were received as 
cash but have become stocks, bonds and 
real estate—and therefore they should be 
considered part of the marital estate. 
Plaintiff relies on Mortensen, wherein the 
Court stated that property which had lost 
its "identity through commingling or ex-
changes" could properly be considered part 
of the marital estate. 760 P.2d at 308. We 
disagree with plaintiffs reading of Morten-
sen. The thrust of Mortensen is not 
whether the mere form of property has 
changed, but whether it has lost its "identi-
ty" as separate property. Id. The sepa-
rate character of the defendant's inheri-
tance has been maintained in segregated 
accounts and portfolios and the home she 
purchased. Conversion from one invest-
ment medium to another does not, by itself, 
destroy the integrity of segregation. To 
accept plaintiff's view of Mortensen would 
unreasonably discourage the prudent in-
vestment of inherited funds. In order to 
< 
preserve the property's separate character, 
the donee or heir would be required to 
maintain the property in the same physical 
form in which it was received, be it securi-
ties, real estate, or cash. The law does not 
require such economic absurdity. 
[4-6] Having so concluded, we none-
theless recognize that this precept does not 
place defendant's separate property totally 
beyond the court's reach in an equitable 
property division. The court may award an 
interest in the inherited property to the 
non-heir spouse in lieu of alimony, Weaver 
v. Weaver, 21 Utah 2d 166, 442 P.2d 928, 
929 (1968)vor in "other extraordinary situa-
tions where equity so demands."2 Mor-
tensen, 760 P.2d at 308; see also, Naranjo 
v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah Ct. 
App.1988); Bailey v. Bailey, 745 P.2d 830, 
terest in the marital home, the court may reme-
dy any gross disparity in income by an award of 
alimony to plaintiff. See Weaver, 442~P.2d at 
929; Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 167 P.2d 
121, 124 (Utah Ct.App.1988). 
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833 (Utah Ct.App.1987). However, we-
agree with defendant that the trial court 
did not make sufficient findings to justify 
its decision to award defendant's share in 
the marital home to plaintiff as an offset to 
plaintiffs putative interest in the home 
purchased by defendant with inherited 
funds. See, e.g., Throckmorton v. Throck-
morton, 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah Ct.App. 
1988) (trial court must make findings on all 
material issues); Naranjo, 751 P.2d at 
1147 (trial court must support its decision 
with adequate findings). Accordingly, 
without necessarily implying that the re-
sult was incorrect given the peculiar facts 
of this case, we must remand for further 
findings in support of the court's disposi-
tion of the marital home and the defen-
dant's separate property. 
ALIMONY 
17-9J The trial court granted defendant 
alimony in the amount of $300 per month in 
an attempt to help equalize the monthly 
income of the parties. While equity should 
be the watchword as the trial court appor-
tions property and calculates alimony pay-
ments, see Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 
P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987), alimony may 
not be automatically awarded whenever 
there is disparity between the parties' in-
comes.3 Alimony is appropriate "to enable 
the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly 
as possible the standard of living enjoyed 
during the marriage and to prevent the 
spouse from becoming a public charge." 
Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 
CtApp.1987). 
A trial court must consider three factors 
in setting a reasonable award of alimony: 
3. It is questionable from the record that this is a 
case warranting alimony in favor of defendant, 
whose substantial accumulated wealth and 
monthly income should permit her a standard 
of living comparable to what she enjoyed during 
the marriage. Rather, alimony was the device 
the court selected to narrow the gap between 
the parties' incomes. Especially since nearly all 
income at issue in this case is simply the return 
on property interests, the court's approach was 
incorrect. Proper distribution of property inter-
ests of one sort or another should have come 
first, and only then would alimony need to be 
considered. Defendant has conceded that the 
alimony award should be vacated if the marital 
1) the financial conditions and needs'•*# 
the receiving spouse; 2) the ability
 0f tk! 
receiving spouse to produce a suffice 
income for him or herself; and 3) •}* 
ability of the responding spouse to Dm. 
vide support 
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 pw 
121, 124 (Utah Ct.App.1988). The triaf 
court failed to enter specific findings oa! 
the needs and condition of the defendant 
prohibiting effective review of the alimony 
award.4 We have held that the omission of 
particular findings in alimony awards is arf 
abuse of discretion. Id.; Ruhsam v. RuK-
sam} 742 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah Ct.App.1987)? 
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for 
further findings on the needs and condi-
tions of both parties relative to alimony* 
In conjunction with making adequate fini 
ings as to the appropriate distribution of 
inherited property in light of our discussion 
above, the court may then determine the 
propriety and amount of alimony for either 
party. 
RETIREMENT INCOME 
The trial court allowed the plaintiff to 
retain his full retirement benefits, which, 
like those of defendant that she was per-
mitted to retain in full, were accumulated 
during the marriage. These benefits had 
not only "vested" prior to the divorce—en-
titlement had ripened and regular distribu-
tions were being made. 
[10] Retirement benefits accrued dur-
ing marriage must normally be "considered 
a marital asset subject to equitable distri-
bution upon divorce." Motes v. Motes, 786 
P.2d 232, 234 (Utah Ct.App.1989); Greene 
property is properly divided. See also note 2, 
supra. 
4. But see note 3, supra. 
5. The court's general comment that the par t i c s 
financial practices were "highly unusual" is not 
enough. This [cjourt has consistently empha-
sized the importance of specific findings— 
Asper v. Asper, 753 P.2d 978, 981 (Utah Ct.App. 
1988). This is particularly important iri divorce 
actions. See Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 
1331. 1333-34 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (findings 
must demonstrate that the court's decision logi-
cally follows from the evidence before it). 
BURT 
Cite as 799 P.2d 1 
v. ureene, vai r.za 827, 830 (Utah CtApp. 
1988). Here, the value of the parties' re-
tirement benefits may readily be calculated 
and equitably apportioned between the par-
ties as the court on remand reconsiders 
distribution of other marital assets.6 See 
Motes, 786 P.2d at 234. 
Defendant also seeks a share of the sur-
vivor annuity benefit incident to the plain-
tiffs government retirement benefit, which 
would provide continued income to defen-
dant upon plaintiffs death. On remand, 
the court may treat the annuity in a similar 
fashion to the retirement income stream, 
see note 8, infra, fixing a present value 
and considering that sum in the distribu-
tion scheme, or awarding the defendant an 
interest in the annuity to protect her right 
to continued payment of her share of the 
retirement income. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
[11-13] The defendant seeks an award 
of attorney fees incurred on appeal, relying 
on Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 
(Utah CtApp. 1988), and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-3 (1989). In Rasband, we stated 
that a trial court has the power to make an 
award of attorney fees in divorce actions, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 
(1989), upon a showing of financial need 
and reasonableness. 752 P.2d at 1336. Or-
dinarily, when -fees in a "divorce were 
awarded below to* the party who then pre-
vails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to 
that party on appeal. ' Weston v. Weston, 
773 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah Ct.App.1989); 
Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 162 
(Utah Ct.App.1989). Conversely, when 
they were not awarded below, we will not 
generally award them on appeal, except 
when a party has presented a well-sup-
*• In evaluating the nature of defendant's IRA, 
the court must determine whether contributions 
were made with inherited funds, as an invest-
ment device, or with money earned from em-
ployment during the marriage to provide a true 
retirement benefit. If the former, the IRA is 
defendant's separate property; if the latter, it 
should be treated like the other retirement bene-
fits. 
'• See note 6, supra. 
v. BURT Utah H 7 1 
166 (Utah App. 1990) 
ported claim of changed circumstances. 
See Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 
1061-62 (Utah Ct.App.1990); Riche v. 
Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 470-71 (Utah CtApp. 
1989). The major exception, inapplicable 
here, is when an appeal is frivolous, in 
which event we will award fees regardless 
of the trial court's ruling on fees. See, e.g., 
Hurt v. Hurt, 793 P.2d 948, 951 (Utah 
CtApp. 1990); Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365 
(Utah CtApp. 1988). Attorney fees were 
not awarded to defendant below and she 
has made no showing of changed circum-
stances necessitating that they be awarded 
to her on appeal. Accordingly, she is not 
entitled to an award of attorney fees in-
curred in this appeal. 
SUMMARY 
[14] Defendant's inherited property and 
its increase are properly characterized as 
defendant's separate property. The same 
is true of plaintiff's inherited property. 
Neither party's property has lost its sepa-
rate character. All retirement benefits, in-
cluding defendant's Social Security and 
possibly her IRA,7 are marital property and 
must be divided accordingly. As a mea-
sure of convenience, the court may simply 
award defendant one-half of the difference 
between the value of plaintiffs and defen-
dant's retirement8 -» However, such '- an 
award is not terminable alimony; it is a 
property interest Similarly; the - marital 
home and possibly the savings accounts9 
are marital property and defendant must 
be granted her share. 
[15] The foregoing discussion assumes 
the proper application of Utah law in a 
situation where no extraordinary circum-
stances are found by the court to exist 
8. While a present settlement is preferable, Motes 
v. Motes, 786 P.2d at 234, the trial court may 
award the defendant a share of the income 
stream from the retirement benefits as they are 
paid, id., not in the form of alimony but as a 
property award not terminable upon remar-
riage. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1989). 
9. The court must also consider whether the sav-
ings accounts awarded to plaintiff were marital 
property or separate property derived from 
plaintiffs inheritance. 
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However, these are presumptive only and 
not immutable principles. "The overriding 
consideration is that the ultimate division 
be equitable—that property be fairly divid-
ed between the parties given their contribu-
tions during the marriage and their circum-
stances at the time of the divorce." New-
meyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 
(Utah 1987). On remand, the court should 
first properly categorize the parties' prop-
erty as part of the marital estate or as the 
separate property of one or the other. 
Each party is presumed to be entitled to all 
of his or her- separate property and fifty 
percent of the marital property.- But rath-
er than simply enter such a decree, the 
court should then consider the existence of 
exceptional circumstances and, if any be 
shown, proceed to effect an equitable dis-
tribution in light of those circumstances 
and in conformity with our decision. That 
having been done, the final step is to con-
sider whether, following appropriate divi-
sion of the property, one party or the other 
is entitled to alimony.10 
We recognize that the trial court at-
tempted to do equity in its distribution of 
the marital estate and acted in the face of 
atypical circumstances. Notwithstanding, 
the court's division of the estate cannot 
stand undisturbed when we are not 
presented with sufficient findings to dem-
onstrate that the court's ruling comports 
with established law. Accordingly, we re-
mand for further proceedings. The parties 
will bear their own attorney fees and costs. 
BENCH and GARFF, JJ., concur. 
10. In prescribing a systematic approach on re-
mand, we do not suggest any particular out-
come following reconsideration. We do recog-
nize that our alteration of pivotal portions of 
the trial court's decree may necessitate reassess-
ment and adjustment of other portions of the 
Raychelle MERRIAM, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Todd MERRIAM, Defendant 
and Appellee. 
No. 890484-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Oct 16, 1990. 
Mother appealed from divorce decriS 
of the Sixth District Court, Sanpete CoiuS 
ty, Don V. Tibbs, J., awarding custody of 
parties' child to father. The Court of Ap^  
peals, Greenwood, J., held that: (1) trial 
court could rely on child custody evaluation 
report even though it was never formally 
admitted into evidence and evaluator was 
not quahfied as expert or called as witness 
at trial; (2) father's testimony supported 
finding regarding mother's extramarital af-
fairs, and those affairs could be considered 
in custody decision; (3) finding that neither 
parent had been child's primary caretakei 
during pendency of divorce did not refled 
confusion by trial court, and balance oi 
factors did not otherwise tip in favor oi 
custodial status quo; and (4) trial couri 
gave adequate weight to desirability o\ 
keeping child and his half-brother together 
Affirmed. 
1. Divorce <£=*301 
Child custody evaluation report could 
be relied on in making custody determina-
tion, even though report was not formally 
admitted into evidence and evaluator was 
never qualified as expert or called as wit-
ness at trial. Judicial Administration Rule 
4-903; Rules of Evid., Rule 706(a). 
decree and that the trial court has the authority 
to reconsider its entire decree in light of this 
court's opinion and to make such adjustment 
as may be necessan to achieve an equitable 
overall result 
GILL v. GILL Utah 779 
ate M 718 f-2d 779 (Utah 1986) 
tion. (Per opinion of Hall, CJ., with one 
LeNore M. GILL, Plaintiff Judge concurring and one Judge not partic-
and Appellant, ipating.) 
v. 
Ruland J. GILL, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 19142. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 29, 1986. 
Rehearing Denied May 29, 1986. 
Wife appealed from order of the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, J. Dentfis 
Frederick, J., dividing marital assets in di-
vorce action. The Supreme Court, H*ft> 
CJ., held that evidence was sufficient to 
support finding that husband did not hide 
or secrete marital assets. 
Affirmed. 
Zimmerman, J., filed dissenting opinion 
in which Howe, J., concurred. 
1. Divorce «=>235, 252.1, 286(2) 
In adjusting financial and property in-
terests of parties to divorce, trial court is 
afforded considerable discretion, and its ac-
tions are cloaked with presumption of valid-
ity. (Per opinion of Hall, CJ., with one 
Judge concurring and one Judge not partic-
ipating.) 
* 
2- Divorce *=>206, 253(2) 
k Evidence regarding wife's knowledge 
rt operations of husband's businesses was 
efficient to support finding that husband 
djd not hide or secrete marital assets in 
fviolation of restraining order or rights of 
• J*fe- (Per opinion of Hall, CJ., with one 
fudge concurring and one Judge not partic-
S*tfog.) 
^ Divorce <s=>192 
Not requiring husband to assume and 
1*7 additional fees incurred by wife in di-
£** action to resolve wife's contention 
??*. husband had secreted or dissipated 
T***tal assets was not abuse of discretion, 
^
8?!it evidence in support of such cont£n-
Gary L. Paxton, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiff and appellant 
Dwight L. King, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and respondent. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
This appeal challenges the propriety of 
the district court's division of marital as-
sets. Plaintiff contends that she was enti-
tled to a proportionately larger share of the 
marital assets to compensate her for de-
fendant's alleged dissipation of those as-
action, in direct contravention of the 
court's injunction and restraining order. 
Plaintiff brought this action for divorce 
in September 1979. The parties' marital 
assets consisted of a residence, an automo-
bile, a pickup truck and camper, several 
horses, trailers, and related tack, various 
life insurance policies, guns, camping 
equipment, furniture, jewelry, ^personal 
items, an ongoing business known as Fleet-
way, Inc., and a defunct business known as 
Gill's Tire Market 
In October 1979, at plaintiffs instance 
and request and pursuant to stipulation, a 
restraining order was entered, against de-
fendant by which he was enjoined from* 
encumbering or disposing of any marital 
property and any assets of Gill's Tire Mar-
ket or Fleetway, Inc., without the, express 
or without first obtaining an appropriate 
court order. At the time the order was 
entered, defendant was operating both 
businesses and making his living there-
from. Plaintiff did not participate in the 
management of either of the businesses, 
and after the restraining order was en-
tered, defendant continued to operate 
them. 
In December 1979, plaintiff sought and 
obtained an order bifurcating the divorce 
issue. A decree of divorce was obtained in 
January 1980, reserving the issue of prop-
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erty division for a subsequent proceeding. 
At the time the divorce decree was entered, 
defendant was continuing to operate the 
businesses known as GUI's Tire Market and 
Fleetway, Inc. 
In October 1980, following the bankrupt-
cy of Gill's Tire Market and after Fleetway, 
Inc., had also failed, defendant utilized the 
remaining assets to open a retail tire store, 
which he operated under the name of Tire 
City for approximately two years. Two 
months prior to trial, defendant sold the 
assets of Tire City for $15,000, a sum near-
ly equal to Tire City's indebtedness. 
At trial, the focal issue was plaintiffs 
Contention that defendant had intentionally 
secreted or disposed of marital assets to 
deprive plaintiff of her rightful share. The 
trial court specifically found that defendant 
had not hidden any of the assets of the 
marital, estate and
 n had not attempted to 
deprive plaintiff of her interest in those 
assets. The°court then divided the assets 
oiT hand and^ awarded^generally equal 
shares to <each party. The court also or-
dered that the accounts receivable from the 
Fleetway Tire Market business be divided 
equally; that defendant pay the business 
debts and the marital debts incurred prior 
to separation; that any proceeds remaining 
from the business bankruptcy be divided 
equally; and that defendant pay all income 
tax obligations owing for the years 1977-
1979. 
The court limited its award of attorney 
fees to those incurred up to the time the 
decree of divorce was obtained in January 
1980. The court made no award for fees 
incurred by plaintiff for the purpose of 
showing that defendant had intentionally 
dissipated the marital assets. 
[1] The long-recognized and oft-re-
peated standard of appellate review per-
mits this Court to overturn the judgment of 
the trial court only when the evidence 
clearly preponderates to the contrary or 
the trial court has abused its discretion or 
1. Wiese v. Wiese, Utah. 699 P.2d 700, 701 (1985). 
2. ArgyU v. Argyle, Utah. 688 P-2d 468, 470 
(1984). 
misapplied principles of law.1 In adjusting 
the financial and property interests of par-
ties to divorce, the trial court is afforded 
considerable discretion,2 and its actions are 
cloaked with a presumption of validity3 
[2] The record reflects that although 
Gill's Tire Market and Fleetway, Inc., were 
not prospering, the parties were dependent 
upon the operation of those businesses for 
their livelihood. It necessarily follows that 
at the time the court entered its order 
restraining the disposition of marital as-
sets, it was within the contemplation of all 
concerned that defendant would continue to 
operate the businesses. 
It was reasonable for the trial court to 
conclude that plaintiff was aware of de-
fendant's business revenues and that plain-
tiff knew defendant had transferred the 
remaining assets of the defunct Fleetway, 
Inc., to the new business operated under 
the name of Tire City. This conclusion is 
supported by the fact that ^ commencing in 
October 1979 and continuing to the time of 
trial, plaintiff engaged m extensive dis-
covery proceedings seeking evidence con-
cerning defendant's fmancial affairs and 
the busmesses he continued to operate, spe-
cifically Tire City. Furthermore, no effort 
was made by plaintdff to restrain defendant 
from operating his busmesses, and no cita-
tion for contempt was sought or obtained 
for any violation of the court's restraining 
order. 
Trial of this case extended over a period 
of three days, and the record is replete 
with evidence that bears upon the property 
division issue. Not unexpectedly, most of 
the testimony was controverted, but a can-
vass of the record fails to disclose any 
evidence that clearly preponderates con-
trary to the findings of the trial court that 
defendant did not hide or secrete marital 
assets in violation of the court's order or 
the rights of plaintiff. 
3. Savage v. Savage, Utah, 658 P.2d 1201. 1203 
(1983). 
ate 
GIL^ v. GILL 
u 7 i 8 f Od 779 (Utah 1986) 
Utah 781 
[3] Plaintiffs remaining contention <?n 
appeal is that the court abused its discre-
tion in limiting the award of attorney fees. 
In substance and effect, the court conclud-
ed that the legal expense of conducting ti»e 
extensive discovery proceedings engaged in 
by plaintiff was not reasonable and neces-
sary. 
In light of plaintiffs failure to demon-
strate either by way of discovery or by 
evidence elicited at trial that defendant did 
in fact secrete or dissipate marital assets, 
the court did not abuse its discretion in n0t 
requiring defendant to assume and pay the 
additional fees plaintiff incurred. 
The propriety of the court's limited 
award of attorney fees is further indicated 
bY the relative ability Q{ the parties* ta p^ Y 
their respective attorneys for services ren-
dered. Plaintiff was employed and earning 
approximately $12,000 per annum, and de-
fendant was unemployed and without in-
come from any source. 
Affirmed. No costs awarded. 
STEWART, J., concurs. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice (dissenting) 
I dissent^ The issue on appeal is wheth-
er the trial court erred when it found th^t 
Mr. Gill did not violate an injunction prohib-
iting him "from encumbering or disposing 
of in any manner whatsoever; any assets 0r 
properties of . . . Gill's Tire Market, Inc., or 
Pleetway, Inc., without the [express, prior 
knowledge and approved of [Mrs. GDI] or 
without first obtaining* an^rappropriate 
court order alfter notice ~ and applica-
tion... ." (Emphasis added.) There is no 
conflict in the evidence that at the time the 
^junction was entered, pursuant to Mr-
Gill's stipulation, the marital estate includ-
ed the business assets of Gill's Tire Market 
^ d Pleetway Tires, Inc. These assets 
*ere then worth approximately $50,000. 
% the time the marital estate was divided 
k December of 1982, the value of the busi-
ness assets had diminished to approximate-
ly $6,000, primarily as a result of Mr. Gill's 
transfer of those assets into a new, but 
^unsuccessful business, Tire City. That 
transfer occurred without Mrs. Gill's "ex-
press, prior knowledge " and without any 
request to or order from the court, as 
required by the injunction. 
Contrary to the suggestion in the majori-
ty opinion, resolution of the issue presented 
by this case does not turn upon whether 
Mrs. Gill proved that Mr. Gill intentionally 
hid assets belonging to the marital estate 
or upon whether Mr. Gill intentionally at-
tempted to deprive Mrs. Gill of her interest 
in the business portion of the marital es-
tate. In determining whether one is civilly 
liable for violating an injunction, the ele-
ment of intent is irrelevant E.g., Rogers 
v. Pitt, 89 F. 424, 429 (Cir.CtNev.D.1898); 
Weston v. John L. Roper Lumber Co., 158 
N.C. 270, 73 S.E. 799, 800 (1912). 
The absence of willfulness does not re-
lieve [an individual] from civil contempt 
Civil as distinguished from criminal con-
tempt is a sanction to enforce compliance 
with an order of the court or to compen-
sate for losses or damages sustained by 
reason of noncompliance Since the 
purpose is remedial, it matters not with 
what intent the defendant did the prohib-
ited act 
McComb v. "Jacksonville Paper Co':,''336 
U.S. 187, 191, 69 S.Ct 497; 499, 93 L.Ed. 
599 (1949) (citations omitted). .The Utah 
courts have long recognized that civil con-
tempt for. violation of a court order or 
injunction requires no intent Gunnison 
Irrigation Co. v. Peterson, 74 Utah 46Gr 
464, 280 P. 715, 717 (1929). 
Thus, ~ the issue on appeal is simply 
whether Mr.J Gill violated the plain terms of 
terms of the injunction were clear/ Its 
purpose was to preserve the marital estate 
against loss. Mr. Gill violated the injunc-
tion. Mrs. Gill clearly sustained damages 
as a result of that violation. The trial 
court acted contrary to the uncontradicted 
evidence when it refused to find the injunc-
tion had been violated and to compensate 
Mrs. Gill accordingly. 
The majority seems to rely in part on the 
fact that prior to the trial on division of 
assets, Mrs. Gill failed to petition the trial 
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court to hold her former husband liable for 
contempt Despite her failure to do so, 
however, the record establishes that she 
was diligent in her efforts to protect her 
interest jn the assets. Beginning with the 
commencement of the divorce addon in De-
cember of 1979/ Mrs. Gill took steps to 
determine the nature and disposition of the 
business assets. Mr. GDI was dilatory and 
evasive in responding to her repeated dis-
covery requests. His lack of candor forced 
Mrs. Gill to bring several motions to com-
pel, a motion in supplemental proceedings, 
orders to show cause, and a motion for 
sanctions. As late as the second day of 
trial in December of 1982, Mr. Gill was 
producing documents relating to the status 
of the assets, and even then he did not 
comply fully with Mrs. Gill's earlier dis-
covery requests. Many^of the discovery 
responses ultimately" supplied were inex-
cusably dificient i The majority's opinion 
allows Mr/ Gill "to, hJenefit from his own 
dilatory and' evasive ^tactics. Mrs. Gill 
should not be prejudiced for having pro-
ceeded, via means other than a contempt 
proceeding, to determine the value and dis-
position of her share of the assets. 
I would also hold that the trial court 
clearly abused its discretion in limiting 
Mrs. Gill's attorney fees, especially because 
a significant portion of those fees resulted 
from her repeated attempts to force Mr. 
Gill to comply with legitimate discovery 
requests. It is certainly true, as the major-
ity states, that we should defer to the trial 
court under appropriate circumstances. 
However, by affirming the unsupportable 
order of the trial court in this case, we are 
not deferring. Rather, we are abdicating 
our responsibility to see that orders re-
viewed by us are legally supportable, which 
the one involved in this case certainly is 
not 
HOWE, J., concurs in the dissenting 
opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J. 
DURHAM, J., having disqualified her-
self, does not participate herein. 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SE-
CURITY OF the INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, Plaintiff, 
v. 
NINTH CIRCUIT COURT In and For CE-
DAR CITY DEPARTMENT, Iron Coun" 
ty, State of Utah, and Patricia J. Meis-
ter, Defendants. 
No. 20876. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 5, 1986. 
The Department of Employment Secur-
ity petitioned for writ of certiorari tc re-
view orders o^f the Ninth Circuit Court 
Iron County, pursuant to defendant's 
guilty* pleas to \charge?^of making false 
statements to obtain ^unemployment com-
pensation, that defendant pay restitution to 
the DES and that the DES cease and desist 
its collection efforts of remaining amount 
owed to i t The Supreme Court, Howe, J., 
held that (1) trial court's order requiring 
defendant to pay restitution to the DES of 
the $2,428 she had actually received as a 
condition of probation was within its discre-
tion, and the exercise of such discretion 
was not an arbitrary extension of judicial 
authority so as to effectively redetermine 
administration decision by the DES that 
claimant repay twice amount which which 
she had received by reason of her fraud, 
but (2) statute providing that the DES shall 
demand repayment of twice amount of un-
employment benefits fraudulently collected 
required the DES to collect the remaining 
one-half of the amount owed by defendant 
through civil proceedings or through is-
suance of a warrant 
Order vacated. 
1. Social Security and Public Welfare 
*=>751 
Trial court's order requiring that de-
fendant convicted of making false state-
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Connie Rae POPE, Plaintiff, Respondent, 
and Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
Dan LeRoy POPE, Defendant, Appellant, 
and Cross-Respondent 
No. 15538. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec 15, 1978. 
Wife brought divorce proceeding. The 
First District Court, Cache County, VeNoy 
Christofferson, J., entered judgment divorc-
ing the parties, dividing their property, and 
awarding attorney fees and costs to wife, 
and husband appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Wilkins, J., held that: (1) trial 
court's division of marital property result-
ing in 65% of benefits to wife and 35% to 
husband did not constitute abuse of discre-
tion, since husband was awarded income-
producing assets of family, husband had 
two college degrees and several years expe-
rience in s operating his business, and wife 
had no college education and was unem-
ployed at time of trial; (2) trial court did 
not err in awarding wife $1,500 in attorney 
fees and $30 in costs, notwithstanding fact 
that wife, in her pleadings, prayed for only 
$1,000 in attorney fees and failed altogether 
to pray for costs, and (3) trial court did not 
err in ordering that if husband failed to pay 
wife specified sum of cash within six 
months of trial court's order that such 
amount would bear interest at the rate of 
10% per year. 
Affirmed. 
1. Divorce <*=> 252.1, 286(2) 
Trial court in divorce action has con-
siderable latitude of discretion in adjusting 
financial and property interests, and party 
appealing therefrom has burden of proving 
that there was a misunderstanding or mis-
application of law resulting in substantial 
and prejudicial error, or that evidence clear-
ly preponderated against findings, or that 
such a serious inequity resulted as to mani-
fest a clear abuse of discretion. 
2. Divorce <*=> 252.2 
Trial court's division of marital proper-
ty resulting in 65% of benefits to wife and 
35% to husband did^not constitute abuse of 
discretion, since husband was awarded in-
come-producing assets'" of family, husband 
had two college degrees and several years 
experience in operating his business, and 
wife had no college education and was un-
employed at time of trial. 
3. Divorce <*=>189, 196 
In divorce action, trial court did not err 
in awarding wife $1,500 in attorney fees 
and $30 in costs, notwithstanding fact that 
wife, in her pleadings, prayed for only 
$1,000 in attorney fees and failed altogether 
to pray for costs. Rules of Civil Procedure, 
rule 54(cXl). 
4. Interest <3=>38(1) 
In divorce action, trial court did not err 
in ordering that if husband failed to pay 
wife specified sum of cash within six 
months of trial court's order that such 
amount would bear interest at the rate of 
10% per year. 
Jay D. Edmonds, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant, appellant, and cross-respondent. 
Pete N. Vlahos, Ogden, for plaintiff, re-
spondent, and cross-appellant. 
WILKINS, Justice: 
This is a divorce action, in which the 
District Court for Cache County, sitting 
without a jury, entered a decree divorcing 
the parties, dividing their property, and 
awarding attorney's fees and costs to plain-
tiff. References herein to statutes and 
rules are to the Utah Code Ann., 1953, as 
amended, and the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, respectively. 
Plaintiff and defendant were married 
more than ten years and have two daugh-
ters as issue of the marriage. After his 
marriage to plaintiff, defendant attended 
college and obtained a bachelor's degree in 
engineering and a master's degree in busi-
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ness administration. Plaintiff, on the other 
hand, terminated her education after one 
and one-half years of college and spent her 
time caring for the children. During their 
marriage, defendant and plaintiff acquired 
assets, mentioned infra 
[n its division of this property the District 
Court awarded to defendant the family 
business property and certain other items of 
personalty, the net value of which was $76,-
577. Plaintiff was given the family resi-
dence, subject to the existing mortgage, the 
household furnishings, and certain other 
items of personalty. The net value of this 
property was $26,609. The District Court 
also ordered defendant to pay plaintiff $24,-
984 in cash, this being one-half of the 
amount by which the net value of property 
awarded defendant exceeded that awarded 
plaintiff. 
Defendant urges on appeal that the Dis-
trict Court erred in calculating the value of 
the parties' property and debts, resulting in 
an unjust and inequitable division of the 
property. He claims the Court failed to 
include certain debts owed by defendant 
amounting to $24,225 in its calculation of 
the value of the business and other property 
awarded to him. 
[1] It is well established that 
The trial court, in a divorce action, has 
considerable latitude of discretion in ad-
justing financial and property interests. 
A party appealing therefrom has the bur-
den to prove there was a misunderstand-
ing or misapplication of the law resulting 
in substantial and prejudicial error; or 
the evidence clearly preponderated 
against the findings; or such a serious 
inequity has resulted as to manifest a 
clear abuse of discretion. 
English v. English9i\Jtah, 565 P.2d 409, 410 
(1977). 
[2] However defendant's argument—in 
thrust—is that a serious inequity does exist 
as the obligation to pay the debts amount-
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ing to $24,225 results, in effect, in a division 
of the net value of property which gives 
sixty-five percent to the plaintiff and only 
thirty-five percent to the defendant.1 In 
light of the facts and circumstances of this 
case, we believe, however, that the Court's 
division of property is equitable. Defend-
ant was awarded the income-producing as-
sets of the famih He has two college 
degrees and several years experience in op-
erating his businesses and thus has a rea-
sonably assured future of earnings and 
profits from his business activities. Plain-
tiff, however, has no college education and 
was unemployed at the time of trial. The 
Court awarded her no alimony. She was 
given custody of the children and only $135 
per month for each child's support. 
Defendant's other allegations of errors 
and omissions relating to the division of 
property are either without merit or non-
prejudicial. 
[3] Defendant also contends that the 
Court's award to plaintiff of $1,5/X) attor-
ney's fees and $30 costs must be reversed 
since plaintiff, in her pleadings, prayed for 
only $1,000 in attorney's fees and failed 
altogether to pray for costs. 
Rule 54(c)(1) states in relevant part. 
Except as to a party against 
whom a judgment is entered by default, 
every final judgment shall grant the re-
lief to which the party in whose favor it 
is rendered is entitled, even if the party 
has not demanded such relief in his plead-
ings . 
In Ferguson v. Ferguson, Utah, 564 P2d 
1380 (1977), we held that under this Rule, 
an award of attorney's fees in excess of 
that requested in the pleadings, is allowable 
where the proof shows the party to be 
entitled to it. Also see Palombi v. D&C 
Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325 
(1969). These cases properly applied Rule 
54(cXl) and are controlling here.2 The Dis-
I. The District Court ordered that defendant pa> 2. In Palombi, it was stated "The fact that there 
all debts incurred by the parties since their 
marriage, excepting the house mortgage The 
debts which totaled $24,225 according to de-
fendant's testimony were incurred by the par-
ties after their marriage 
was no specific pleading does not 
preclude such an award It is indeed important 
that the issue be raised that the parties have 
full opportunity to meet it *' Here, certainly 
the issue was raised with full opportunity to 
meet it 
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trict Court's award on these two items was 
therefore not improper. 
[4] Apparently in order to induce de-
fendant to pay plaintiff the $24,984. cash 
within six months the District Court or-
dered that if the amount remained unpaid 
during this period that the amount would 
bear interest at the rate of ten percent per 
year. 
Sec 15-1-4, which requires, except as 
noted therein (not applicable here), judg-
ments to bear interest at the rate of eight 
percent per year, does not preclude a Dis-
trict Court, under Sec. 30-3-5 3 from impos-
ing an interest rate of more than eight 
percent where, under the circumstances, 
that award is reasonable and equitable. In 
this case such an award is both. The inter-
est rate here increased from eight to ten 
percent only when defendant failed to pay 
the amount within six months. The $24,984 
is the only cash which plaintiff was award-
ed.. The court did not award alimony to 
plaintiff a>nd the child support is only $135 
per month per child. Plaintiff is unem-
ployed and will reasonably need cash in the 
near future for mortgage payments on the 
house and for her personal needs. Thus, 
requiring that defendant pay an additional 
two percent interest on the $24,984 in the 
event that defendant failed to pay plaintiff 
this amount within six months is a reasona-
ble exercise of the District Court's equitable 
discretion. 
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiff. 
ELLETT, C. J., and CROCKETT, 
MAUGHAN and HALL, JJ., concur. 
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3. This statute states in relevant part: . . 
"the court may make such orders in relation to 
Carl WISEMAN, Plaintiff, 
v. 
VILLAGE PARTNERS and Continental 
Casualty, Defendants. 
No. 15729. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec 26, 1978. 
Claimant filed claim for workmen's 
compensation benefits arising out of injury 
allegedly received in course of his employ-
ment The Industrial Commission affirmed 
administrative law judge's decision denying 
award and denied a motion for review. 
The Supreme Court, Maughan, J., held that 
construing evidence in light most favorable 
to sustaining findings and order of Commis-
sion, substantial evidence supported Com-
mission's denial of award. 
Affirmed. 
1. Workers' Compensation <*=> 1939.5 
Upon review of Industrial Commis-
sion's decision upholding denial of work-
men's compensation award, the Supreme 
Court could not weigh contradictory evi-
dence for purpose of interposing its own 
judgment as to what the facts were. U.C. 
A.1953, 35-1-84. 
2. Workers' Compensation <*=>1533 
Construing evidence in light most fa-
vorable to sustaining findings and order of 
Industrial Commission, substantial evidence 
supported Commission's denial of work-
men's compensation award to claimant, 
cause of whose back injury was subject of 
contradictory evidence. 
William B. Parsons, III, Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff. 
. property and the parties . • • a s 
may be [applicable!." 
V. Glen NOBLE, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Elaine Hanson NOBLE, Defendant 
and Appellee. 
Elaine Hanson NOBLE, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
V. Glen NOBLE, Defendant 
and Appellee. 
Nos. 19934, 20401. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 15, 1988. 
In separate actions, wife sued husband 
for personal injuries, and parties sought 
divorce. The Fourth District Court, Utah 
County, Don V. Tibbs and George E. Ballif, 
JJ., entered divorce decree and dismissed 
personal injury action, and appeals were 
itaken. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, 
J., held that (1) alimony award and proper-
ty division were not abuse of discretion; (2) 
divorce action did not preclude wife from 
bringing personal injury action; and (3) 
divorce decree precluded husband from re-
litigating issue of whether he intentionally 
shot wife. 
Divorce decree affirmed and remand-
ed; tort judgment reversed and remanded. 
1. Divorce <&=>82 
If spouses have tort claims pending 
against each other which are likely to have 
bearing on outcome of divorce action, those 
claims should be resolved prior to divorce 
proceedings. 
2. Divorce «=>237, 252.2 
Divorce court did not improperly con-
sider wife's pending tort claim against hus-
band in determining property division and 
alimony award when it took into account 
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wife's medical and living expenses incurred 
as result of husband's shooting of her. 
3. Divorce <&=*240(1) 
Trial court, in setting alimony, must 
attempt to provide support for receiving 
spouse sufficient to maintain that spouse 
as nearly as possible at standard of living 
enjoyed during marriage; trial court must 
make sufficient findings to demonstrate 
that it considered financial condition and 
needs of party seeking alimony, that par-
ty's ability to produce sufficient income, 
and ability of other party to provide sup-
port. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5. 
4. Divorce <5=>240(2) 
Award of $750 per month in alimony 
was not abuse of discretion where there 
was evidence that husband's shooting of 
wife left her totally and permanently dis-
abled, with monthly expenses of $2,600, 
and evidence that husband's present in-
come was insufficient to provide for his 
needs and still meet wife's needs. 
5. Divorce «=»199 
Overarching aim of property division, 
and of decree to which it and alimony 
award are subsidiary parts, is to achieve 
fair, just, and equitable result between par-
ties. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5. 
6. Divorce «=>252.3(3) 
Property division awarding wife pqp-
tion of premarital assets of husband was 
not abuse-of discretion given wife's total 
disability due to husband's shooting of her, 
and husband's inability to provide suffi-
cient alimony to meet wife'? present and 
future needs. 
7. Damages «=>127 
To extent that divorce court took into 
account wife's disabilities resulting from 
her injuries by husband, by awarding her 
more alimony or property than she would 
have received but for the injuries, wife was 
not entitled to additional damages in pend-
ing personal injury action against husband. 
8. Divorce <*=>255 
Wife's tort claims against husband 
were not tried as such in divorce action, 
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and thus claim preclusion did not bar wife 
from proceeding on intentional tort claims 
and recovering damages. 
9. Judgment «»634 
Elements required if determination of 
issue in preceding case is to bind parties in 
later case are: issues must be identical, 
judgment must be final, party estopped 
must be party or in privity with party to 
preceding adjudication, and issue must 
have been competently, fully, and fairly 
litigated. 
10. Divorce e=>172 
Husband, as defendant in wife's per-
sonal injury action, was precluded from 
relitigating specific finding made in prior 
divorce action that he intentionally shot 
wife where issue of husband's liability for 
shooting was raised in divorce pleadings, 
was fully and fairly litigated, and was ex-
pressly made basis for granting wife's 
counterclaim for divorce. 
Jackson B. Howard, Provo, Raymond M. 
Berry, Kent M. Kasting, Salt Lake City, for 
V. Glen Noble. 
W. Eugene Hansen, Salt Lake City, for 
Elaine Hanson Noble. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
In this decision, we dispose of two con-
solidated appeals. The first arises from a 
divorce action between Elaine Noble and 
Glen Noble in which a divorce decree was 
granted to Elaine. Glen seeks to modify 
the alimony award and property division. 
We affirm the decree but remand for addi-
tional findings. The second appeal arises 
from the summary judgment dismissing 
Elaine's separately filed tort action against 
Glen based upon his having shot her. 
Elaine seeks a reversal of the order of 
dismissal. We reverse the summary judg-
ment and reinstate her intentional tort 
claims. 
1. Glen was tried and acquitted by a jury of 
attempted murder. Neither party argues that 
Elaine and Glen were married in July of 
1977, when Elaine was thirty-four years old 
and Glen was fifty-eight. This was the 
second marriage for each, and no children 
were born of the marriage. On August 18, 
1980, while Elaine was lying on their bed, 
Glen shot her in the head at close range 
with a .22 caliber rifle.1 He then attempt-
ed to commit suicide by shooting himself 
under the chin with the same rifle. Ap-
proximately seven months later, Glen initi-
ated a divorce action in the Fourth Judicial 
District. That case was assigned to Judge 
Tibbs, sitting by special appointment. 
Elaine counterclaimed for divorce on 
grounds that Glen had physically abused 
her, leaving her unable to work. Elaine 
later filed a personal injury action against 
Glen. That case was assigned to Judge 
Ballif in the Fourth Judicial District. 
Elaine asserted claims based on negligence, 
battery, and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. In April of 1983, Judge 
Ballif entered partial summary judgment 
for Glen, ruling that Elaine's negligence 
claim was barred by the doctrine of inter-
spousal immunity. Elaine filed a notice of 
intent to appeal the dismissal of her negli-
gence claim and continued to pursue the 
intentional tort claims. 
The divorce action was tried before 
Judge Tibbs on .December 22, 1983, and a 
divorce decree in Elaine's favor was en-
tered. In fixing the alimony and the prop-
erty division, Judge Tibbs expressly took 
into account Elaine's increased living ex-
penses and decreased earning ability result-
ing from the disabilities caused by the 
shooting. 
Glen then brought a motion for summary 
judgment in the tort action pending before 
Judge Ballif, arguing that Elaine's inten-
tional tort claims had, in effect, been decid-
ed in the divorce action because the alimo-
ny and property awards were to some ex-
tent intended to compensate for the shoot-
ing injuries. Judge Ballif agreed and, rely-
ing on the doctrine of res judicata, dis-
missed Elaine's tort action in its entirety. 
the outcome of that criminal action has any 
bearing on the divorce and tort claims. 
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Glen appeals from the divorce decree. 
Elaine appeals from the summary judg-
ment dismissing her tort claims. We will 
discuss the two appeals separately, consid-
ering first the challenge to the divorce de-
cree and then the attack on the dismissal of 
the tort action. At the outset, we empha-
size that the issues in these appeals proba-
bly would not have arisen and the resolu-
tion of both cases would have been greatly 
expedited had the tort case been tried be-
fore the divorce action. As a general rule, 
that is how such cases should be handled, 
and it is the course of action that should 
have been followed here.2 
I. The Divorce Action 
In the divorce decree, Judge Tibbs 
awarded Elaine alimony of $750 per month, 
the house she brought into the marriage, a 
$264,000 share of the approximately $800,-
000 in assets that Glen brought to the 
marriage, and $10,000 in attorney fees.3 
[1] Glen's first argument is that Judge 
Tibbs improperly considered Elaine's tort 
claims in the divorce action. We held in 
Walther v. Walther, 709 P.2d 387, 388 
(Utah 1985), that it is improper to try a tort 
claim, as such, within a divorce action. Ac-
cord Lord v. Shaw, 665 P.2d 1288, 1291 
(Utah 1983). Tort claims, which are legal 
in nature, should be kept separate from 
divorce actions, which are equitable in na-
ture. As a practical matter, if spouses 
have tort claims pending against each other 
which are likely to have a bearing on the 
outcome of the divorce action, those claims 
should be resolved prior to the divorce pro-
ceedings.4 
2. Although that course of action was con-
sidered, it was not followed for reasons that are 
not entirely clear. 
3. Glen now challenges the award of attorney 
fees. However, he raises this issue for the first 
time in his reply brief, contrary to rule 24(c), 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court (formerly 
entitled Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 
24(c)). And he provides no reasoning or au-
thority to support this claim of error. There-
fore, we deem any error to have been waived. 
See RomreU v. Zions First Natl Bank, 611 P.2d 
1 0 IOC rrit.K io«n\ 
[2] In this case, Glen contends that 
Judge Tibbs combined the two proceedings 
and used the property division and alimony 
award as a means of giving Elaine dam-
ages properly attributable to her tort 
claims. The record does not support this 
contention. Judge Tibbs was fully in-
formed that the tort claims were being 
tried in a separate action before Judge 
Ballif. For that reason, Judge Tibbs stated 
in his findings and conclusions that he had 
avoided consideration of the merits of the 
tort claims qua tort claims, and our review 
of the record provides us with no cause to 
dispute that assertion. It is true that some 
of the facts relevant to the tort claims were 
considered in the divorce proceeding, in-
cluding Elaine's medical and living ex-
penses incurred as a result of the shooting, 
as well as Glen's role in causing her inju-
ries. However, it was not improper to take 
those factors into account in the context of 
the divorce action. As we explained in 
Walther, 709 P.2d at 388 (citing Anderson 
v. Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 109, 138 P.2d 
252, 254 (1943)), "[Injuries and attendant 
medical expenses [caused by a spouse's 
tort] may be considered" in deciding the 
level of need of the other spouse in a 
divorce proceeding. And because Elaine's 
counterclaim for divorce was based on 
Glen's cruelty to her, it was proper for 
Judge Tibbs to consider the issue of Glen's 
fault in causing those injuries. Merely be-
cause Judge Tibbs considered facts; rele-
vant to the divorce action that were also 
relevant to the tort action does not mean 
that he impermissibly adjudicated the tort 
claims in the divorce action. 
4. To do otherwise may raise significant con-
cerns if a fact question with respect to which a 
party has requested a jury and is entitled to a 
jury verdict is first decided by a judge in an 
equitable proceeding. Cf. Beacon Theaters, Inc. 
v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500. 510-11. 79 S.Ct. 948. 
956-957, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959) (the federal con-
stitutional right to a jury trial of legal issues 
may be lost through prior judicial determina-
tion of equitable claims only in the most imper-
ative circumstances). However, those concerns 
have not been raised by the parties to this case. 
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Glen's second argument, which is some-
thing of a variation on the theme of the 
first, is that Judge Tibbs abused his discre-
tion in setting the amount of the alimony 
award and in dividing the property. He 
contends that the award and distribution 
were unjustifiably generous to Elaine, par-
ticularly in light of the short duration of 
the marriage, and that the only explanation 
for this generosity is an intent to punish 
Glen for the shooting and to compensate 
Elaine for her injuries. 
[3] We first address Glen's challenge to 
the $750-per-month alimony award. We 
accord trial courts broad discretion in 
awarding alimony so long as the trial court 
exercises its discretion "in accordance with 
the standards that have beer, set by this 
Court" Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 
1074 (Utah 1985). We require that a trial 
court, in setting alimony, attempt to pro-
vide support for the receiving spouse suffi-
cient to maintain that spouse as nearly as 
possible at the standard of living enjoyed 
during the marriage. In determining the 
amount of the award necessary to accom-
plish this aim, the trial court must make 
adequate findings and conclusions demon-
strating that it has considered three 
factors: (i) the financial condition and 
needs of the party seeking alimony, (ii) that 
party's ability to produce a sufficient in-
come, and (iii) the ability of the other party 
to provide support Davis v. Davis, 749 
P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1988); Jones v. Jones, 
700 P.2d at 1074-75; see Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-5 (1984 & Supp.1988). In weighing 
those three factors, it is entirely appropri-
ate for the trial court to take into account 
whether physical or mental disabilities aris-
ing during the marriage, regardless of 
their cause, have made the receiving par-
ty's needs greater or reduced that party's 
ability to produce an income. The fact that 
such disabilities may have resulted from 
the tortious acts of another, including the 
divorcing spouse, certainly does not pre-
clude the trial court from considering those 
disabilities. We said as much in Walther, 
709 P.2d at 388. 
[4] Applying those rules to this case, 
the disabilities Elaine suffered as a result 
of her injuries at Glen's hands were an 
important consideration in assessing the 
first two Jones factors—Elaine's financial 
condition and needs and her ability to pro-
duce an income. Judge Tibbs specifically 
found that Elaine had suffered permanent 
injuries which left her unemployable, un-
able to operate a motor vehicle, and "total-
ly and permanently disabled." Evidence 
was presented that as a result, Elaine need-
ed approximately $2,600 per month to meet 
her expenses. Glen has not challenged 
those findings of fact Applying the third 
Jones factor, Glen's ability to provide sup-
port, the court found that Glen's present 
income was insufficient to provide for his 
needs and still meet Elaine's needs. It set 
alimony at only $750 per month, but also 
considered its finding of Elaine's need for 
much higher alimony when it fixed the 
property division, as will be discussed be-
low. 
Judge Tibbs made the required findings 
and conclusions demonstrating his consid-
eration of the Jones factors. He quite 
properly took into account Elaine's needs 
and disabilities resulting from her injuries. 
By no stretch of the imagination could the 
$750-per-month award be deemed exces-
sive, and we reject Glen's challenge to the 
award as meritless. 
We next consider Glen's challenge to the 
property division. This is a variation on 
the argument advanced regarding the ali-
mony award. After finding that Elaine 
needed $2,600 per month for expenses and 
was unemployable and that Glen could af-
ford only $750 per month in alimony, the 
judge also found that because of the differ-
ence in the parties' ages, Elaine could be 
expected to outlive Glen by some twenty-
five years, years during which she would 
be without alimony and otherwise unable to 
earn an income. In light of these circum-
stances, the court made what it termed an 
"unusual order" awarding Elaine $264,000 
of Glen's assets as a means of supplement-
ing the clearly inadequate alimony award 
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and ensuring that Elaine would have a 
source of support in the future. Before 
this Court, Glen argues that in making this 
division Judge Tibbs improperly considered 
the needs that resulted from Elaine's inju-
ries. He contends that it was error to give 
her property she did not bring into the 
marriage and that she should have received 
only her house and personal effects. 
[5^]) We do not lightly disturb a trial 
courts division of property in a divorce 
decree and will uphold a division made in 
accordance with the standards we have set 
and in the exercise of the trial court's dis-
cretion "except where to do so would work 
a manifest injustice or inequity." Pusey v. 
Pusey, 728 P.2d 117,119 (Utah 1986); Sav-
age v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 
1983) (quoting Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 
6, 8 (Utah 1982)). The overarching aim of 
a property division, and of the decree of 
which it and the alimony award are subsidi-
ary parts, is to achieve a fair, just, and 
equitable result between the parties. See 
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222 
(Utah 1980); Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 
(1984 & Supp.1988). Stated more specifi-
cally, the purpose of property divisions is 
to allocate property in the manner which 
"best serves the needs of the parties and 
best permits them to pursue their separate 
lives." Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 
(Utah 1987); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d at 
1074-75. Given this purpose, it is entirely 
proper for a trial court making a property 
division to consider all the needs of each 
spouse, regardless of the cause of the disa-
bilities that give rise to those needs. And, 
contrary to Glen's contention, there is no 
per se ban on awarding one spouse a por-
tion of the premarital assets of another. 
In fact, our cases have consiistently___he]d 
that under appropriate circumstances, 
achieving a fair, just, and equitable result 
may require that the trial court exercise its 
discretion to award one spouse^ the premari-
tal property of the other. E.g., Burke, 733 
P.2d at 135 (citing Workman v. Workman, 
652 P.2d 931, 933 (Utah 1982)). 
The question then is whether Judge 
Tibbs abused his discretion in making the 
property division when he took account of 
Elaine's need for present and future sup-
port and Glen's inability to provide suffi-
cient alimony. We recently explained in 
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 
1279 n. 1 (Utah 1987), that the issues of 
alimony and property division are not en-
tirely separable. 
[N]either the trial court nor this Court 
considers the property division in a vac-
uum. The amount of alimony awarded 
and the relative earning capabilities of 
the parties are also relevant, because the 
relative abilities of the spouses to sup-
port themselves after the divorce are per-
tinent to an equitable determination of 
the division of the fixed assets of the 
marriage. 
Id.; see Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697, 
699-700 (Utah 1974). The gross inadequa-
cy of the alimony available to provide for 
Elaine's needs, the paucity of her separate 
premarital property, and Glen's relative 
wealth all warranted Judge Tibbs' award-
ing Elaine a substantial portion of Glen's 
premarital property. We cannot say that 
thejunount awarded was excessive under 
the circumstances. 
[7] Finally, Glen argues that if the di-
vorce decree is allowed to stand and Elaine 
is successful in her tort action, she might 
receive double compensation for her inju-
ries. We agree that to the extent that the 
divorce decree has taken account of disabil-
ities resulting from her injuries by award-
ing her more alimony or property than she 
would have received but for the injuries, 
she should not be compensated for those 
disabilities again through special damages 
in tort In its present form, the divorce 
decree does not specify to what precise 
extent the alimony and property awards 
are based on needs or disabilities arising 
from the shooting which could also be the 
basis for special damages in tort, such as 
lost earning ability and medical expenses. 
Therefore, we remand the divorce case to 
Judge Tibbs with instructions that he make 
findings of sufficient specificity to enable 
Judge Ballif to avoid duplicate compensa-
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tion in the tort action. The divorce decree 
is affirmed in all other respects. 
II. The Tort Actions 
Elaine appeals from Judge Ballif s deci-
sion dismissing her intentional tort claims 
on the basis of the claim preclusion branch 
of the doctrine of res judicata.5 And she 
argues that if she is allowed to proceed 
with that action, Glen should be bound 
under the issue preclusion branch of res 
judicata by the divorce court's specific find-
ing that he intentionally shot Elaine. 
[8] Neither of these arguments re-
quires extensive analysis. The rules of res 
judicata and the records in both of these 
cases fully support Elaine's position. 
Judge Ballif ruled that Elaine's intentional 
tort claims had been litigated and deter-
mined in the earlier divorce action and were 
therefore barred under the rules of claim 
preclusion. In Penrod v. Nu Creation 
Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983), 
we explained that claim preclusion applies 
only to claims that actually were or could 
and should have been litigated in the prior 
action. Tort claims qua tort claims should 
not be tried as part of a divorce action, 
Walther v. Walther, 709 P.2d at 388, and 
the record shows that Elaine's tort claims, 
as such, were not tried. Therefore, claim 
preclusion does not bar Elaine from pro-
ceeding on her intentional tort claims and 
5. The doctrine of res judicata has two branches, 
claim preclusion and issue preclusion. As the 
United Slates Supreme Court has noted, there 
has been a great deal of confusion with respect 
to the ^varying and, at tiroes, seemingly conflict-
ing terminology" used in discussing the doctrine 
and its two branches, hiigra v. Warren City 
School DisL Bd. of Educ., 465 VS. 75, 77 n. 1, 
104 S.CL 892. 894 n. 1, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984). 
Much confusion has resulted from the use of the 
term "res judicata'* to refer to either claim pre-
clusion alone or to the overall doctrine, incorpo-
rating both claim and issue preclusion. To 
avoid engendering further confusion, we will 
use "res judicata" to refer to the overall doctrine 
of the preclusive effects to be given prior judg-
ments. We will use the term "claim preclusion" 
to refer to the branch which has often been 
referred to as "res judicata" or "merger and 
bar." And we use the term "issue preclusion" to 
refer to the branch often termed "collateral es-
recovering damages. Once proper findings 
have been made by Judge Tibbs with re-
spect to the specific elements of loss or 
injury considered in making the alimony 
and property awards, it will be a simple 
matter for Judge Ballif to structure the 
tort case so as to avoid duplicate compensa-
tion. The claim preclusion ruling was er-
ror, and we reverse the grant of summary 
judgment and remand for further proceed-
ings on the claims of battery and intention-
al infliction of emotional distress. 
[9] Elaine argues that on remand of the 
tort case, Glen should be precluded from 
relitigating the specific finding made in the 
divorce action that he intentionally shot 
her.6 In Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588 P.2d 
689, 691 (Utah 1978), we reviewed the rules 
of issue preclusion and listed the elements 
generally accepted to be required if the 
determination of an issue in a preceding 
case is to bind the parties in a later case: (i) 
the issues must be identical, (ii) the judg-
ment must be final, (iii) the party estopped 
must be a party or in privity with a party 
to the preceding adjudication, and (iv) the 
issue must have been competently, fully, 
and fairly litigated. In this case, the par-
ties only dispute whether the second and 
fourth elements have been satisfied. 
There is no merit in Glen's lack-of-finali-
ty claim, at least at this point Although 
he appealed from the divorce decree, Glen 
did not challenge the specific finding of 
toppel." See the discussions in Penrod v. Nu 
Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 874-75 (Utah 
1983), Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista 
Ranch, Inc., 86 Utah Adv.Rep. 29, 30 (Utah App. 
1988). and Lane v. Honeywell Inc., 663 F.Supp. 
370, 371 n. 1, 372 & n. 2 (D.Utah 1987). See 
generally F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure 
§ 11.3 (3d ed. 1985); C. Wright, A. Miller & E. 
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Juris-
diction § 4402 (1981). 
6. Finding No. eight in the divorce proceeding 
reads: "On the late night of the 18th of August 
1980, plaintiff intentionally and willfully and 
without just cause, shot the defendant Elaine 
Hans[o]n Noble, in the head with a 22 caliber 
rifle, thereby causing severe bodily injury to the 
defendant" 
liability for the shooting. 
affirmance of the decree disposes of the 
finality issue. 
[10] Glen's second argument, that the 
issue was not fully and fairly litigated be-
cause it was not essential to the divorce 
decree, is entirely contrary to the record, 
and we reject it as meritless. Section 30-
3-l(3Xg) of the Code provides that cruel 
treatment causing bodily injury is grounds 
for divorce. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-l(3Xg) (Supp.1988) (formerly codi-
fied at Utah Code Ann. § 30-8-1(7) (1984)). 
Elaine's counterclaim for divorce was 
based on Glen's cruelty to her. The issue 
of liability for the shooting was raised in 
the pleadings, was fully and fairly litigat-
ed, and was expressly made the basis for 
granting Elaine's counterclaim for divorce. 
Throughout the divorce proceeding, Glen 
was repeatedly put on notice that issue 
preclusion would be asserted against him in 
the tort case. As Glen's own memorandum 
urging the trial court to dismiss on 
grounds of claim preclusion accurately ex-
plained, "The key issue to the present tort 
action—whether or not an intentional tort 
was committed [—] was in fact litigated in 
the divorce action It cannot be dis-
puted that a dominant issue in the divorce 
action between these parties was whether 
an intentional shooting took place." The 
policies behind the doctrine of res judicata 
would be ill-served by allowing Glen to 
force Elaine to retry this issue. 
We have considered the remaining argu-
ments and find them to be without merit 
The divorce decree is remanded for further 
findings but affirmed in all respects. The 
summary judgment dismissing Elaine's in-
tentional tort claims is reversed, and those 
claims are remanded for further proceed-
ings in which Glen will be bound by the 
7. P-l»in» has also appealed from Judge Ballifs 
ruling that her negligence claim was barred by 
the doctrine of interspousal immunity. She ar-
gues that the partial summary judgment was in 
error because the common law doctrine was 
held to have been abrogated as to negligence 
actions in Stoker v. Stoker, 616 ?2d 590 (Utah 
1980). In Stoker, this Court held that the doc-
CHRISTENSON v. JEWKES Utah 1375 
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At any rate, our previous finding of liability for intentional-
ly shooting Elaine.7 After general and spe-
cial damages have been set, the trial court 
is instructed to offset that portion of spe-
cial damages provided for in the divorce 
decree, as shown by the revised findings to 
be made by Judge Tibbs. Costs on both 
appeals are awarded to Elaine. 
HALL, CJ., HOWE, Associate CJ.; 
and STEWART and DURHAM, J J , 
concur. 
Richard A. CHRISTENSON, Trustee for 
Cape Trust, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
J. Paul JEWKES and Lorna Jewkes, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 19984. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 25, 1988. 
Creditor brought deficiency judgment 
action against debtors after nonjudicial 
trust deed sale of undeveloped real proper-
ty. The Fourth District Court, Utah Coun-
ty, J. Robert Bullock, J., by jury verdict, 
entered judgment in favor of debtors. 
trine had been abrogated with respect to inten-
tional torts. Id. at 590, 592. We have never had 
occasion to decide whether this abrogation ex-
tended to negligence claims, and we do not do 
so in this case. It is unnecessary for us to reach 
that question because our disposition of Elaine's 
intentional tort action makes it a certainty that 
she will have a remedy for her injuries. 
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not necessarily binding on the trial court in 
its distribution of marital property. Jack-
son, 617 P.2d at 340. 
[14,15] At the time of trial, plaintiff 
had already invested $30,000 of the award 
proceeds in the National Military Under-
writers stock. When plaintiff purchased 
the stock, it was valued at its purchase 
price, but its current value is unknown. 
An in-kind distribution of closely-held cor-
porate stock is appropriate where the evi-
dence fails to establish the stock's value. 
Savage, 658 P.2d at 1204-05. The trial 
court awarded plaintiff one-half of the 
stock and defendant the other half and all 
the remaining cash proceeds. It would be 
inappropriate, given the speculative nature 
of the investment and the fact that defend-
ant has already been awarded the major 
income-producing assets, for plaintiff to re-
ceive all of the stock and defendant to 
receive offsetting property. We further 
note that plaintiff was not given an equal 
share in the award proceeds from the out-
set, but only an equal share in the National 
Military Underwriters stock, so defendant's 
objection to an equal division of the award 
proceeds is not well taken. While we do 
not condone plaintiffs behavior in award-
ing herself a pre-trial "distribution" of joint 
assets, in view of the entire allocation of 
marital assets, we do not find that the trial 
court abused its discretion. See Boyle, 735 
P.2d at 670-71. 
ified when there has been a change in the 
circumstances or condition of a party since 
the entry of the original decree. Thomp-
son v. Thompson, 709 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 
1985); Chandler v. West, 610 P.2d 1299, 
1300 (Utah 1980). 
[16] However, defendant has neither al-
leged nor proven such changed circum-
stances, so the trial court did not err m 
refusing to modify the decree.2 
Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm 
the trial court's order and award costs to 
plaintiff. 
BENCH and GREENWOOD, JJ., 
concur. 
( O | UY NUMKR SYSTIM^ 
Charlotte B. SMITH, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v, 
Daniel Harold SMITH, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 860252-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 23, 1988. 
Future Effect of Decree With Respect 
to Defendant's Medical Needs 
Defendant argues that the trial court did 
not look ahead to his future medical needs 
in fashioning the decree. Immediately af-
ter the decree was entered, defendant filed 
a motion to modify, which the court denied. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1984) has been 
consistently interpreted to mean that the 
trial court has continuing jurisdiction over 
the divorce decree with respect to property 
distributions, and the decree may be mod-
s' Since the filing of this appeal, the trial court, 
under its continuing jurisdiction, entered a sup-
plemental recommendation and order reducing 
Parties1 marriage was dissolved by the 
Sixth District Court, Garfield County, Don 
V. Tibbs, J., and husband appealed from 
court's property distribution and alimony 
awards. The Court of Appeals, Billings, J., 
held that (1) divorce court order awarding 
wife the marital home and all furnishings 
and appliances therein and ordering hus-
band to repay mother's purchase-money, 
loan was not abuse of discretion, and (2) 
award of $425 per month in temporary 
alimony was not abuse of discretion. 
Affirmed. 
the alimony award to $350 per month due to a 
reduction in defendant's income. 
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1. Divorce «=>235, 252.1, 286(3, 5) 
Divorce court has considerable discre-
tion in adjusting financial and property in-
terests of parties, and Court of Appeals 
will not disturb court's decision unless it is 
clearly unjust or clear abuse of discretion. 
2. Divorce «=»240(2), 252.2 
Divorce court should distribute proper-
ty and income to allow parties to readjust 
their lives to new circumstances. 
3. Divorce *=»252.5(1, 3) 
Divorce court order awarding wife the 
marital home and all furnishings a ad appli-
ances therein and ordering husband to re-
i.pay mother's purchase-money loan was not 
"abuse of discretion, where wife was; only 14 
years old at time of marriage and did not 
have high school education, and husband 
anticipated earnings of at least $1,450 per 
month. 
4. Divorce *»211 
Divorce court order awarding 16-year-
old wife $425 per month in temporary ali-
mony, untfl loans on mobile home and car 
were satisfied, was not abuse of discretion, 
where wife had not completed high school 
and had no vocational or technical training, 
and husband anticipated earnings of at 
least $1,450 per month. 
Benjamin P. Knowlton (argued), Salt 
Lake City, for defendant and appellant 
Michael R. Labrum (argued), Labrum & 
Taylor, Richfield, for plaintiff and respon-
dent 
Before BILLINGS, DAVIDSON and 
GARFF, JJ. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Defendant husband appeals from the 
property distribution and alimony provi-
sions of the decree of divorce. Defendant 
contends the trial court abused its discre-
tion in awarding plaintiff wife properties 
partially paid for by his mother and in 
ordering him to pay the debts thereon, and 
in fixing alimony at $425.00 per month 
payable until the debt on a mobile home 
and a car were satisfied. He seeks a modi-
fication of the decree or, alternatively, to 
have the decree reversed and the case re-
manded. We affirm. 
FACTS 
The parties were married on July 27 
1984. At the time of the marriage, plain-
tiff was fourteen years of age and still 
enrolled in high school. Defendant was 
twenty-four years of age. The day follow-
ing the marriage plaintiff gave birth to the 
couple's only child. Plaintiff filed for di-
vorce on January 30, 1986. Defendant's 
mother filed a "Notice of Interest" in the 
action, claiming ownership or security in-
terests in some of the marital assets. 
At trial, plaintiff testified she was em-
ployed at a cafe for roughly eight months 
during 1985, after which time she was un-
employed. During these eight months, she 
earned $3,846.00. Plaintiffs only other 
employment during the marriage was tem-
porary seasonal work at Escalante Sawmill 
for one month prior to the divorce trial at a 
monthly salary of $714.00. At the time of 
trial, plaintiff had not completed high 
school and had no vocational or technical 
training. She estimated her minimum 
monthly expenses for herself and the child 
at $1,161.00, which included the monthly 
payments on the automobile and mobile 
home. 
Defendant worked for Escalante Sawmill 
as a "millwright" His 1985 W2 form re-
flected earnings of $20,302.80. At trial, 
defendant testified this amount was un-
usually high because of an abundance of 
overtime. He projected his future income 
to be $7.88 per hour, averaging 88 hours 
every two weeks, for a total prospective 
gross monthly income of approximately 
$1,450.00. He estimated his monthly ex-
penses to be between $513.00 and $563.00. 
The only evidence adduced at trial re-
garding the couple's marital assets was an 
exhibit, introduced by plaintiff, which listed 
the couple's property, the fair market val-
ues of each item, the amount of debt, if 
any, thereon, and the resulting net values. 
Both parties conceded that defendant's 
SMITH v. SMITH 
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mother purchased, either by lending the 
couple cash or purchasing the items herself 
on credit, the parties, mobile home, a wash-
er and the dryer, and a wood burning 
stove. Defendant's mother purchased 
these assets on the condition that she be 
repaid. 
The trial court awarded plaintiff custody 
of the couple's daughter plus child support 
in the amount of $170.00 per month. Nei-
ther of these determinations is contested. 
The court found that plaintiff had an earn-
ing capacity of $700.00 per month while 
defendant had an earning capacity of 
$1,500.00 per month. The court awarded 
plaintiff the mobile home; furnishings and 
appliances therein, including the washer, 
dryer, and wood-burning stove; and a car. 
The court ordered plaintiff to satisfy the 
liens owing on the mobile home and the 
car. Defendant was ordered to pay 
$425.00 per month in temporary alimony, 
composed of $275.00 per month attributa-
ble to the mobile home payment and 
$150.00 attributable to the car payment 
This $11,000.00 temporary alimony award 
is to terminate when these two debts are 
satisfied.
 v Moreover, the court ordered de-
fendant to pay all debts owing to his moth-
er. 
Two issues are presented on appeal. 
First, did the trial court abuse its discretion 
in distributing the marital assets? Second, 
did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
fixing alimony at $425.00, to be paid until 
the liens on the mobile home and a car are 
satisfied? 
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION 
[1,2] In divorce actions, the trial court 
has considerable discretion in adjusting the 
financial and property interests of the par-
ties, Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1878, 1380 (Utah 
CtApp.1987), and we will not disturb its 
decision unless it is clearly unjust or a clear 
abuse of discretion. Gardner v. Gardner, 
748 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988). The trial 
court should distribute property and in-
come to allow the parties to readjust their 
lives to their new circumstances. How-
l e r , the trial court must make findings on 
*11 material issues, and its failure to do so 
constitutes reversible error unless the facts 
in the record are "clear, uncontroverted, 
and capable of supporting only a finding in 
favor of the judgment" Id. at 1078 (quot-
ing Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 
(Utah 1987)); Lee, 744 P.2d at 1380. 
[3] As stated, the trial court awarded 
plaintiff the mobile home; the furnishings 
therein, including the washer and dryer, 
and wood-burning stove; and a car. De-
fendant was awarded a 1978 Ford flatbed, 
a 1972 Ford pickup, a 1979 Ford Bronco, a 
camptrailer, a trailer, a honda motorcycle, 
a camper shell, 12 acres of property in 
Arizona, guns, mechanic tools, a television, 
a stereo, and records. Although the trial 
court in its findings did not assign a value 
to any asset, according to the only evidence 
submitted at trial, plaintiffs apportioned 
share of property has a value of $3,500.00 
while defendant's has an estimated value 
of $15,500.00. Because defendant did not 
present any evidence on the value of the 
assets, we do not find the trial court's 
distribution clearly unjust or a clear abuse 
of discretion because the facts in the record 
are "clear, uncontroverted, and* capable of 
supporting only a finding in favor of the 
judgment" . Gardner,.748-P.2d-at 1078 
(quoting Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 
999 (Utah 1987)). 
Defendant's primary challenge, to the 
property distribution is that the trial court 
awarded plaintiff properties in which his 
mother had an ownership interest We dis-
agree with defendant's characterization. Ar 
review of the record clearly indicates that 
the parties conceded that defendants moth-
er either purchased the assets herself or 
lent the parties the money to purchase the 
assets on the condition that she be repaid, 
making the mother's interest that of a 
creditor rather than an owner. The court 
acknowledged the mother's interest and de-
termined the mother should be repaid. 
Consequently, the court ordered defendant 
to repay his mother. Given defendant's 
earning potential vis-a-vis plaintiffs, we do 
not find that the trial court's property allo-
cation constituted an abuse of discretion. 
ALIMONY 
[4] Defendant also claims the trial 
court's order to have him pay the $275.00 
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monthly mobDe home payment and the par-
tial $150.00 monthly car payment, as part 
of the alimony award, constitutes an abuse 
of discretion. We disagree. In the leading 
case of Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072,1075 
(Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court delin-
eated three factors that the trial court 
must consider in fixing alimony awards: (1) 
the financial conditions and needs of the 
spouse seeking alimony; (2) the ability of 
the spouse seeking alimony to produce suf-
ficient income; and (3) the ability of the 
paying spouse to provide support 
Plaintiff was 14 years of age when she 
and defendant were married. She now has 
custody of an infant daughter. She has 
i^not completed high school and has no voca-
tional or technical training. Though testi-
mony indicated plaintiff had worked at a 
cafe in Escalante and at seasonal employ-
ment at Escalante Sawmill, it will be diffi-
cult for her to gain employment with a 
salary commensurate with her estimated 
monthly expenses. By contrast, defendant 
is employed by Escalante Sawmill and had 
been for three and one-half years prior to 
the divorce proceedings. His 1985 earn-
ings were $1,691.83 a month. In the fu-
ture, he anticipates earning at least 
$1,450.00 a month. 
Plaintiff estimated her monthly expenses 
at $1,161.00 per month, which includes the 
monthly mobile home and car payments. 
Viewing her future earning potential and 
current monthly expenses against that of 
defendant convinces us that fixing the 
award at $425.00 per month until the loans 
on the mobfle home and car are satisfied is 
not an abuse of discretion.1 
Affirmed. Costs to Mrs. Smith. 
DAVIDSON and GARFF, JJ., concur. 
1. The Utah Supreme Court has Indicated that 
rircumstanccs similar to these may be diffident 
to support an award of permanent spousal sup-
port. Olson v. Olson, 704 ?2d 564, 567 (Utah 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Charles R. COX, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 870237-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 23, 1988. 
Defendant was convicted in the Circuit 
Court, Grand County, Bruce K. Halliday, 
J., of unlawful control of vehicle, and he 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings, 
J., held that defendant's subjective knowl-
edge that his taking of automobile was 
without owner's permission was not ele-
ment of joyriding. 
Affirmed. 
1. Automobiles «=>339 
Defendant's subjective knowledge that 
his taking of automobile was without own-
er's permission was not element of joyrid-
ing. U.C.A.1953, 41-1-109. 
2. Automobiles *=>355(10) 
Automobile owner's testimony that 
automobile was taken without his knowl-
edge or consent established that defendant 
intended to deprive owner of possession as 
element of joyriding, despite evidence that 
defendant was acquaintance of owner and 
had obtained owner's permission to use 
automobile on prior occasions. U.C.A.1953, 
41-1-109. 
3. Criminal Law *=»1038.4, 1173.2(3) 
Trial court's failure in joyriding prose-
cution to instruct jury that it was free to 
find automobile owner's implied consent 
for defendant to use automobile in light of 
1985); see Paffel v. Paffel 732 P.2d 96, 102 
(Utah 1986). However, since the wife did not 
raise the duration of the alimony award on 
appeal, we do not consider it 
WOODWARD v. WOODWARD Utah 431 
Cite i s , Utah, 656 P.2d 431 
/Whether right to benefit or asset has ac-
Marvin L. WOODWARD, Plaintiff, / crued in whole or in part during marriage 
Appellant and Cross-Respondent, / and, to extent that right has so accrued, i1 
v \ j s subject to equitable distribution 
Mildred L. WOODWARD, Defendant, 
Respondent and Cross-Appellant 
No. 18089. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 4, 1982. 
The First District Court^  Box Elder 
County, VeNoy ChristoffersenT"^ granted 
divorce witlTproperty""3ivision, and husband 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Durham, J., / 
held that: (1) trial court properly awarded! 
wife share in that portion of husband's! 
retirement benefits to which rights accrued) 
during marriage, notwithstanding that hus-1 
4. Divorce *=>2523(4) 
In divorce proceeding, trial court prop-
erly awarded wife one-half share in that 
portion of husband's government retire-
ment benefits to which rights accrued dur-
ing^ marriage, notwithstanding that hus-
band was not entitled to any such benefits 
until and unless he worked additional 15 
years at government job. 
5. Divorce <s=>252.3(4) 
"-~" Where husband's right to retirement 
_benefits was contingent upon his working 
an additional 15 years, tml_ court propeifly 
awarded wife share in such benefits in form 
oi deferred distribution based upon fixed 
band was not entitled to such benefits untif—-*^^n^a^e-
he worked additional 15 years, and (2) 
award of such benefits was properly made 
in form of deferred distribution based upon 
fixed percentage. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded. 
1. Divorce *=>252.3(4) 
Concept of "vesting" of retirement and 
pension rights is inappropriate basis for de-
termining what property should be subject 
, to equitable division in divorce proceeding. 
2. Divorce «=> 252.3(1, 4) 
- In fashioning equitable property divi-
sion in divorce proceeding, court may take 
linto consideration all pertinent circumstanc-
jes, encompassing all assets of every nature 
possessed by parties, whenever obtained 
and from whatever source deriyed,_and_ in-
cluding retirement and pension rights; 
overruling Bennett v. Bennett, 607 P.2d 
839. 
3. Divorce «=> 252.3(1) 
Whether resource is subject to distribu^ 
tion in divorce proceeding does not turn on 
whether spouse can presently use or control 
it, or on whether resource can be given 
present dollar value; essential criterion is 
Brian R. Florence, Ogden, for plaintiff, 
appellant and cross-respondent. 
Ben H. Hadfield, Brigham City, for de-
fendant, respondent and cross-appellant 
DURHAM, Justice: 
The plaintiff husband appeals from that 
portion of the trial court's decree of divorce 
which awarded to the defendant wife a 
portion of his retirement benefits. The 
husband argues that the court erred in con-
sidering, as a marital asset, that portion _of 
his pension which would be contributed by 
the government at some future date. 
The husband has worked as a civilian 
employee at Hill Air Force Base for fifteen 
years. Under his government pension plan, 
he has contributed $17,500 to the pension 
fund dunng that time. If he were to leave 
hisjob now, he woulcTreceive only the 
amount of his contr^^ior^s.~"rirorder' to 
receive "maximum benefits from_the plan, 
thejiusband woul^hjivejojmrticipate in it 
for a total of 30 yeajs^ At that time, the 
government would match the amount of his 
contributions and the husband could elect to 
receive the benefits as an annuity or as a 
lump sum. In its Findings of Fact, the trial 
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court stated that, because one-half of the 
30-year period occurred during the mar-
riage and because the wife is entitled to 
one-half of the amount accrued during that 
time, the wife was therefore "granted an 
equity interest of one-fourth of all proceeds 
which the [husband] receives on his retire-
merrt account, to be paid to Tthe wife] 
^ ffi% husband]^receives the proceeds " 
The ntisbaftdxofieeaes that the wife is enti-
tled to one-half of the sum he has contribut-
ed during the fifteen years of their mar-
riage. However, he^claims that she has no 
right or interest in the amount to be con-
tributed by the government at the time of 
Kis~retirement becauseJthat_amQunt is con-
tingent upon his continued government em-
ployfnent ~ ^ 
[1,2] The only authority cited by the 
husband for his position is Bennett v. Ben-
nett, Utah, 607 P.2d 839 (1980). In that 
case, this Court reversed a trial court's divi-
sion of the husband's retirement benefits 
because the government's future contribu.-
tion to the retirement fund was found to 
have "no present value." Id. at 840. How-
ever, in Dogu v. Dogu, Utah, 652 P.2d 1308 
(1982), we commented that "that holding 
reflected a failure of proof." Id. The wife 
urges the adoption of the position taken by 
the California Supreme Court in In re Mar-
riage of Brown, 15 Cal.3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 
126 Cal.Rptr. 633 (1976). fhere the court' 
held that "[p}ension rights, whether or not 
vested, represent a property interest; to 
the extent that such rights derive from' 
employment during coverture, they com-
prise a community asset subject to division 
in a dissolution proceeding." Id. at 562-63, 
126 Cal.Rptr. at 634-35. This case over-
ruled an earlier California case of long-
standing which had distinguished pension 
rights on the basis of whether the rights 
had vested. In the context of Utah law, we 
find it unnecessary to consider whether or 
1. In Stem v. Stern, 66 NJ. 340, 331 A.2d 257 
(1975), the court commented that "the concept 
of vesting should probably find no significant 
place in the developing law of equitable distri-
bution." /d at 348,331 A.2dat262. The court 
refers briefly to the origins of the vested inter-
est as it was associated with the concept of 
not the pension rights are "vested or non-
y^^arrEngtert v. Englert. UtahHs76 
i R2d 1274(1978), we emphasized the equita-
> ble nature of proceedings dealing with the 
\ family, pointing out that the court may 
take into consideration all of the pertinent 
circumstances These circumstances en-
compass "all of the assets of every nature 
' possessed by the parties, whenever obtained 
Ijnd^from" whatever source derivedLand 
' that this includes any such pension fund or 
1
 insurance/' Id at 1276. To the extent that 
Bennett v Bennett, supra, may limit the 
[ability of the court to consider all of the 
"parties' assets and circumstances, including 
retirement and pension rights, it is express-
ly overruled 
[3] In the instant case, the husband ar-
gues that because he cannot now benefit 
from the government's promised contribu-
tions to his pension at the time of retire-
ment, the wife should not receive any por-
tion of the benefits which are based on the 
government's participation. This argument 
faiis to recognize that pension or retirement 
benefits aj-e a form of deferred compensa-
tion by the employer.. If the rights to those 
benefits are acquired during the marriage, 
then the court must, at least consider those 
benefits in making an equitable distribution 
of the marital assets. "JThe rierht to re-
ceivemonies in the future is unquestionably 
^ an economic resource' subject to equita-
ble distribution based upon proner computa-
tion of its present dollar value." Kikkert v. 
Kikkert, 111 NJ.Super. 471, 475, 427 A.2d 
76, 78 (1981) (emphasis and omission in orig-
inal) (quoting Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N.J. 
464, 4G8, 375 A.2d 659, 662 (1977)), affd, 88 
NJ. 4, 438 A.2d 317 (1981). Whether that 
resource is suhiect to distribution doesjiot 
turn on whether_the_spoyse_can preienHy 
use or control ik.Qr_gn whether thj resource 
can be^giveji^4)res€nt_ dollar value. ~TKe 
Essential criterion is.whetheiCajnght^ tojhe 
seisin and also to its use in connection with 
"vested rights" in discussions of Constitutional 
guaranties. We agree that this concept of 
"vesting" is an inappropriate basis for deter-
mining what property should be subject to eq-
uitable division in a divorce proceeding. 
WOODWARD v, 
mefit or asset has accrued in whote or in 
trt during the marriage^ To the extent^ 
iat"lfee"right has so'accrued it is subject ta 
[uitable distribution. 
141 In the instant case, the "husband 
ust work for another fifteen years to 
lalify for the maximum benefits under 
le pension plan. He will not qualify in the 
yenty-ninth year or in the next to the last 
onth. Because he must work for a total 
' thirty years, his pension benefits, includ-
g any contribution by the government, 
•e as dependent on the first fifteen years 
; the last fifteen. Thus, the wife is enti-
sd to share in that portion of the benefits 
which the rights accrued during the mar-
age. We hold that the trial court did not 
r in making equitable distribution of the 
lsband's retirement benefits. 
[5] We also hold that the method used 
distribute the retirement benefits was a 
•oper exercise of the court's discretion. 
re agree with the discussion in Kikkert, 
ipra, where it was stated: 
Umfc-tetm axvd deferred *tarmg ol fvuMx-
cial interests are obviously too susceptible 
to continued strife and hostility, circum* 
stances which our courts traditionally 
strive to avoid to the greatest extent 
possible. This goal may be best accom-
plished, if a present value of the pension 
plan is ascertainable, by fixing the other 
spouse's share thereof, as adjusted for all 
appropriate considerations, including the 
length of time the pensioner must survive 
to enjoy its benefits, to be satisfied out of 
other assets leaving all pension benefits 
to the employee himself. 
On the other hand, where other assets. 
for equitable distribution are inadequate. 
or lacking altogether, or where ncL 
present value can be establish ftfld t^(L 
parties are unable to reach agreem^^t. 
resort must be had to a form of deferred. 
distribution based upon fixed percent* 
ages^ 
Id. at 478, 427 A.2d at 79-S0. The facts in 
the present case present just such a circum* 
stance: other assets available for equitable 
distribution are inadequate, and a present 
value of retirement benefits would be diffi-
. WOODWARD Utah 433 
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cult if not impossible to ascertain because 
^the value of the benefits is contingent on 
the husband's decision to remain working 
for the government In such a case, "the 
traA tty&yl tsft\d \*s& ^  Tpfc<iVrt>d ^ ridfcfy %YT>-
ployed in other states, whereby the trial 
court determines what percentage o f the 
niarital property each spouse is to receive, 
and then divides payments from the pension 
plan accordingly." Selchert v. Selchert, 90 
Wis^d 1, 10, 280 N.WJ2d 293, 298 (1979). 
The Wisconsin court continued: 
Under this approach it is unnecessary to 
make any determination as to the value 
of the pension fund... . When the bene-
ficiary spouse then opts to receive pay-
ments under the pension plan, the non-
covered spouse would be entitled to her 
established percentage of those pay-
ments Any risk associated with the 
fund . . . would be by this method appor-
tioned equally between the parties. This 
method may [sic] particularly appropriate 
where tfte "presenT^alue of a pension 
fund is very difficult or impossible to 
assess. 
Id at 10-12, 280 N.W.2d at 298 (footnotes 
omitted). 
The trial court awarded one-half of the 
marital property to each of the parties in 
the instant case. It is clear that the court 
intended the wife to receive one-half of the 
retirement benefits which had accrued dur-
ing the fifteen-year marriage. However, in 
its order, the court specified that the wife 
receive one-fourth of the proceeds of the 
retirement plan as they are received by the 
husband. This portion, one-fourth, awards 
to the wife one-half of the benefits accrued 
during the marriage only if the husband 
works for the full thirty years. The order 
should be modified to provide for the wife 
to receive one-half of the benefits accrued 
during the marriage, regardless of the' 
length of time the husband continues in the 
same employment 'Whenever the husband 
chooses to terminate his government em-
ployment, the marital property subject to 
distribution is a portion of the retirement 
benefits represented by the number of 
years of the marriage divided by the num-
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ber of years of the husband's employment 
The wife is entitled to one-half of that 
portion pursuant to the award of the trial 
judge in this case, which our modification is 
intended to sustain. 
We therefore affirm in part, reverse in 
part and remand to the trial court so that 
the order may be amended to conform with 
this opinion. No costs or fees are awarded. 
HALL, CJ., and STEWART, OAKS and 
HOWE, JJ., concur. 
Kristine H. BOWEN and Cynthia Bowen, 
an infant by Nathaniel Bowen, her 
guardian ad litem, Plaintiffs and Appel-
lants, 
v, 
RIVERTON CITY, a municipal corpora-
tion, Sterling R. Draper and Enoch 
Smith Sons Company, Defendants and 
Respondents. 
No. 17732. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 4, 1982. 
In a personal injury action, the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, James S. 
Sawaya, J., granted summary judgment for 
city and subsequently, pursuant to motions 
and stipulations in consolidated actions, dis-
missed all claims, counterclaims and cross 
claims with prejudice except for claim 
against city, and plaintiffs appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) 
appeal was timely filed, and (2) whether 
city fulfilled its duty to maintain city 
streets in safe condition was question of 
fact for jury, precluding summary judg-
ment 
Reversed and remanded for trial. 
1. Appeal and Error «=»430(1) 
Since failure to file timely notice of 
appeal is jurisdictional, Supreme Court 
lacks, jurisdiction to hear appeal if notice 
was not timely filed. Rules Civ.Proc., Rules 
42(a), 73(a). 
2. Appeal and Error <s=>344, 428(2) 
Trial court's April 13 order, entered 
pursuant to stipulation of counsel in both 
consolidated actions, was final judgment in 
each case for purpose of calculating timeli-
ness of appeal, and thus plaintiffs, who on 
May 12, 1981, filed notice of appeal, timely 
filed appeal from trial court's grant of sum-
mary judment on January 26 for city. 
3. Judgment $=181(2, 3) 
Summary judgment is proper only if 
pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admis-
sions show that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and that moving party is enti-
tled to judgment as matter of law. 
4. Judgment *=>185(2) 
If there is any doubt or uncertainty 
concerning questions of fact, doubt should 
be resolved in favor of opposing party on 
motion for summary judgment and thus 
court must evaluate all evidence and all 
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from ev-
idence in light most favorable to party op-
posing summary judgment. 
5. Judgment *=>180 
Summary judgment is appropriate only 
in the most clear-cut negligence cases. 
6. Municipal Corporations *=> 757(1) 
City has nondelegable duty to exercise 
due care in maintaining streets within its 
corporate boundaries in reasonably safe 
condition for travel and may be held liable 
for injuries proximately resulting from its 
failure to do so. 
7. Municipal Corporations *=»798 
In fulfilling its nondelegable duty to 
maintain streets^ it is necessary for cities to 
maintain traffic signals in reasonably safe, 
visible and working condition. 
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§ 1056. Form and payment of benefits 
(a) Commencement date for payment of benefits 
Each pension plan shall provide that unless the participant otherwise elects, thi 
payment of benefits under the plan to the participant shall begin not later than th< 
60th day after the latest of the close of the plan year in which— 
(1) occurs the date on which the participant attains the earlier of age 65 o 
the normal retirement age specified under the plan, 
(2) occurs the 10th anniversary of the year in which the participant com 
menced participation in the plan, or 
(3) the participant terminates his service with the employer. 
In the case of a plan which provides for the payment of an early retirement benefil 
such plan shall provide that a participant who satisfied the service requirements fo 
such early retirement benefit, but separated from the service (with any nonforfeil 
able right to an accrued benefit) before satisfying the age requirement for sue! 
early retirement benefit, is entitled upon satisfaction of such age requirement t 
receive a benefit not less than the benefit to which he would be entitled at th 
normal retirement age, actuarially reduced under regulations prescribed by th 
Secretary of the Treasury. 
(b) Decrease in plan benefits by reason of increases in T>enefit levels under Social Securit. 
Act or Railroad Retirement Act of 1937 
If— 
(1) a participant or beneficiary is receiving benefits under a pension plan, o 
(2) a participant is separated from the service and has nonforfeitable rights t 
benefits, 
a plan may not decrease benefits of such a participant by reason of any increase ii 
the benefit levels payable under title II of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 40 
et seq.] or the Ejailroad Retirement Act of 1937 [45 U.S.C.A. § 231 et seq.], oran; 
increase in the Wage base under such title II, if such increase takes'place, afte 
September 2, 1974, or (if later) the earlier of the date of first entitlement of sue! 
benefits or the date of such separation. 
(c) Forfeiture of accrued benefits derived from employer contributions ' 
No pension plan may provide that any part of & participant's, accrued benef 
derived from employer contributions (whether or not otherwise nonforfeitable) i 
forfeitable solely because of withdrawal by such participant of any amount attribute 
ble to the benefit derived from contributions made by such participant Th 
preceding sentence shall not apply (1) to the accrued benefit of any participan 
unless, at the time of such withdrawal, such participant has a nonforfeitable right t 
at least 50 percent of such accrued benefit, or (2) to the extent that an accrue 
benefit is permitted to be forfeited in accordance with section 1053(aX3XDXiii) of thi 
title. 
(d) Assignment or alienation of plan benefits 
(1) Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may nc 
be assigned or alienated. 
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection, there shall not be take 
into account any voluntary and revocable assignment of not to exceed 10 percent c 
any benefit payment, or of any irrevocable assignment or alienation of benefit 
executed before September 2, 1974. The preceding'sentence shall not apply to an 
assignment or alienation made for the purposes of defraying plan administratio 
costs. For purposes of this paragraph a loan made to a participant or beneficiar 
shall not be treated as an assignment or alienation if such loan is secured by th 
participant's accrued nonforfeitable benefit and is exempt from the tax imposed b 
section 4975 of Title 26 (relating to tax on prohibited transactions) by reason ( 
section 4975(dXl) of Title 26. 
OKA) Paragraph (1) shall apply to the creation, assignment, or "recognition ~bf 
right to any benefit payable with respect to a participant pursuant to. a domest 
relations order, except that paragraph (1) shall not apply if the^order is determine 
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to be a qualified domestic relations order. Each pension plan shall provide for the 
payment of benefits in accordance with the applicable requirements of any qualified 
domestic relations order. 
(B) For purposes of this paragraph— 
(i) the term "qualified domestic relations order" means a domestic relations 
order— 
(I) which creates or recognizes the existence of an alternate payee's right 
to, or assigns to an alternate payee the right to, receive all or a portion of 
the benefits payable with respect to a participant under a plan, and 
(II) with respect to which the requirements of subparagraphs (C) and (D) 
are met, and 
(ii) the term "domestic relations order" means any judgment, decree, or order 
(including approval of a property settlement agreement) which— 
(I) relates to the provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital 
property rights to a spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a 
participant, and 
(II) is made pursuant to a State domestic relations law (including a 
community property law). 
(C) A domestic relations order meets the requirements of this subparagraph only 
if such order clearly specifies— 
(i) the name and the last known mailing address (if any) of the participant 
and the name and mailing address of each alternate payee covered by the order, 
(ii) the amount or percentage of the participant's benefits to be paid by the 
plan to each such alternate payee, or the manner in which such amount or 
percentage is to be determined, 
(iii) the number of payments or period to which such order applies, and 
(Iv) each plan to which such order applies. 
(D) A domestic relations order meets the reauirements of (this subparagraph only 
if such order'— 
(i) does not require a plan to provide any tyDe or form of benefit or any 
option, not otherwise Provided under the Dlan. 
(ii), does not require the plan to provide increased benefits (determined on the 
basis of actuarial value), and 
(iii) does not require the payment of benefits to an alternate payee which are 
required to be paid to another alternate payee under another order previously 
determined to l>e a qualified domestic relations order. 
(E)(i) A domestic relations order shall not be treated Jas failing to meet the 
requirements of clause (i) of subparagraph (D) solely because such order requires 
that payment of benefits be made to an alternate payee— 
(I) in the case of any payment before a participant has separated from 
service, on or after the date on which the participant attains (or would have 
attained) the earliest retirement age, 
(II) as if the participant had retired on the date on which such payment is to 
begin under such order (but taking into account only the present value of 
benefits actually accrued and not taking into account the present value of any 
employer subsidy for early retirement), and 
(III) in any form in which such benefits may be paid under the plan to the 
participant (other than in the form of a joint and survivor annuity with respect 
to the alternate payee and his or her subsequent spouse). 
For purposes of subclause (II), the interest rate assumption used in determining the 
present value shall be the interest rate specified in the plan or, if no rate is specified, 
5 percent 
(ii) For purposes of this subparagraph, the term "earliest retirement age" means 
the earlier of— 
(I) the date on which the participant is entitled to a distribution under the 
plan, or 
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(II) the later of the date of the participant attains age 50 or the earliest date 
on which the participant could begin receiving benefits under the plan if the 
participant separated from service. 
(F) To the extent provided in any qualified domestic relations order— 
(i) the former spouse of a participant shall be treated as a surviving spouse of 
such participant for purposes of section 1055 (and any spouse of the participant 
shall not be treated as a spouse of the participant for such purposes) of this title, 
and 
(ii) if married for at least 1 year, the surviving former spouse shall be treated 
as meeting the requirements of section 1055(f) of this title. 
(G)(i) In the case of any domestic relations order received by a plan— 
(I) the plan administrator shall promptly notify the participant and each 
alternate pavee of the receipt of such order and the plan's procedures for 
determining the qualified status of domestic relations orders, and 
(II) within a reasonable period after receipt of such order, the plan adminis-
trator shall determine whether such order is a qualified domestic relations order 
and notify the participant and each alternate payee of such determination. 
(ii) Each plan shall establish reasonable procedures to determine the qualified 
status of domestic relations orders and to administer distributions under such 
qualified orders. Such procedures— 
(I) shall be in writing, 
(II) shall provide for the notification of each person specified in a domestic 
relations order as entitled to payment of benefits under the plan (at the address 
included in the domestic relations order) of such procedures promptly upon 
receipt by the plan of the domestic relations order, and 
(III) shall permit an alternate payee to designate a representative for receipt 
of copies of notices that are sent to the alternate payee with respect to a 
domestic relations order. 
(H)(i) During any period in which the issue of whether a domestic relations order 
is a qualified domestic relations order is being determined (by the plan administrator, 
by a court of competent jurisdiction, or otherwise), the plan administrator shall 
separately account for the amounts (hereinafter in this subparagraph referred to as 
the "segregated amounts") which would have been payable to the alternate payee 
during such period if the order had been determined to be a qualified domestic 
relations order. 
(ii) If within the 18-riionth period described in clause (v) the order (or modification 
thereof) is determined to be a qualified domestic relations order, the plan administra-
tor shall pay the segregated amounts (including any interest thereon) to the person 
or persons entitled thereto, 
(iii) If within 18-month period described in clause (v) 
(I) it is determined that the order is not a qualified domestic relations order, 
or 
(II) the Issue as to whether such order is a qualified domestic relations order 
is not resohed, 
then the plan ad Tin is tra tor shall pay the segregated amounts (including any interest 
thereon) to the person or persons who v,ould have been entitled to such amounts if 
there had been no.order. 
(iv) Any determination that an order is a qualified domestic relations order which 
is made after the close of the 18-month period described in clause (v) shall be applied 
prospectively only. 
(v) For purposes of this subparagraph, the 18-month period described in this 
clause is the 18-month period beginning with the date on which the first payment 
would be required to be made under the domestic relations order. 
(I) If a plan fiduciary acts in accordance with part 4 of this subtitle in— 
(i) treating a domestic relations order as being (or not being) a qualified 
domestic relations order, or 
(ii) taking action under subparagraph (H), 
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then the plan's obligation to the participant and each alternate payee shall be 
discharged lo the extent of any payment made pursuant to such Act 
(J) A person who is an alternate payee under a qualified domestic relations order 
shall be considered for purposes of any provision of this chapter a beneficiary under 
the plan. Nothing in the preceding sentence shall permit a requirement under 
section 1301 of this title of the payment of more than 1 premium with respect to a 
participant for any period. 
(K) The term "alternate payee" means any spouse, former spouse, child, or other 
dependent of a participant who is recognized by a domestic relations order as having 
a right to receive all, or a portion of, the benefits payable under a plan with respect 
to such participant 
(L) This paragraph shall not apply to any plan to which paragraph (1) does not 
apply. 
(M) Payment of benefits by a pension plan in accordance with the applicable 
requirements of a qualified domestic relations order shall not be treated as garnish-
ment for purposes of section 303(a) of the Consumer Credit Protection Act 
(N) In prescribing regulations under this paragraph, the Secretary shall consult 
w ith the Secretary of the Treasury. 
(Pub L 93-406, Title I, § 206, Sept 2, 1974, 88 Stat 864, Pub L 98-397, Title I, § 104(a), Aug 
23, 1984, 98 Stat 1433, Pub L 99-514, Title XVIII, § 1898(cX2KB), (4KB), (5), (6KB), (7KB), 100 
Stat 2952-2954, PubL. 101-239, Title VII, §§ 7891(a)(1), 7894(cK8), (9XA), Dec 19, 1989, 103 
Stat 2445, 2449.) 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
References in Text The words "this chapter", 
referred to in subsec (dX3)(I), w^re in the original 
"such Act", meaning Pub L 93-406, as amended, 
knov.n as the Employee Retirement Income Se-
cunt> Act of 1974. Titles I, III, and IV of such 
Act are classified principally to this chapter For 
complete classification of this Act to the Code, see 
Short Title note set out under section 1001 of this 
title and Tables volume. 
1989 Amendment Subsec (aXl) PubL 
101-239, § 7894{cX8), substituted "occurs the 
date" for "the date*!. 
Subsec (dX2). Pub.L 101-239. $ 7891(*X1), 
substituted "section 4975 of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986" for -section 4975 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 19$4**J which for purposes of 
codification was translated as "section 4975 of 
Title 26", thus requiring no change in text, and 
also for purposes of codification, "section 
4975(dXl) of such Code" was translated as "sec-
tion 4975(dXl) of Tide 26". 
Swbsec " (dX3XI> PubL. 101-239, 
§ "i94(cX9XA), substituted "such Act" for "such 
act codified as "this chapter" Sec References 
in Text note set out under this section 
Effective Date of 1989 Amendment Amend-
ment by section 7891 of Pub L 101-239 effective, 
except as otherwise provided, as if included in the 
prevision of Pub L 99-514 to which such amend-
ment relates, see section 7891(0 of PubL 
101-239, set out as a note under section 1002 of 
this title. 
Amendment by section 7894{cX8) of PubL 
101-239 effective as if originally included in the 
provision of Pub L 95-406 to which such amend-
ment relates, see section 7894<i) of PubL 
101-239, set out as a note under section 1002 of 
this title. 
Section 7894<cX9XB) of Pub L 101-239 provid-
ed that "The amendment made by subparagraph 
(A) [amending subsec (dX3XD of this section] 
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shall Lake effect as if included in section 104 of the 
Retirement Equity Act of 1984 [amending this 
section]" 
Effective Date of 1986 Amendment Amend-
ment by section 1898(cX2XB), (4XB), (5), (6XB). 
(7XB) of Pub L 99-514 to take effect as if includ-
ed in the provision of the Retirement Equity Act 
of 1984 to which such amendment relates, except 
as otherwise provided, see section 18980) of 
Pub L 99-514, set out as a note under section 401 
of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code. 
Legislative History. For legislative history and 
purpose of PubL 99-514, see 1986 U.S Code 
Cong and Adm. News, p. 4075. See, also, Pub L 
101-239 Wft9 tf-S.Ovfc Crmo ami A H m N m . n. 
1906. 
Law Review Commentaries 
Applying Louisiana's community property prin-
ciples to pensions. Dian Tooley Arruebarrena, 33 
Lovola (La.) LRev 241 (1987) 
ERISA-Exoeptions to the anti-alienation provi-
sion Strengthening ERISA's protection through 
a fraud amendment Comment 10 W.New Eng. 
LRev 317 (1988) 
ERISA retirement plans in individual bankrupt-
cy John Minton Newell, 19 U Mich J L Ref 183 
(1985) 
Exempting retirement benefits from bankruptcy 
in Colorado Chuck Schlosser, 18 Colo Law 17 
(1989) 
Kansas enacts new provisions for child support 
enforcement—mandatory *age withholding 25 
Washburn LJ 91 (1985) 
Multi-junsdictjonal analysis of plan exemptions. 
Andrew J. Klein, 42 J of Mo B 477 (1986) 
Qualified domestic relations orders' A statutory 
analysis. Howard A Massler, 19 Seton Hall 
LRev. 224 (1989) 
Qualified retirement plan benefits—Does 
ERISA's anti-alienation provision protect them 
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from bankruptcy court attachment? 62 U.Det.L. 
Rev. 109 (1984). 
The division oi pension benelits m divorce. 
Sheppard F. Micrs, Jr., Thomas J. St. Ville, and 
G. Samuel Schaunaman, II, 57 Okl.B.J. 2601 
(1986). 
Notes of Decisions 
Assignment or alienation of benefits 
Constructs e trust 21a 
Employee pension plans 20a 
Severance agreement for disability benefits 
24 
4. Prohibition on assignment or alienation 
of benefits 
Purpose of ERISA's proscription on alienation 
and assignment is to protect an employee from his 
own financial improvidence in dealing with third 
parties; provision is not intended to alter tradi-
tional support obligations, but rather to assure 
that the employee and his beneficiaries reap the 
ultimate benefits due upon retirement. Stinner v. 
Stinner, Pa 1989, 554 A.2d 45. 
6. Law governing 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
did not apply to a case in which the disputed sums 
were not benefits under the protection of an 
ERISA plan, benefits had been distributed in a 
lump sum and therefore recipient was no longer 
"entitled to a benefit" under ERISA. Clark v. 
Superior Court for Dist. of Columbia, C.A D C 
)990, 905 R2d 189. 
7. State regulation or control 
Missouri statute providing for bankruptcy ex-
emption of property exempt from attachment and 
execution under Missouri or federal law could not 
and did not create ERISA exemption on theory 
ERISA antialienation provisions constitute federal 
law exempting property from attachment and exe-
cution; ERISA preempts state law. In re Gaines, 
Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.l989,<106B.R. 1008. 
11. Commencement date of payment-^Generally 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act sec-
tion designed to protect participant's right to ben-
efits by establishing age 65 as latest possible trig-
ger date for payment of benefits, while leaving 
employer free to set earlier date under its plan, did 
not give agent as participant right to enforce 
payment of benefits under deferred compensation 
plan before reaching age 65. Wolcott v. Nation-
wide Mut. Ins. Co., S.D.Ohio 1987, 664 F.Supp. 
1533, affirmed in part, reversed in part on other 
grounds 884 F.2d 245. 
13. Lump-sum payment 
Where bank employee presented no evidence 
that he had made personal contributions to em-
ployee pension plan at time such contributions 
were allowed, provision of pension plan estab-
lished under Employee Retirement Income Securi-
ty Act which gave contributor participants rights 
to receive those employee contributions, plus in-
terest, in lump-sum at retirement did not support 
lump-sum payment to bank employee of all his 
pension benefits, 26 U.S.C.A. § 4U(cX2XQ; 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974. § 204(cX2XQ, as amended, 29 U.$.C.A. 
Denton v. First Nat. Bank of Waco, Texas. CA.5 
(Tex.) 1985, 765 F.2d 1295. 
14. Payment of early retirement benefit—Gener-
ally 
Early retirement provision in the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974 did not 
apply to ^M pension plan which provides benefits 
to employees, who have had their service to the 
company interrupted or are otherwise absent from 
work by reason of plant shutdown, lay-off, or 
disability; plan contains conditions other than age 
and service for benefit accrual. Roper v. Pullman 
Standard. C.A.I 1 (Ala.) 1988, 859 F.2d 1472. 
ERISA provision setting forth requirements 
that must be met should plan provide for early 
retirement benefits does not confer upon plan 
participants any substantive right to continued 
employment in order to qualify for earlier retire-
ment benefits. Phillips v. Amoco Oil Co., GA. 11 
(Ala.) 1986, 799 F.2d 1464, certiorari denied 107 
S.Ct. 1893, 481 U.S. 1016, 95 L.Ed.2d 500. 
Employee who was not yet 65 could not compel 
payment of pension benefits under ERISA-quali-
fied plan that did not provide for early retirement 
or for distribution of benefits at ealier date, not-
withstanding that benefits might already have 
vested. First Atlantic Leasing Corp. v. Tracey, 
D.N J. 1990, 738 F.Supp. 863. 
Employees' retirement applications were not of-
fers to retire subject to withdrawal by employees, 
rather retirement applications constituted employ* 
ees' decision to invoke rights earned in course of 
their years of employment, and thus date of retire-
ment was determined not by formal acceptance of 
application, but by date employees ceased working 
so that employees who retired prior to effective 
date of more lucrative special retirement plan 
were not eligible for participation in plan. Mus-
car v. ARCO Chemical Ca.-Dtv.- of Atlantic-
Richfield Co., W. D.Pa. 1986,; 651. ;F.Supp._ 864. 
Pension plan, -which offered fully vested termi* 
nated employees'with 20 or more years of service' * 
actuarially ^reduced normal' retiretnent benefits* j 
commencing at age 60/rcV>mpued with ERISA^ 
requirements. Moehle v.'NL" Industries, Inc., 
E.D.Mo.1986. 646 F.SUDD.769. affirmed 845 F.2d 
1027. 
No specific mode of pension rplan payment is 
required by Employee Retirement Income Securi-
ty Act; at most, ERISA provides that if an 
optional plan is ofTered, it be the actuarial equiva-
lent of what the participant would have received 
under the regular retirement age. Prusak v. Beth-
lehem 1980 Salaried Pension Plan, D.C.N.Y.1984, 
618 F.Supp. 530. 
15. Lump-sum payment 
Pension plan providing that pension committee 
"may" direct a lump-sum payment, if vested bene-
fit uas less than $1,750 or member agreed in 
vrriting, conferred no rights upon employees ter-
minated because of plant closing to receive lump-
sum payments rather than annuities. Wilson v. 
Mid-South Foundry, Inc. E.D.Ark.1987, 660 
F.Supp. 267. 
Oil company, by selling its liquid propane gas 
division, did not violate section of ERISA relating 
to early retirement benefits, [Employee Retire-
LABOR 
ment* Income Security Act of 1974, §$ 206, 
206(a), 29 U.S.GA1 §§ 1056, 1056(a)] where com. 
pany's retirement plan gave terminated employees 
option to receive actuarially reduced benefits im-
mediately upon their termination rather than re-
quiring that terminated employees attain early 
retirement age specified in the plan before receiv-
ing vested early retirement benefits, and division 
employees who were vested under the plan elected 
that option and received such payments. Phillips 
v. Amoco Oil Co., D.C.Ala. 1985, 614 F.Supp. 
694, affirmed 799 F.2d 1464, certiorari denied 107 
S.Ct. 1893. 481 U.S. 1016, 95 L.Ed.2d 500. 
17. Assignment or alienation of benefits—Gen-
erally 
California Franchise Tax Board's income tax 
levy procedure with respect to retirement trust 
was prohibited by ERISA's antialienation provi-
sion. Retirement Fund Trust of Plumbing v. 
Franchise Tax Bd., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1990, 909 F.2d 
1266. 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act pro-
vision prohibiting assignment of pension benefits 
did not apply to assignment of medical and dis-
ability benefits. Wisconsin Dcpt. of Health and 
Social Services v. Upholsterers Intern. Union 
Health and Welfare Fund, W.D.Wis. 1988, 686 
F.Supp. 708. 
Nonforfeiture and alienation provisions of Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act precluded 
employer from withholding employee's vested 
pension benefits due to employee's alleged miscon-
duct Crausman v. Curtis-Wnght Corp., D.N.J. 
1988, 676 F.Supp. 1302. 
ERISA's antialienation provision applies only to 
pension plans and does not cover welfare plans, 
including health and welfare trust fund and vaca-
tion and savings trust fund. Arizona Laborers, 
Teamsters, and Cement Masons, Local 395 Pen-
sion Trust Fund v. NeVarez. D.Ariz. 1987. 661 
F.SUD0. 365. 
18. *" Alimony and family support 
Because of different'circumstances in which 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order may prove 
necessary m'order for pension benefits to be as-
signed or alienated under the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act, it is not essential that 
such onJer be part of judgment in action; party 
otherwise entitled to QDRO may obtain one as 
aid to enforcing previously entered judgment. 
Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 'Md.1989, 566 A.2d 767. 
Order entered in enforcement of property settle-
ment agreement, which contained a provision for 
payment of alimony to wife until death or remar-
riage, was a "qualified domestic relations order** 
within meaning of exception to antialienation pro-
vision of the Employee Retirement Income Securi-
ty Act, and thus former wife could garnish former 
husband's pension to satisfy order, order was not 
based solely on contract but on the decisional 
domestic relations law of Pennsylvania. Sttnner 
v Stinner, Pa.1989, 554 A.2d 45. 
19. Attachment 
Funds held by custodian of Individual Retire-
ment Accounts, established by judgment debtor, 
were neither preempted nor exempted from at-
tachment by judgment creditor in view of the fact 
that IRA was not qualified pension plan or bene-
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fit. Long Island Jewish Hillside Medical'Center 
v. PrendergasV 1986, 509 N.Y.S.2d 697, 134 
Misc.2d93. ' '' ' ~ 
Ohio statute authorizing the withholding of any 
form of income for payment of alimony constitut-
ed **state domestic relations law," within meaning 
of federal statute requiring that any attachment of 
benefits payable under pension plan qualifying 
under Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
be made pursuant to "state domestic relations 
law." Taylor v. Taylor, Ohio 1989, 541 N.E2d 
55. 
ERISA does not prohibit assignment of health 
care benefits or limit the class of persons a partici-
pant is permitted to designate to receive benefits 
under health plan. Kennedy v. Deere & Co., 
1987, 514 N.E2d 171, 112 Ill.Dec. 705, 118 IU.2d 
69, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct 1024, 484 U.S. 
1064, 98 L.Ed.2d 989. 
Under federal law, individual retirement ac-
count is not exempt from levy or attachment by 
judgment creditor, Congress specifically excluded 
IRA's from antialienation protection of the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act Row-
land v. Strickland, App.1987, 362 S.E.2d 892, 294 
S.C 119. 
20. Bankruptcy 
In re McLean, 41 B.R. 893 [main volume] 
reversed 762 F.2d 1204. 
ERISA plans containing antialienation clauses 
are not excluded from bankruptcy estate, under 
statute making restriction on transfer of beneficial 
interest of debtor in trust that is enforceable under 
applicable nonbankruptcy law enforceable in 
bankruptcy case, by operation of ERISA itself, 
but ERISA plans may be excluded from bankrupt-
cy estate under that statute if they qualify as 
enforceable spendthrift trusts under applicable 
state law. • In re Boon, W.D.Mo.1989, 108 B.R. 
697/ 
. Where ERISA pension plan assets were includ-
ed in debtors* bankruptcy estates and were not 
exempt, trustees could administer assets for bene-
fit of creditors; antiasslgnment and antialienadoo 
requirements of ERISA andf Interna^ jRevenue 
Code did not create separate basis upon which 
pension plan funds were placed beyond reach of 
trustee, "In re Flindall. Bkrtcy.D.Ariz. 1989, 105 
B.R. 32." 
20a. Employee pension plans 
Antialienation provisions of Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA) precluded 
offset against participant's pension interest in plan 
covered by ERISA of judgment based on partici-
pant's breaches of duty as trustee to same plan. 
Herberger v. Shanbaum, CA.5 (Tex.) 1990, 897 
F.2d 801. 
Controversy between good-faith adverse claim-
ants as to pension benefits is subject to settlement 
like any other controversy and assignment made 
pursuant to bona fide settlement of such a contro-
versy is not invalidated by the antialienation pro-
visions of ERISA or of the Internal Revenue 
Code. Stobnicki v. Textron, Inc., CA.5 (Tex.) 
1989, 868 F.2d 1460. 
Pension plan covered under Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act could not set off vested 
benefits owed by nonfiduciary who was found to 
have participated in a breach of trust and jointly 
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liable for damages which the plan thereby in-
curred; vested benefits of plan could not be as-
signed or alienated, particularly in light of nonfi-
duciary's lack of criminal action or fraud during 
the breach, and the equities of the case. 
McLaughlin v. Lindcmann, CA.5 (Tex.) 1988, 
853 F.2d 1307. 
Notwithstanding antialicnation provisions of 
ERISA, court could offset participants' interests 
in plan covered by ERISA against judgment based 
on participants' breaches of duty in their capacity 
as trustees to same plan. Crawford v. La Bouch-
erie Bernard Ltd., 1987, 815 F.2d 117, 259 U.S. 
App.D.C. 279, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 328, 
735, 98 L Ed.2d 355, 683. 
Antialienation provision of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.A 
§ 1056(d), prohibited employer from reclaiming, 
through imposition of constructive trust under 
state common-law principles of equity, funds con-
tributed to employee's pension plans while em-
ployer was unaware that those funds represented 
monies derived from fraudulent practices for 
which employee was subsequently indicted and 
convicted and for which employer effectively be-
came liable to defrauded customers, Ellis Nat. 
Bank of Jacksonville v. Irving Trust Co., C.A.2 
(N.Y.) 1986, 786 F.2d 466. 
Where Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
obtained judgment against plan fiduciary for 
breaches of his fiduciary duties in connection with 
his alleged failure to forward employee and em-
ployer contributions to plan, fiduciary's claim to 
benefits could be set off against judgment; such 
setoff would not violate ERISA's antialienation 
provision. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Solm-
sen, E.D.N.Y.1990, 743 F.Supp. 125. 
Equitable offset remedy, by which pension plan 
beneficiary's liability to plan for losses suffered by 
plan as a result of beneficiary's misconduct with 
fiduciary is offset against his payments from plan, 
is available as against nonfiduciary who is directly 
and severally liable for knowing participation in 
fiduciary's breachl' Brock v. Lindemann, N.D. 
Tcxil987. 689 FSupp. 678. 
21a/ Constructive trust 
Remedial provision of Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act did not override-Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act's prohibi-
tion on alienation of pension benefits so as to 
allow court to place constructive trust in favor of 
union on former union official's pension benefits 
after official was convicted of embezzling funds 
from union. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat 
Pension Fund CrAn. loon n n S Ct MCI 107 
L.Ed.2d 781 
ERISA's antialienation provision did not pre-
vent imposition of constructive trust on pension 
benefits owing to union official who was found 
guilty of embezzlement from union. Guidry v. 
LABOfll 
National Sheet' Metal Workers* Nat Pensidtf 
Fund, D.Colo.1986, 641 RSupp. 360. affirm^ 
856 F.2d 1457. 
22. Garnishment 
Judgment creditor could not garnish or attach 
proceeds of ERISA-qualified pension plan, even 
though plan was terminating and judgment debt>4 
ors plan participants were scheduled to receive 
lump-sum payment prior to retirement. Travelers 
Ins. Companies v. Fountain City Federal Credit 
Union, C.A.I 1 (Ala.) 1989, 889 F.2d 264. 
23. Marital asset distribution 
State court divorce decree order pursuant to 
which one spouse waives any interest in other 
spouse's ERISA-qualified pension plan can affect 
payment of benefits under plan, even though em-
ployee-spouse does not change designation of ben-
eficiary prior to his or her death Fox Valley & 
Vicinity Const. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 
C.A.7 (111.) 1990, 897 F.2d 275. 
Under Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act, divorced wife, who was designated as lump-
sum death benefit beneficiary according to terms 
of former husband's pension before divorce, could 
not receive lump-sum death benefits, where di-
vorce settlement agreement contained mutual 
waiver of parties' rights to each other's pension 
benefits. Fox Valley and Vicinity Const Workers 
Pension Fund v. Brown, N.D.IH.19SS, 684 
F.Supp. 185. 
Because group life policy was part of an em-
ployee welfare plan and not a pension plan, di-
vorce decree provision that wife be retained as the 
beneficiary was not a qualified domestic relation 
order and the antialienation provision of ERISA 
did not apply. Carland v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 
Co, D.Kan.1989, 727 RSupp. 592. 
y 
A union retirement and benefits plan funded 
only by contributions from employees was a 
"trust" exempt from taxation and was not subject 
to domestic relations ^ order exception to ERISA 
antialienation. and^preemption provisions; thus, 
the fund was not required to comply" with state 
court orders directing it to pay ex-spouses a por-
tion of their former husband's retirement monies. 
Inter-Local Pension Fund of Graphic Communi-
cations Intern. Union v. Gill, ND.I1U989, 723 
RSupp. 1254. 
24. Severance agreement for disability 
benefits 
Antialienation provision in Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act did not preclude em-
ployee from entering into severance agreement 
which relinquished his rights to long-term disabili-
ty benefits under his employer's disability plans. 
Nichol v. Pullman Standard, Inc., C A 7 (UL) 
1989. 889 R2d 115. 
§ 1058. Mergers and consolidations of plans or transfers of plan assets 
Notes of Decisions 
Benefits included 
Transfers 3 
3. Transfers 
Spin-off of retirement plan from former employ-
er's plan to plant purchaser occurred when pur-
chaser's employees began accruing benefits under 
new plan, when one major calculation of transfer 
amount was made, and when interest accrued on 
84 
INCOME TAXES 26 § 414 
(i) such plan is a money purchase pension plan with a nonintegrated 
employer contribution rate for each participant of at least 10 percent of 
compensation, 
(ii) such plan provides for full and immediate vesting, and 
(iii) each employee of the leasing organization (other than employees 
who perform substantially all of their services for the leasing organiza-
tion) immediately participates in such plan. 
Clause (iii) shall not apply to any individual whose compensation from the 
leasing organization in each plan year during the 4-year period ending with 
the plan year is less than $1,000. 
(C) Definitions.—For purposes of this paragraph— 
(i) Highly compensated employee.—The term "highly compensated 
employee" has the meaning given such term by section 414(q). 
(ii) Nonhighly compensated work force.—The term "nonhighly 
compensated work force" means the aggregate number of individuals 
(other than highly compensated employees)— 
(I) who are employees of the recipient (without regard to this 
subsection) and have performed services for the recipient (or for 
the recipient and related persons) on a substantially full-time basis 
for a period of at least 1 year, or 
(II) who are leased employees with respect to the recipient 
(determined without regard to this paragraph). 
(iii) Compensation.—The term "compensation" has the same mean-
ing as when used in section 415; except that such term shall include— 
(I) any employer contribution under a qualified cash or deferred 
arrangement to the extent not included in gross income under 
section 402(a)(8) or 402(h)UXB), 
(II) any amount which the employee would have received in cash 
but for an election under a cafeteria plan (within the meaning of 
section 125), and 
(III) any amount contributed to an annuity contract described in 
section 403(b) pursuant to a salary reduction agreement (within the 
meaning of section 3121(aX5XD)). 
(6) Other rules.—For purposes of this subsection— 
(A) Related persons.—The term "related persons" has the same meaning 
as when used in section 144(aX3). 
(B) Employees of entities under common control.—The rules of subsec-
tions (b), (c), (m), and (o) shall apply. 
(o) Regulations.—The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations (which may 
provide rules in addition to the rules contained in subsections (m) and (n)) as may be 
necessary to prevent the avoidance of any employee benefit requirement listed in 
subsection (m)(4) or (n)(3) or any requirement under section 457 through the use of— 
(1) separate organizations, 
(2) employee leasing, or 
(3) other arrangements. 
The regulations prescribed under subsection (n) shall include provisions to minimize 
the recordkeeping requirements of subsection (n) in the case of an employer which 
has no top-heavy plans (within the meaning of section 416(g)) and which uses the 
services of persons (other than employees) for an insignificant percentage of the 
employer's total workload. 
(p) Qualified domestic relations order defined.—For purposes of this subsection 
and section 401(aX13>— 
(1) In general.— 
(A) Qualified domestic relations order.—The term "qualified domestic 
relations order" means a domestic relations order— 
(i) which creates or recognizes the existence of an alternate payee's 
right to, or assigns to an alternate payee the right to, receive all or a 
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portion of the benefits payable with respect to a participant undeiq 
plan, and 
(ii) with respect to which the requirements of paragraphs (2) and 
are met 
(B) Domestic relations order.—The term "domestic relations ordej 
means any judgment, decree, or order (including approval of a proper! 
settlement agreement) which— 
(i) relates to the provision of child support, alimony payments, 
marital property rights to a spouse, former spouse, child, or oth«» 
dependent of a participant, and 
(ii) is made pursuant to a State domestic relations law (including 
community property law). 
(2) Order must clearly specify certain facts.—A domestic relations order 
meets the requirements of this paragraph only if such order clearly specifies-jj 
(A) the name and the last known mailing address (if any) of the particfi 
pant and the name and mailing address of each alternate payee covered ^ 
the order, 
(B) the amount or percentage of the participant's benefits to be paid Dy. 
the plan to each such alternate payee, or the manner in which such amount 
or percentage is to be determined, 
(C) the number of payments or period to which such order applies, and 
(D) each plan to which such order applies. 
(3) Order may not alter amount, form, etc., of benefits.—A domestic rela? 
tions order meets the requirements of this paragraph only if such order-3 
(A) does not require a plan to provide any type or form of benefit, or any* 
option, not otherwise provided under the plan, 
(B) does not require the plan to provide increased benefits (determined on 
the basis of actuarial value), and 
(C) does not require the payment of benefits to an alternate payee which' 
are required to be paid to another alternate payee under another order 
previously determined to be a qualified domestic relations order. 
(4) Exception for certain payments made after earliest retirement age.— 
(A) In general.—A domestic relations order shall not be treated as failing 
to meet the requirements of subparagraph (A) of paragraph (3) solely 
because such order requires that payment of benefits be made to an 
alternate payee— 
(i) in the case of any payment before a participant has separated 
from service, on or after the date on which the participant attains (or 
would have attained) the earliest retirement age, 
(ii) as if the participant had retired on the date on which such 
payment is to begin under such order (but taking into account only the 
present value of the benefits actually accrued and not taking into 
account the present value of any employer subsidy for early retire-
ment), and 
(iii) in any form in which such benefits may be paid under the plan to 
the participant (other than in the form of a joint and survivor annuity 
with respect to the alternate payee and his or her subsequent spouse). 
For purposes of clause (ii), the interest rate assumption used in determining 
the present value shall be the interest rate specified in the plan or, if no rate 
is specified, 5 percent 
(B) Earliest retirement age.—For purposes of this paragraph, the term 
"earliest retirement age" means the earlier of— 
(i) the date on which the participant is entitled to a distribution under 
the plan, or 
(ii) the later of— 
(I) the date the participant attains age 50, or 
(II) the earliest date on which the participant could begin receiv-
ing benefits under the plan if the participant separated from 
service. 
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(5) Treatment of former spouse as surviving spouse for purposes of deter-
mining survivor benefits.—To the extent provided in any qualified domestic 
relations order— 
(A) the former spouse of a participant shall be treated as a surviving 
spouse of such participant for purposes of sections 401(aXH) and 417 (and 
any spouse of the participant shall not be treated as a spouse of the 
participant for such purposes), and 
(B) if married for at least 1 year, the surviving former spouse shall be 
treated as meeting the requirements of section 417(d). 
(6) Plan procedures with respect to orders.— 
(A) Notice and determination by administrator.—In the case of any 
domestic relations order received by a plan— 
(i) the plan administrator shall promptly notify the participant and 
each alternate payee of the receipt of such order and the plan's 
procedures for determining the qualified status of domestic relations 
orders, and 
(ii) within a reasonable period after receipt of such order, the plan 
administrator shall determine whether such order is a qualified domes-
tic relations order and notify the participant and each alternate payee of 
such determination. 
(B) Plan to establish reasonable procedures.—Each plan shall establish 
reasonable procedures to determine the qualified status of domestic rela-
tions orders and to administer distributions under such qualified orders. 
(7) Procedures for period during which determination is being made,— 
(A) In general.—During any period in which the issue of whether a 
domestic relations order is a qualified domestic relations order is being 
determined (by the plan administrator, by a court of competent jurisdiction, 
or otherwise), the plan administrator shall separately account for the 
amounts (hereinafter in this paragraph referred to as the "segregated 
amounts") which would have been payable to the alternate payee during 
such period if the order had been determined to be a qualified domestic 
relations order. 
(B) Payment to alternate payee if order determined to be qualified 
domestic relations order.—If within the 18-month period describe*! in 
subparagraph (E) the order (or modification thereof) is determined to 'be a 
qualified domestic relations order, the plan administrator shall pay the 
segregated amounts (including any interest thereon) to the person or 
persons entitled thereto. 
(C) Payment to plan participant in certain cases.—If within the 
18-month period described in subparagraph (E)— 
(i) it is determined that the order is not a qualified domestic relations 
order, or 
(ii) the issue as to whether such order is a qualified domestic 
relations order is not resolved, 
then the plan administrator shall pay the segregated amounts (including any 
interest thereon) to the person or persons who would have been entitled to 
such amounts if there had been no order. 
(D) Subsequent determination or order to be applied prospectively 
only.—Any determination that an order is a qualified domestic relations 
order which is made after the close of the 18-month period described in 
subparagraph (E) shall be applied prospectively only. 
(E) Determination of 18-month period.—For purposes of this para-
graph, the 18-month period described in this subparagraph is the 18-month 
period beginning with the date on which the first payment would be 
required to be made under the domestic relations order. 
IS) Alternate payee defined.—The term "alternate payee" means any spouse, 
former spouse, child or other dependent of a partidpant who is recognized by a 
domestic relations order as having a right to receive all, or a portion of, the 
benefits payable under a plan with respect to such participant 
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(9) Subsection not to apply to plans to which section 401(a)(13) does noj 
apply.—This subsection shall not apply to any plan to which section 401(aXlSJj 
does not apply. For purposes of this title, except as provided in regulations, anj 
distribution from an annuity contract under section 403(b) pursuant to a quali 
fied domestic relations order shall be treated in the same manner as a distribit 
tion from a plan to which section 401(a)(13) applies. 
(10) Waiver of certain distribution requirements.—With respect to the re-
quirements of subsections (a) and (k) of section 401, section 403(b), and section 
409(d), a plan shall not be treated as failing to meet such requirements solely by 
reason of payments to an alternative payee pursuant to a qualified domestic 
relations order. 
(11) Application of rules to governmental and church plans.—For purposes 
of this title, a distribution or payment from a governmental plan (as defined in 
subsection (d)) or a church plan (as described in subsection (e)) shall be treated 
as made pursuant to a qualified domestic relations order if it is made pursuant 
to a domestic relations order which meets the requirement of clause (i) of 
paragraph (1)(A). 
(12) Consultation with the Secretary.—In prescribing regulations under this 
subsection and section 401(a){13), the Secretary of Labor shall consult with the 
Secretary. 
(q) Highly compensated employee.— 
(1) In general.—The term "highly compensated employee" means any em-
ployee who, during the year or the preceding year— 
(A) was at any time a 5-percent owner, 
(B) received compensation from the employer in excess of $75,000, 
(C) received compensation from the employer in excess of $50,000 and 
was in the top-paid group of employees for such year, or 
(D) was at any time an officer and received compensation greater than 50 
percent of the amount in effect under section 415(bXl)(A) for such year. 
The Secretary shall adjust the $75,000 and $50,000 amounts under this para-
graph at the same time and in the same manner as under section 415(d). 
(2) Special rule for current year.—In the case of the year for which the 
relevant determination is being made, an employee not described in subpara-
graph (B), (C), or (D) of paragraph (1) for the preceding year (without regard to 
this paragraph) shall not be treated as described in subparagraph (B), (Q, or (D) 
of paragraph (1) unless such employee is a member of the group consisting of 
the 100 employees paid the greatest compensation during the year for which 
such determination is being made. 
(3) 5-percent owner.—An employee shall be treated as a 5-percent owner for 
any year if at any time during such year such employee was a 5-percent owner 
(as defined in section 416(iXl)) of the employer. 
(4) Top-paid group.—An employee is in the top-paid group of employees for 
any year if such employee is in the group consisting of the top 20 percent of the 
employees when ranked on the basis of compensation paid during such year. 
(5) Special rules for treatment of officers.— 
(A) Not more than 50 officers taken into account—For purposes of 
paragraph (1XD), no more than 50 employees (or, if lesser, the greater of 3 
employees or 10 percent of the employees) shall be treated as officers. 
(B) At least 1 officer taken into account—If for any year no officer of 
the employer is described in paragraph (1XD), the highest paid officer of the 
employer for such year shall be treated as described in such paragraph. 
(6) Treatment of certain family members.— 
(A) In general.—If any individual is a member of the family of a 
5-percent owner or of a highly compensated employee in the group consist-
ing of the 10 highly compensated employees paid the greatest compensation 
during the year, then— 
(i) such individual shall not be considered a separate employee, and 
(ii) any compensation paid to such individual (and any applicable 
contribution or benefit on behalf of such individual) shall be treated as 
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"(4) in the case of plans not subject to title I **(A) both such plans are jointly administered 
or IV of such Act and having only 1 partici- pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement 
pant, a resolution terminating the plan was between the employer maintaining such plans 
adopted by the employer before October 1, and one or more employee representatives, 
1*90" 4t(B) the welfare benefit plan provides retiree 
•r , , T- . r> ~ ..« . « health benefits, and 
Transfer of Excess Assets From Qualified Pen* ^ „ 
slon Plan to Welfare Benefit Plan ^° t h c <l"a»r'«1 P™*'0" P,an h a s « * » >n 
_ , .
 t_, - , - _ excess of liabilities (determined on a termi-
J f L c0 1"",9;J"l e V Jli lmW- Dee- " ' »«™ basis) and the welfare benefu plan has 
1989. 103 Stat. 2430. prov.ded that: ^ K w h j c h ,„ ] c s s ( h a n | h e p r e $ e n | , v l l u e rf 
**(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of the benefits to be provided under the plan 
law, in thc case of any qualified pension plan and (determined as of the time of termination of the 
welfare benefit plan described in paragraph (2), pension plan). 
the assets of such pension plan in excess of its „ ( 3 ) F o f o f | h e , n l c r n a l R c v c n u c 
liabilities may be transferred to such welfare bene-
 C o d c o f , 9 g 6 [thh j k ] c ] a n y t r a n s f e r o f M s e | s , 0 
fit plan upon the termination of such pension plan
 w h i c h p3 r a g r a p h ( I ) a p p l i e s s h a i l ^ t r c a t c d ^ a 
if such assets are to be used to provide retiree
 rcvcrs\0n 0 f such assets to thc employer maintain-
ncaltn benefits.
 j n g l h c p J a n w h i c h h includible in the gross 
**(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), a qualified income of such employer and subject to the tax 
pension plan and welfare benefit plan are de- imposed by section 4980 of such Code [this sec-
scribed in this paragraph if— tion). 
§ 4980A. Tax on excess distributions from qualified retirement plans 
L I B R A R Y R E F E R E N C E S Overview of recent tax law changes affecting 
Law Reviews estate planning administration. Robert H. 
Fitting qualified plans and IRAs into the estate H o l m c s» 4 2 Ark.L.Rev. 671 (1989). 
plan. Edward F. Martin, 36 U.BJ. 340 (1989). 
§ 4980B. Failure to satisfy continuation coverage requirements of group health 
plans 
(a) General rule.—There is hereby imposed a tax on the failure of a group health 
plan to meet the requirements of subsection (f) with respect to any qualified 
beneficiary. 
(b) Amount of tax.— 
(1) In generaL—The amount of the tax imposed by subsection (a) on any 
failure with respect to a qualified beneficiary shall be $100 for each day in the 
noncompliance period with respect to sjjich failure. . 
(2) Noncompliance period.—For purposes of this section, the term "noncom-
pliance period" means, with respect to any failure, the period— 
(A) beginning on the date such failure first occurs, and 
(B) ending on the earlier of— 
(i) the date such failure is corrected, or 
(ii) the date which is 6 months after tne last day in the period 
applicable to the qualified beneficiary under subsection (fX2XB) (deter-
mined without regard to clause (iii) thereof). 
If a person is liable for tax under subsection (eXIXB) by reason of subsec-
tion (e)(2XB) with respect to any failure, the noncompliance period for such 
person with respect to such failure shall not begin before the 45th day after 
the written request described in subsection (e)(2)(B) is provided to such 
person. 
(3) Minimum tax for noncompliance period where failure discovered after 
notice of examination.—Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection 
(c)-
(A) In general.—In the case of 1 or more failures with respect to a 
qualified beneficiary— 
(i) which are not corrected before the date a notice of examination of 
income tax liability is sent to the employer, and 
(ii) which occurred or continued during the period under examina-
tion, 
the amount of tax imposed by subsection (a) by reason of such failures with 
respect to such beneficiary shall not be less than the lesser of $2,500 or the 
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amount of tax which would be imposed by subsection (a) without regard to 
such paragraphs. 
(B) Higher minimum tax where violations are more than de minimis. 
—To the extent violations by the employer (or the plan in the case of a 
multiemployer plan) for any year are more than de minimis, subparagraph 
(A) shall be applied by substituting "$15,000" for "$2,500" with respect to 
the employer (or such plan). 
(c) Limitations on amount of tax.— 
(1) Tax not to apply where failure not discovered exercising reasonable 
diligence.—No tax shall be imposed by subsection (a) on any failure during any 
period for which it is established to the satisfaction of the Secretary that none of 
the persons referred to in subsection (e) knew, or exercising reasonable diligence 
would have known, that such failure existed. 
(2) Tax not to apply to failures corrected within 30 days.—No tax shall be 
imposed by subsection (a) on any failure if— 
(A) such failure was due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect, 
and 
(B) such failure is corrected during the 30-day period beginning on the 
1st date any of the persons referred to in subsection (e) knew, or exercising 
reasonable 'diligence would have known, that such failure existed.. 
(3) $100 limit on amount of tax for failures on any day with respect to a 
qualified beneficiary.— 
(A) In general.—Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the maximum 
amount of tax imposed by subsection (a) on failures on any day during the 
noncompliance period with respect to a qualified beneficiary shall be $100. 
(B) Special rule where more than 1 qualified beneficiary.—If there is 
more than 1 qualified beneficiary with respect to the same qualifying event, 
the maximum amount of tax imposed by subsection (a) on all failures on any 
day during the noncompliance period with respect to such qualified benefi-
ciaries shall be $200. 
(4) Overall limitation for unintentional failures.—In the case of failures 
which are due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect— 
(A) Single employer plans.— 
(i) In general.—In the case of failures with respect to plans other 
than multiemployer plans, the tax imposed by subsection (a) for failures 
during the taxable year of the employer shall not exceed the amount 
equal to the lesser of— 
(I) 10 percent of the aggregate amount paid or incurred by the 
employer (or predecessor employer) during the preceding taxable 
year for group health plans, or 
(II) $500,000. 
(ii) Taxable years in the case of certain controlled groups.—For 
purposes of this subparagraph, if not all persons who are treated as a 
single employer for purposes of this section have the sarr^ taxable 
year, the taxable years taken into account shall be detenr.ir-d .inder 
principles similar to the principles of section 1561. 
(B) Multiemployer plans.— 
(i) In general.—In the case of failures with respect to a ir.u.t.errplov-
er plan, the tax imposed by subsection (a) for failures during the 
taxable year of the trust forming part of such plan shall ro: exceed the 
amount equal to the lesser of— 
(I) 10 percent of the amount paid or incurred by s-:h trust 
during such taxable year to provide medical care <as Ccf.r.cd in 
section 213(d)) directly or through insurance, reimburserr.enl, or 
otherwise, or 
(II) $500,000. 
For purposes of the preceding sentence, all plans of which the same 
trust forms a part shall be treated as 1 plan. 
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(ii) Special rule for employers required to pay tax.—If an employer 
is assessed a tax imposed by subsection (a) by reason of a failure with 
respect to a multiemployer plan, the limit shall be determined under 
subparagraph (A) (and not under this subparagraph) and as if such plan 
were not a multiemployer plan. 
(C) Special rule for persons providing benefits.—In the case of a person 
described in subsection (eXl)(B) (and not subsection (eXl)(A)), the aggregate 
amount of tax imposed by subsection (a) for failures during a taxable year 
with respect to all plans shall not exceed $2,000,000. 
(5) Waiver by secretary.—In the case of a failure which is due to reasonable 
cause and not to willful neglect, the Secretary may waive part or all of the tax 
imposed by subsection (a) to the extent that the payment of such tax would be 
excessive relative to the failure involved. 
(d) Tax not to apply to certain plans.—This section shall not apply to— 
(1) any failure of a group health plan to meet the requirements of subsection 
(f) with respect to any qualified beneficiary if the qualifying event with respect 
to such beneficiary occurred during the calendar year immediately following a 
calendar year during which all employers maintaining such plan normally 
employed fewer than 20 employees on a typical business day. 
(2) any governmental plan (within the meaning of section 414(d)), or 
(3) any church plan (within the meaning of section 414(e)). 
(e) Liability for tax.— 
(1) In general.—Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the follow-
ing shall be liable for the tax imposed by subsection (a) on a failure: 
(A)(i) In the case of a plan other than a multiemployer plan, the employ-
er. 
(ii) In the case of a multiemployer plan, the plan. 
(B) Each person who is responsible (other than in a capacity as an 
employee) for administering or providing benefits under the plan and whose 
act or failure to act caused (in whole or in part) the failure. 
2) Special rules for persons described in paragraph (1)(B).— 
(A) No liability unless written agreement.—Except in tjie case of liabili-
ty resulting from the application of subparagraph (B) of this paragraph, a 
person described in subparagraph (B) (and not in subparagraph (A)) of 
paragraph (1) shall be liable for the ^ax imposed by subsection (a) on any 
failure only if such person assumed (under a legally enforceable written 
agreement) responsibility for the performance of the act to which the 
failure relates. 
(B) Failure to cover qualified beneficiaries where current employees 
are covered.—A person shall be treated as described in paragraph (1KB) 
with respect to a qualified beneficiary if— 
(i) such person provides coverage under a group health plan for an\ 
similarly situated beneficiary under the plan with respect to \*hom a 
qualifying event has not occurred, and 
(ii) the— 
(I) employer or plan administrator, or 
(II) in the case of a qualifying event described in subparagraph 
(C) or (E) of subsection (f)(3) where the person described in clause 
(i) is the plan administrator, the qualified beneficiary, 
submits to such person a written request that such person ira?e 
available to such qualified beneficiary the same coverage which such 
person provides to the beneficiary referred to in clause U< 
(f) Continuation coverage requirements of group health plans.— 
(1) In general.—A group health plan meets the requirements of this subsec-
tion only if each qualified beneficiary who would lose coverage under the plan as 
a result of a qualifying event is entitled to elect, within the election period, 
continuation coverage under the plan. 
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(2) Continuation coverage.—For purposes of paragraph (1), the term "contin-
uation coverage" means coverage under the plan which meets the following 
requirements: 
(A) Type of benefit coverage.—The coverage must consist of coverage 
which, as of the time the coverage is being provided, is identical to the 
coverage provided under the plan to similarly situated beneficiaries under 
the plan with respect to whom a qualifying event has not occurred. If 
coverage under the plan is modified for any group of similarly situated 
beneficiaries, the coverage shall also be modified in the same manner for all 
individuals who are qualified beneficiaries under the plan pursuant to this 
subsection in connection with such group. 
(B) Period of coverage.—The coverage must extend for at least the 
period beginning on the date of the qualifying event and ending not earlier 
than the earliest of the following: 
(i) Maximum required period.— 
(I) General rule for terminations and reduced hours.—In the 
case of a qualifying event described in paragraph (3KB), except as 
provided in subclause (II), the date which is 18 months after the 
date of the qualifying event 
(II) Special rule for multiple qualifying events.—If a qualify-
ing event (other than a qualifying event described in paragraph 
(3XF)) occurs during the 18 months after the date of a qualifying 
event described in paragraph (3)(B), the date which is 36 months 
after the date of the qualifying event described in paragraph (3)(B). 
(III) Special rule for certain bankruptcy proceedings.—In the 
case of a qualifying event described in paragraph (3)(F) (relating to 
bankruptcy proceedings), the date of the death of the covered 
employee or qualified beneficiary (described in subsection 
(g)(lXD)(iii)), or in the case of the surviving spouse or dependent 
children of the coveraged employee, 36 months after the date of the 
death of the covered employee. 
(IV) General rule for other qualifying events.—In the case of a 
qualifying event not described in paragraph (3)(B) or (3)(F), the date 
which is 36 months after the date of the qualifying event. In the 
case of a qualified beneficiary who is determined, under title II or 
XVI of the Social Security Act, to have been disabled at the time of 
a qualifying event described in paragraph (3XB), any reference in 
subclause (I) or (II) to 18 months with respect to such event is 
deemed a reference to 29 months, but only if the qualified benefi-
ciary has provided notice of such determination under paragraph 
(6XC) before the end of such 18 months. 
(V) Qualifying event involving medicare entitlement—In the 
case of an event described in paragraph (3)(D) (without regard to 
whether such event is a qualifying event), the period of coverage 
for qualified beneficiaries other than the covered employee for such 
event or any subsequent qualifying event shall not terminate 
before the close of the 36-month period beginning on the date the 
covered employee becomes entitled to benefits under title XVIII of 
the Social Security Act 
(ii) End of plan.—The date on which the employer ceases to provide 
any group health plan to any employee. 
(iii) Failure to pay premium.—The date on which coverage ceases 
under the plan by reason of a failure to make timely payment of any 
premium required under the plan writh respect to the qualified benefi-
ciary. The payment of any premium (other than any payment referred 
to in the last sentence of subparagraph (C)) shall be considered to be 
timely if made within 30 days after the date due or within such longer 
period as applies to or under the plan. 
(iv) Group health plan coverage or Medicare entitlement—The 
date on which the qualified beneficiary' first becomes, after the date of 
the election— 
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(I) covered under any other group health plan (as an employee 
or otherwise) which does not contain any exclusion or limitation 
•with respect to any preexisting condition of such beneficiary, or 
(II) in the case of a qualified beneficiary other than a qualified 
beneficiary described in subsection (gXIXD) entitled to benefits 
under title XVIII of the Social Security Act. 
(v) Termination of extended coverage for disability.—In the case of 
a qualified beneficiary who is disabled at the time of a qualifying event 
described in paragraph (3)(B), the month that begins more than 30 days 
after the date of the final determination under title II or XVI of the 
Social Security Act that the qualified beneficiary is no longer disabled. 
(C) Premium requirements.—The plan may require payment of a premi-
um for any period of continuation coverage, except that such premium— 
(i) shall not exceed 102 percent of the applicable premium for such 
period, and 
(ii) may, at the election of the payor, be made in monthly install-
ments. In no event may the plan require the payment of any premium 
before the day which is 45 days after the day on which the qualified 
beneficiary made the initial election for continuation coverage. In the 
case of an individual described in the last sentence of subparagraph 
(B)(i), any reference in clause (i) of this subparagraph to "102 percent" 
is deemed a reference to "150 percent" for any month after the 18th 
month of continuation coverage described in subclause (I) or (II) of 
subparagraph (B)(i). 
(D) No requirement of insurability.—The coverage may not be condi-
tioned upon, or discriminate on the basis of lack of, evidence of insurability. 
(E) Conversion option.—In the case of a qualified beneficiary whose 
period of continuation coverage expires under subparagraph (B)(i), the plan 
must, during the 180-day period ending on such expiration date, provide to 
the qualified beneficiary the option of enrollment under a conversion health 
plan otherwise generally available under the plan. 
(3) Qualifying event—For purposes of this subsection, the term "qualifying 
event" means, with respect to any covered employee, any of the following 
events which, but for the continuation coverage required under this subsection, 
would result in the loss of coverage of a qualified beneficiary— 
(A) The death of the covered employee. 
(B) The termination (other than by reason of such employee's gross 
misconduct), or reduction of hours, of the covered employee's employment 
(C) The divorce or legal separation of the covered employee from the 
employee's spouse. 
(D) The covered employee becoming entitled to benefits under title XVIII 
of the Social Security Act 
(E) A dependent child ceasing to be a dependent child under the generally 
applicable requirements of the plan. 
(F) A proceeding in a case under title 11, United States Gode, commenc-
ing on or after July 1, 1986, with respect to the employer frum whose 
- employment the covered employee retired at any time. 
In the case of an event described in subparagraph (F), a loss of coverage 
includes a substantial elimination of coverage with respect to a qualified 
beneficiary described in subsection (gXl)(D) within one year before or after the 
date of commencement of the proceeding. 
(4) Applicable premium.—For purposes of this subsection— 
(A) In general.—The term "applicable premium" means, with respect to 
any period of continuation coverage of qualified beneficiaries, the cost to 
the plan for such period of the coverage for similarly situated beneficiaries 
v, ith respect to whom a qualifying event has not occurred (without regard 
to whether such cost is paid by the employer or employee). 
(B) Special rule for self-insured plans.—To the extent that a plan is a 
self-insured plan— 
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(i) In general.—Except as provided in clause (ii), the applicable 
premium for any period of continuation coverage of qualified benefi-
ciaries shall be equal to a reasonable estimate of the cost of providing 
coverage for such period for similarly situated beneficiaries which— 
(I) is determined on an actuarial basis, and 
(II) takes into account such factors as the Secretary may pre-
scribe in regulations. 
(ii) Determination on basis of past cost—If a plan administrator 
elects to have this clause apply, the applicable premium for any period 
of continuation coverage of qualified beneficiaries shall be equal to— 
(I) the cost to the plan for similarly situated beneficiaries for the 
same period occurring during the preceding determination period 
under subparagraph (C), adjusted by 
(II) the percentage increase or decrease in the implicit price 
deflator of the gross national product (calculated by the Depart-
ment of Commerce and published in the Survey of Current Busi-
ness) for the 12-month period ending on the last day of the sixth 
month of such preceding determination period. 
(iii) Clause (ii) not to apply where significant change.—A plan 
administrator may not elect to have clause (ii) apply in any case in 
which there is any significant difference between the determination 
period and the preceding determination period, in coverage under, or in 
employees covered by, the plan. The determination under the preced-
ing sentence for any determination period shall be made at the same 
time as the determination under subparagraph (C). 
(C) Determination period.—The determination of any applicable premi-
um shall be made for a period of 12 months and shall be made before the 
beginning of such period. 
(5) Election.—For purposes of this subsection— 
(A) Election period.—The term "election period" means the period 
v. hich— 
(i) begins not later than the date on which coverage terminates 
under the plan by reason of a qualifying event, 
(ii) is of at least 60 days' duration, and 
(iii) ends not earlier than 60 days after the later of— 
(I) the date described in clause (i), or 
(II) in the case of any qualified beneficiary who receives notice 
under paragraph (6XD), the date of such notice. 
(B) Effect of election on other beneficiaries.—Except as otherwise 
specified in an election, any election of continuation coverage by a qualified 
beneficiary described in subparagraph (AXi) or (B) of subsection (gXl) shall 
be deemed to include an election of continuation coverage on behalf of any 
other qualified beneficiary who would lose coverage under the plan by 
reason of the qualifying event If there is a choice among types of 
co\erage under the plan, each qualified beneficiary is entitled to make a 
separate selection among such types of coverage. 
(6) Notice requirement—In accordance with regulations prescnbed by the 
Secretary— 
(A) The group health plan shall provide, at the time of commencement of 
coverage under the plan, written notice to each covered employee and 
spouse of the employee (if any) of the rights provided under this subsection. 
(B) The employer of an employee under a plan must notify the plan 
administrator of a qualifying event described in subparagraph (A), (B), (D), 
or (F) of paragraph (3) with respect to such employee within 30 days (or, in 
the case of a group health plan which is a multiemployer plan, such longer 
period of time as may be provided in the terms of the plan) of the date of 
the qualifying event 
(C) Each covered employee or qualified beneficiary is responsible for 
notifying the plan administrator of the occurrence of any qualifying event 
described in subparagraph (C) or (E) of paragraph (3) within 60 days after 
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the date of the qualifying event and each qualified beneficiary who is 
determined, under title II or XVI of the Social Security Act, to have been 
disabled at the time of a qualifying event described in paragraph (3KB) is 
responsible for notifying the plan administrator of such determination 
within 60 days after the date of the determination and for notifying the plan 
administrator within 30 days of the date of any final determination under 
such title or titles that the qualified beneficiary is no longer disabled. 
(D) The plan administrator shall notify— 
(i) in the case of a qualifying event described in subparagraph (A), 
(B), (D), or (F) of paragraph (3), any qualified beneficiary with respect 
to such event, and 
(ii) in the case of a qualifying event described in subparagraph (C) or 
(E) of paragraph (3) where the covered employee notifies the plan 
administrator under subparagraph (C), any qualified beneficiary with 
respect to such event, 
of such beneficiary's rights under this subsection. 
For purposes of subparagraph (D), any notification shall be made within 14 
days (or, in the case of a group health plan which is a multiemployer plan, 
such longer period of time as may be provided in the terms of the plan) of 
the date on which the plan administrator is notified under subparagraph (B) 
or (C), whichever is applicable, and any such notification to an individual 
who is a qualified beneficiary as the spouse of the covered employee shall 
be treated as notification to all other qualified beneficiaries residing with 
such spouse at the time such notification is made. For purposes of 
subparagraph (D), any notification shall be made within 14 days (or, in the 
case of a group health plan which is a multiemployer plan, such longer 
period of time as may be provided in the terms of the plan) of the date on 
which the plan administrator is notified under subparagraph (B) or (C), 
whichever is applicable, and any such notification to an individual who is a 
qualified beneficiary as the spouse of the covered employee shall be treated 
as notification to all other qualified beneficiaries residing with such spouse 
at the time such notification is made. 
The requirements of subparagraph (B) shall be'considered satisfied in the 
case of a multiemployer plan in connection with a qualifying event described 
in paragraph (3)(B) if the plan provides that the determination, of the 
occurrence of such qualifying event will be made by the plan administrator. 
(7) Covered employee.—For purposes of this subsection, the term "covered 
employee" means an individual who is (or was) provided coverage under a group 
health plan by virtue of the performance of services by the individual for 1 or 
more persons maintaining the plan (including as an employee defined in section 
401(c)(1)). 
(8) Optional extension of required periods.—A group health plan shall not 
be treated as failing to meet the requirements of this subsection solely because 
the plan provides both— 
(A) that the period of extended co\erage referred to m paragraph (2KB) 
commences with the date of the loss of coverage, and 
(B) that the applicable notice period provided under paragraph (6KB) 
commences with the date of the loss of coverage. 
(g) Definitions.—For purposes of this section— 
(1) Qualified beneficiary.— 
(A) In general.—The term "qualified beneficiary" means, v»ith respect to 
a covered employee under a group health plan, any other individual who, on 
the day before the qualifying event for that emplojee, is a beneficiary 
under the plan— 
(i) as the spouse of the covered employee, or 
(ii) as the dependent child of the employee 
(B) Special rule for terminations and reduced employment—In the 
case of a qualifying event described in subsection (fK3)(B), the term "quali-
fied beneficiary" includes the covered -employee. 
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(C) Exception for nonresident aliens.—Notwithstanding subparagraphs 
(A) and (B), the term "qualified beneficiary" does not include an individual 
whose status as a covered employee is attributable to a period in which such 
individual was a nonresident alien who received no earned income (within 
the meaning of section 911(dX2)) from the employer which constituted 
income from sources within the United States (within the meaning of section 
861(a)(3)). If an individual is not a qualified beneficiary pursuant to the 
previous sentence, a spouse or dependent child of such individual shall not 
be considered a qualified beneficiary by virtue of the relationship of the 
individual. 
(D) Special rule for retirees and widows.—In the case of a qualifying 
event described in subsection (f)(3)(F), the term "qualified beneficiary" 
includes a covered employee who had retired on or before the date of 
substantial elimination of coverage and any other individual who, on the day 
before such qualifying event, is a beneficiary under the plan— 
(i) as the spouse of the covered employee, 
(ii) as the dependent child of the covered employee, or 
(iii) as the surviving spouse of the covered employee. 
(2) Group health plan.—The term "group health plan" has the meaning 
given such term by section 5000(b)(1). 
(3) Plan administrator.—The term "plan administrator" has the meaning 
given the term "administrator" by section 3(16)(A) of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974. 
(4) Correction.—A failure of a group health plan to meet the requirements of 
subsection (f) with respect to any qualified beneficiary shall be treated as 
corrected if— 
(A) such failure is retroactively undone to the extent possible, and 
(B) the qualified beneficiary is placed in a financial position which is as 
good as such beneficiary would have been in had such failure not occurred. 
For purposes of applying subparagraph (B), the qualified beneficiary shall be 
treated as if he had elected the most favorable coverage in light of the expenses 
he incurred since the failure first occurred. 
(Pub.L. 100-647, Title III, § 3011(a), Nov. lo, 1988,102 S ta t 3616, amended Pub.L. 101-239, Title 
VI, §§ 6202(bX3XB), 6701(a), (b), (c), Tit lejvil §§ 7862(cX2XB), (3XQ, (4XB),(5XA), 7891(dXlXB), 
(2XA), Dec. 19, 1989, 103 S t a t 2233, 2234, 2295, 2432, 2433, 2446; Pub.L. 101-508, Title XI, 
§ 11702(f), Nov, 5, 1990, 104 S t a t 1388-515.) 
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defined in section 401(cX0) for the individual's 
employment or previous employment with an em 
ployer" 
Subsec (0(8) P u b L 101-239, 
§ 7891(dX2XA), added par (8) 
EffectiTe Dates 
1990 Act Amendment by section U702 c( 
Pub,U;JO 1-508 effective as tf included in the 
provision of the Technical and Miscellaneous Rev-
enue Act of 1988 [Pub L, 100-647] to which such 
amendment relates, sec section 11702(j) of P u b L 
101-508, set out as a note under section 59 of this 
title.' 
1989 Act Amendment to subsec (gX2) of this 
section by section 6202(bX3)(B) of P u b L 
101-239 to apply to items and services furnished 
after Dec 19, 1989, see section 6202(b)^5) of 
Pub L 101-239, set out as a note under section 
162 of this title. 
Section 6701(d) pf PubL 101-239 provided 
that *The amendments made by this section 
[amending subsec (0(2)(BXD. (v), and (6XQ of 
this section) shall apply to plan years beginning on 
or after the date of the enactment of this Act 
[Dec 19, 1989], regardless of whether the qualify-
mg event occurred before, on, or after such date.** 
Section 7862(cX2XQ of P u b L 101-239 pro-
vided that "The amendments made by this para-
graph [amending subsec (0(7) of this section and 
section 1167(2) of Title 29] shall apply to plan 
years beginning after December 31, 1989 " 
Amendment by section 7862(cX3XQ of Pub L 
101-239 amending subsec (0(4XBX'V) applicable 
to qualifying events occurring after Dec 31, 1989, 
and in the case of qualified beneficiaries, who 
elected continuation coverage after Dec 31, 1988, 
the period for which the required premium uas 
paid, or was attempted to be paid but was rejected 
as such, see section 7862(cX3XD) of P u b L 
101-239, set out as a note under section 162 of 
this title. 
Section 7862(cX4XQ of Pub L 100-239 pro-
vided that ' The amendments made by this para-
graph [amending subsec (0(2X0 of this section 
and section 1162 of Title 29] shall apply to plan 
years beginning after December 31, 1989" 
Section 7862(cX5XQ of Pub L 101-239 pro-
vided that ' The amendments made by this para-
graph [enacting subsec (0(2X8X1)00 of this sec-
tion and section U62(2XAXv) of Title 29, Ubor] 
shall apply to plan years beginning after Decem-
ber 31. 1989" 
Section 7891(dXlXQ of PubL 101-239 pro-
vided that "The amendments made b> this para 
graph [amending subsec (0(6) of this section] 
shall apply with respect to plan years beginning 
on or after January 1, 1990" 
Section 7891(dX2XQ of P u b L 101-239 pro-
vided that "The amendments made by this para-
graph [enacting subsec (0(8) of this section and 
amending section 1167 of Title 29] shall apply 
with respect to plan years beginning on or after 
January J, 1990," 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
American Digest System 
Excise taxes on acts or transactions in connec-
tion with pension of other employee benefit plans, 
see Internal Revenue <S=»4290 to 4298* 
Encyclopedias 
Excise taxes on acts or transactions in connec-
tion with pension or other employee benefit plans, 
see CJS. Internal Revenue §§ 143(1), 279, 280, 
285, 1021. 
WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH 
Internal revenue cases 220k[add key number] 
CHAPTER 44—QUALIFIED INVESTMENT ENTITIES 
§ 4704. Excise tax on undistributed income of regulated investment companies 
(a) Imposition of tax.—There is hereby imposed a tax on every regulated 
investment company for each calendar year equal to 4 percent of the excess (if any) 
of— 
(1) the required distribution for such calendar year, over 
(2) the distributed amount for such calendar year. 
141 
DIVORCE 30-3-5 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health 
care of parties and children — Court to have con-
tinuing jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — 
Termination of alimony — Nonmeritorious peti-
tion for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equita-
ble orders relating to the children, property, and parties. The court shall 
include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; and 
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the 
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental 
care insurance for the dependent children. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the non-custodial parent to provide 
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the 
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the dis-
tribution of the property as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
relatives, the court shall consider the welfare of the child. 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically termi-
nates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage 
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if 
the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his 
rights are determined. 
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further 
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or associa-
tion is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
(7) When a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions 
of a court order is made and denied, the court may order the petitioner to pay
 ( 
the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, 
if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted in 
good faith. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1212; L. added Subsection (2), designated two undesig-
1909, cbr-109r§ M CX. 1917, § 3000; R.S. nated paragraphs as Subsections (3) and (4); 
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3; inserted I n determining" and "the court" in 
1975, ch. 81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch. Subsection (4); redesignated former Subsec-
13, § 1; 1985, ch. 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, § 1. tions (2) and (3) as Subsections (5) and (6); di-
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend- vided Subsection (5) into two sentences, substi-
ment by Chapter 72 rewrote Subsection (1); tuting "However, if the remarriage" for "unless 
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